

**DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN
EMERGING VALUES:
THE RIGHT TO DECIDE**

COORDINATED BY GERARD BONA
LANGUAGE REVIEW BY EMYR GRUFFYDD

CENTRE MAURITS COPPIETERS
2015

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*This publication is financed with the support of the European Parliament (EP).
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*This project has been funded with support from the European Commission.
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FOREWORD

Roccu Garoby

President of EFAy

SELF-DETERMINATION, THE WAY FORWARD!

A universal right - that is what the self determination principle is. No more, no less! And just as with democracy, Human Rights, gender equality and sexual equality, there should be no limit to any universal right. Even if it were illegal, it would still remain a universal right.

Fortunately, for decades, self-determination has been recognised by the international community through the United Nations Charter which underlines the peoples' right to get self-determination. But while the principle of self-determination is a universal right, some people, states and powers, in a certain neo-imperialism, try to deny this fundamental and universal right. We must therefore proclaim that the principle of self-determination is indeed inalienable.

The European Free Alliance Youth (EFAy) is the only European youth political party which strives for the self determination principle because we believe that democracy, human rights and the 'right to decide' are the cornerstones of any developed and modern society. As a result, we have decided to publish this book to defend our rights, to express our views and to share our hopes and our dreams.

Be it independence, autonomy or minority rights, the principle of self-determination has different forms and different faces, but all of them originate from the concept of the right of all peoples to decide their collective future. Throughout this book, you will read articles from young citizens, young members of nationalist or regionalist parties, or from young people who have already some political responsibilities in their parties and/or territories. These articles, which have been written both in the authors' mother tongue and in English, are our contribution to a more diverse, multilingual, multicultural European Union and world.

I am convinced that the mutual recognition of our differences makes us work together easier; our differences are our greatest strength, and our diversity unites us. Self-determination is the way forward!

Finally, there is no future for any nation or society worldwide if the people, and especially young people, are not able to think about, debate and dream about their future. EFAy do think, debate and dream about it. So lets us share with you our dreams – a dream 'which shall never die'!



INTRODUCTION

Victor Gallou

Vice-President for Self-Determination of EFAy

Defining the concept of self-determination is not the easiest thing to do. The first article of the United Nations Charter which defines self-determination has been applied with to various extents in the recent history.

Originally intended to allow colonised nations to regain their independence, its use is now limited. It could therefore operate well during the process of decolonisation, but today in the XXIst century, it appears that we are facing an injustice: why are nations, particularly in Europe, not free to implement their own processes of self-determination?

The main rules of international public law have been enacted by the states, for the states. This restricts de facto opportunities to proclaim new states or more autonomous regions. Territories such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo have in the past proclaimed their independence. But due to a lack of recognition by other states, they have varying degrees of official existence on the international scene, more often than not, and in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, next to none. Obviously, for a country like the Spanish State, to recognise a new state would mean accepting that other nations within its own territory are legitimised in their desire for self-determination. Therefore, nothing moves forward.

INTRODUCTION

Victor Gallou

Vice-Président pour l'Autodétermination de l'ALE Jeunes

Définir le concept d'autodétermination n'est pas la chose la plus aisée, malgré ce qu'on pourrait penser en premier lieu. L'article 1 de la charte des Nations Unies proclamant le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes s'est appliqué à géométrie variable dans l'histoire récente.

Prévu initialement pour permettre aux nations colonisées de retrouver leur indépendance, son usage est désormais très restreint. Cela a pu ainsi fonctionner lors des processus de décolonisation, mais aujourd'hui au XXI^{eme} siècle, il apparaît que nous faisons désormais face à une injustice : pourquoi les nations, notamment en Europe, ne peuvent-elles librement mettre en œuvre leur processus d'autodétermination ?

Les principales règles de droit international ont été conçues par les Etats, pour les Etats. Cela restreint de facto les possibilités de proclamer de nouveaux Etats. Des territoires comme le Nagorno-Karabagh ou le Kosovo ont par le passé tout de même proclamé leur indépendance. Mais faute de reconnaissance par les autres Etats, cela ne se traduit par aucune existence officielle sur la scène internationale. Evidemment, pour un pays comme l'Espagne, reconnaître un nouvel Etat signifierait accepter que sur son territoire d'autres Nations soient légitimées dans leur désir d'indépendance. Dès lors, rien ne bouge.

This causes a serious democratic problem. The concept of self-determination is considered as a golden rule: it exists in order to consult the population on the way they want to live in the future. The use of the referendum is then the most legitimate and unquestionable way.

In 2014, we lived through two major events in Europe, with different consequences. In Scotland, David Cameron agreed to give the possibility to the Scottish people to decide on their own. This created a major precedent. After a very hostile campaign and an unnatural coalition, the "no" finally won. But we were able to realise that things have now changed, and not only in Scotland. We can consider that we will gradually become the self-determination generation!

At the same time, a similar referendum was held in Catalonia, but the Spanish authorities demonstrated serious hostility towards the process, just as it has every step of the way. This has demonstrated that there are now two camps within Catalan politics - the camp of democracy, and the camp of archaism.

Unionists tend to argue that self-determination is still perceived as an inward-looking attitude. This is the best way to reject the idea, without further debate, as if democracy were a fearful prospect. Even in the so called "country of Human Rights" the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls recently the National Assembly that "There is no Alsatian people", implying in France there is one and only French people. It is a way to deny the existence of a large part of the French population, which also includes Bretons, Basques, Catalans, Corsicans, and others.

The best way now to promote the idea of self-determination in the public debate is to act through organising our own referenda if it is not possible to get an official one. Such operations conducted in the Basque Country, Catalonia or in Brittany (on administrative reunification), raise awareness and bring the issue further into the public debate so that it becomes unavoidable. It is a long struggle for activists, but freedom is obviously very difficult to obtain.

In this book, viewpoints have been collected from all over Europe. Between seeking independence, fighting for more autonomy or seeking recognition of a cultural minority, the idea of self-determination can encompass various meanings.

Cela pose un grave problème démocratique. Le principe d'autodétermination est considéré comme une règle d'or : il s'agit purement et simplement de consulter la population afin qu'elle puisse s'exprimer sur la manière dont elle souhaite vivre dans le futur. La voie du référendum est alors celle qui paraît la plus légitime, et incontestable.

Nous avons vécu en l'année 2014 deux événements majeurs en Europe, aux conséquences différentes. En Ecosse, David Cameron a accepté de donner la parole au peuple écossais. Cela a tout de même permis de créer un précédent majeur. Même si, après une campagne très hostile et une coalition contre-nature, le « non » l'a finalement emporté, nous avons pu nous rendre compte que les choses ont désormais changé, et que nous allons peu à peu devenir la génération de l'autodétermination.

En même temps, un référendum similaire a été organisé en Catalogne, mais les autorités espagnoles ont fait preuve d'une grave hostilité. Cela a permis de démontrer qu'il existait désormais deux camps : celui de la démocratie et celui de l'archaïsme.

Aujourd'hui, l'argumentation des Unionistes est que l'autodétermination est encore perçue dans certains milieux comme un « repli sur soi ». C'est le meilleur argument afin de rejeter l'idée, sans autre forme de débat, comme si la démocratie faisait peur. C'est même dans le pays soi disant considérée comme « patrie des droits de l'homme » que le premier ministre Manuel Valls a récemment déclaré à l'Assemblée Nationale : « Il n'y a pas de peuple alsacien », sous-entendant qu'il n'y a en France qu'un seul et unique peuple français. C'est en cela un moyen de renier une grande partie de la population française, qui aspire également à se revendiquer breton, basque, occitan ou corse...

Le meilleur moyen désormais afin de faire peser l'idée d'autodétermination dans le débat public est d'agir à travers nos propres votations, s'il n'est pas possible d'obtenir des référendums officiels. De tels opérations, menées au Pays Basque, en Catalogne ou aujourd'hui en Bretagne pour la réunification permettent d'éveiller les consciences et de faire entrer encore plus ce thème dans le débat public, afin qu'il devienne incontournable. C'est une longue lutte pour les militants, mais la liberté est très difficile à obtenir.

Dans ce livre ont été recueillis des témoignages de toute l'Europe.

However, the concept in itself is the same for all people: it is simply to apply the idea of the first article of the Charter of the United Nations 1945 which consists of the right of peoples to determine their own future collectively.

Entre la recherche d'indépendance, le combat pour plus d'autonomie ou la quête de la reconnaissance d'une minorité culturelle, l'idée d'autodétermination peut englober différentes facettes. Mais au final, le concept est identique pour tous les peuples : il s'agit d'appliquer purement et simplement l'idée de l'article 1 de la charte des Nations Unies de 1945 qui consiste en le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes.



LAKE OR RIVER

Iria Epalza

Gazte Abertzaleak, The Basque Country

Citizens are ducks who are accustomed to swimming in a lake. The lake is somewhat closed, with a known depth, with a special but known flora and fauna, and with a constant temperature and transparency. And we live happily in this lake because we are the lords and masters of it.

Once in a while, a hunter comes along and takes one of ours. On another occasion, the rains or droughts force us to change our habits until we have to leave the lake, but with the intention of returning.

This lake is our political system. This system has some rules which are compulsory if you want to continue being part of it, unless you want to drown in its waters. Those rules were established many years ago, in a specific historical context, and were written by renowned ducks – our politicians. They say that those rules cannot be changed, and we have to live with them forever. This lake is an impervious place.

If democracy is perceived as something still, immobile, it is difficult to continue practising politics. When we take for granted that the country has been built, we forget that we possess a capacity to transform. Therefore, people and 'democracy' are condemned to live in a still lake.

LAKUA ALA ERREKA

Iria Epalza

Gazte Abertzaleak, Euskalherria

Laku batean igeri egiten ohiak gauden ahateak gara herritarrak. Lakua zerbait itxia da, ezagutzen dugun sakonera jakina duena, flora eta fauna berezi baina katalogatuarekin, ohiuk gauden temperaturarekin eta balekoa zaigun gardentasun batekin. Eta pozik bizi gara lakuan, geu garelako lakuko jaun eta jabe.

Noizean behin ehiztariren bat dator eta gutako bat eramatzen du. Beste batzuetan euriteek edo lehorretek gure ohiturak aldatzera behartzen gaituzte, lakutik aterazaratzen batzuetan, baina nolanahi ere bueltatzeko asmoarekin beti.

Laku hori gure sistema politikoa da. Baditu sistema horrek arau batzuk, betebeharrezkoak direnak sistemaren parte izaten jarraitu nahi baduzu; lakuaren ito egin nahi ez bazara. Arau horiek bere garaian jarriak izan ziren, egoera historiko jakin batean, eta pertsonaia politiko jakin batzuek idatzi zitzuten. Eta arau horiek moldaezinak direla esaten dute, dagoenarekin konformatu behar garela, eta laku bat zera dela; leku estankoa.

Demokrazia zerbait estankotzat, higiezintzat, hartzen dugunean zaila zaigu aurrera egitea politikan. Herria jada eraikitzen ematen dugunean, gure buruaren, gure eskuen ahalmen eraldatzailea ahanzen dugu. Eta

If we understand democracy as a dynamic process, something that has life and has to be nurtured and needs the support of citizens, then we have something to do. Because democracy is a process that is in our hands, as conscious citizens we strengthen our country and we will be able to define our own future. Thus, we will charter a road to a new country, which will be our own country.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

We already know that different realities and different political subjects understand the nature of self-determination in different ways. From our point of view, self-determination means the free decision and sovereignty of a country in internal and external political structures. Therefore, the right to self-determination deals with the ability, capacity and legitimacy of a country to take a decision.

When this power of decision is recognised to a nation, when upon all powers sovereignty prevails, when it can decide on its internal and external regulations without due interference, we can say that the nation is sovereign.

Having the right to self-determination means the freedom to decide on these issues:

- *Assertiveness*, or to be recognised as a nation.
- *Self-definition*, or to define the nationality. That is, who and under what conditions are the participants in that nation.
- *Restraint*, or the ability to limit its territory.
- *Internal Self-determination*, or to have the sovereignty to decide on the political system, economic and social development and other matters.
- *Exterior Self-determination*, or to be free to determine what type of relationship to sustain with other nations (joining, aggregation, federation, separation, secession, independence, etc.).

We have quite clearly established what the concept of self-determination means, but who is the actual owner of it, the people as a collective or individual citizens? This right is awarded to peoples in international law; that is, to the group of citizens who declare themselves to be a nation. However, this right must also be exercised individually. This is precisely the key concept of the argument: the nation-building process. Nations are

Herria eta Demokrazia, hau da gu garena eta garen hori adierazteko eta erabakitzeko modua aldaezinezkotzat jotzean, laku estankoan bizitzena kondenatuak izango gara.

Aldiz, demokrazia prozesu dinamiko bezala ulertzen baldin badugu, zerbaiz bizia bezala, elikatua izan behar duena eta horretarako herritarrak behar dituena, hor badugu zerbaiz egiteko. Gure esku dagoen prozesua delako demokrazia, herritar kontziente izanda, herria indartzen dugulako, zentzu ematen, herri gisa aitortzen zaizkigun eskubideak burutzeko gai izango gara, gure herria Herri izatera eramango duen ibilbideari ekinez.

AUTODETERMINAZIO ESKUBIDEAZ

Autodeterminazio eskubideaz ari garela, ondo legoke definizio bat ematea. Badakigu baina, errealtitate ezberdinak eta subjektu politiko ezberdinak era ezberdinetara ulertzen dutela eskubide honen natura. Guretzako autodeterminazioak zera esan nahi du: Herri baten barne eta kanpo egitura politikoaren erabaki libre eta subiranoa. Beraz, autodeterminazio eskubideak erabakiak hartzeko herri batek duen gaitasuna, ahalmena eta zilegitasunean datza.

Erabakitzeko botere hau herri bati aitortzen zaionean, hau da, botere guztien gainetik subirautasunarena gailentzen denean, herri batek bere barne eta kanpo arau zein legeak erabaki ditzakeanean injerentziarik gabe, herri hori subiranoa dela esan dezakegu. Edo beste modu batera esanda, subirautza nazionala baduela.

Autodeterminazio eskubidea izatea gai zehatz hauen inguruan erabakia hartzeko eskumena edukitza esan nahi du:

- *Autoafirmazioa* edo Herri gisa aitortua izatea.
- *Autodefinizoa* edo bere herritartasuna definitza. Hau da, nortzuk eta zein baldintzetan izango diren herri horretako partaideak.
- *Autolimitazioa* edo bere lurraldetasuna mugatzea.
- *Barne Autodeterminazioa* edo bere erregimen politikoa, garapen ekonomiko eta soziala eta abarren inguruan erabakiak hartzeko gaitasuna izatea.
- *Kanpo Autodeterminazioa* edo beste herri zein Estaturekin izan nahi duen harremanea libreki aukeratzea (Batasuna, agregazioa, federazioa, banaketa, sezesioa, independentzia, etab.)

made up by citizens' everyday work, even if we do not realise that fact. Furthermore, uniquely resting this process on the act of exercising suffrage every four years cannot be considered a truly nation-building process. Nation-building is something that all of us do, from dusk to dawn: how we interact with our neighbours; what type of food we choose to buy and from whom; whether we cycle, drive or use public transport to commute to work or school; whether we choose to recycle the waste we produce or to simply bin it and forget about it; whether we organise, attend or boycott meetings; in which language we choose to start a conversation with our local baker; whether we avoid paying taxes when we employ someone or we declare our activities to Inland Revenue and pay our share of tax...

Nation-building in 21st century Europe is not a mere set of policies against states, but rather a way to democratise them. The second half of this statement could be that there democracy cannot exist unless the demands of the people are met. The fulfilment of those claims is met through institutions, and among them, the state is the one with the most substantial political capabilities. Thus, everyday activism would be considered the nation-building process - democracy is the sum of people's demands - and institutions are the ones who need to fulfil those demands. If all this is made in a conscious manner, considering that the majority of the people's will backs it, and that the institutions (driving in the same direction the legislative and executive powers that those institutions have) will be reflecting the will of citizens and therefore of the people, we engage in a nation-building process. And once we understand peoples as 'states', once we see ourselves as the last link of the 'chain' that the state creates, once we turn the people into a State de facto, institutions will not be able to do anything else but to acknowledge the nation as a state de jure, providing them with the rights and powers that states can hold. It can happen; it has happened in the past, the law does not forbid it, the people want it and has proven it, and because that is the basis of democracy.

There is a common oddity among many nations and states: the lower democratic standards are, the higher the support for independence. Whenever standards of democracy are lowered, citizens tend to become activists; they become aware of their own individual and social rights, and fight for their legitimacy. And there is no more legitimate a fight than that, which will eventually become the great debate of this century. We saw the enactment of the first round of this debate in Scotland, and now the situation in Greece has shown us that the will of the people can seriously

Argi dugu zertain datzan autodeterminazioaren kontzeptua, baina nor da eskubide horren jabe, herria ala herritarra? Eskubide hau herriei onartzen zaie nazioarteko legedian, herri gisa aitortzen den herritar multzoari. Bainak eskubide hau herritar bakoitzak exekutatu behar du. Hemen dago gai honen giltza, hain zuzen ere; herrigintzan. Herria egunero eraikitzentzat dugu herritarrok, hortaz jabetzen ez bagara ere askotan. Herria egitea ez baita soilik 4 urtean behin eskola batera joan eta gure bozka sobretxoa batean sartzea. Herrigintza esnatzen garenetik lotara sartzen garen arte egiten dugun zerbaite da: Nolako harremanak ditugun bizilagunekin, zer nolako elikagaiak erosten ditugun, eta nori erosten dizkiogun, lanera ala ikastera bizikletaz joan, garraio publikoz ala auto pribatuan goazen, hondakinak bereizten ditugun ala zaborra gure etxe atarian utzi eta ahaztu egiten garen, hitzaldiak antolatzen ditugun, entzuten ditugun edo boikotatzan ditugun, zein hizkuntzatan egiten dugun lehen hitza ogia erosterakoan, kontraturrik gabeko lanak eta etxeak onartzen ditugun ala ogasunari dagokiguna ordaintzen diogun....

Herrigintza XXI. mendeko Europan ez da Estatuen kontrako praktika, Estatuak eurak demokratizatzeko praktika multzoa baizik. Ezin dela demokraziarik egon herriaren eskakizunak gauzatu gabe baieztapen honen bigarren zatia litzake. Gauzatze hori erakundeen bidez egiten da, eta ahalmen politiko handiena duen erakunde multzoa da Estatua. Beraz, herrigintza litzake eguneroko militantzia; demokrazia herritarren eskarien zerrenda; eta erakundeak, eskari horiek gauzatu behar dituztenak. Hori guztia era kontziente batean egiten baldin badugu, herritarren gehiengoaren iritzia bide beretik doala jakinez, erakundeak (eta erakunde horiek duten legegintza eta exekuzio botereak bide horretara zuzenduz) herritarren eta beraz herriaren nahiaren isla izanik, Estatua eraikitzentzat egongo gara. Eta behin estatu gisa ulertzen dugunean herria, behin estatuko katenbegi gisa ulertzen dugunean gure burua, behin Herria Estatu bilakatu dugunean de facto, erakundeek ezin izango dute besterik egin herria estatu gisa de iure aitortzea baino, dagozkion lege eta botereekin. Egin daitekeelako, egin izan delako, legeak onartzen digulako, herriak nahi duelako, horrela adierazten duelako, eta horretan datzalako demokraziak.

Munduko herri eta estatu askotan gauza xelebre bat gertatzen da: Zenbat eta demokrazia gutxiago izan, independentziaren aldarrikapen ozenagoak entzun ohi dira. Demokrazia maila jaisten denean, herritarrek militante bilakatzen dira, bere eskubide individual eta sozialen jabe

harm a non-democratic system. We have realised that when citizens begin to consider themselves part of the people, that lake that seemed rather still, can be re-thought, re-arranged, negotiated, discussed... that it can be re-built, creating new scenarios, in which the necessities and demands of the peoples to create a new entity.

This seems simple, but we know that moving from theory to practice, that it's not an easy move, mainly because there are many obstacles and barriers erected to block us. Among them, the ones that already are in the "club of sovereign states", because democratising and returning sovereignty to the people would result in the loss of their status quo. The fervent guardians of capitalism, or the many multinational companies, are against this too, as are the financial markets and the economic powers that nobody seems to have had ever known, but that we all suffer from. The Capital has always organised offensives against democracy; in fact, a strong democratic system always brings a weakening of the Capital. And of course, the heteropatriarchal system has a lot to say about this subject, as it is the most suitable system for the support of a community-based violence. The differences between men and women and gender stratification brings the growth of economic differences, always in favour of white, heterosexual, 40-55 years old males, with a well-paid job. When we talk about creating an identity of people, usually this example is taken as a paradigm, when it is merely a small part of our reality.

Up to now, societies have been created based on all of these models, thus the predominance of the model of the nation-state. We want to start a new process. A revolution to democratise our societies, and we have the right for self-determination as a weapon; to brandish our souls with an identity, to determine us as a collective, and to choose our future. To do so, we have to lose the fear of what other beings who live in the like will say: We've heard thousands of phrases like "Where will you live better than here?", "You will be out of all international organizations", "Your economy will fail" and similar phrases. But perhaps they are the ones who are actually afraid, when they see that we are able to transform the shape of the lake, when they realize that it's beneficial for all, when we begin to navigate down the river that will lead us to an open and infinite sea.

egiten dira, eta hauen zilegitasuna borrokatzentz dute. Hori baino borroka zailegizkoagorik ez dago, eta hau izango da, hain zuzen ere mende honetako borroka. Eskozian ikusi genuen borroka honen lehen asaltoa, Grezian ikusi berri dugu herritarren borondateak sistema ez demokratiko bateri egin diezaioken kaltea, eta ohartu gara herritarrek herri izatearen kontzentzia hartzen dutenean, higiezina zirudien ringa edo lakua berpentsatu, birmoldatu, egokitu, negoziatu, eztabaidatu... berreraiki daitekeela, eszenario berria eraikiz, herritarrek eskatzen duten eta behar duten espazio berria sortuz azken finean.

Erraza dirudi honek, baina badakigu teoriatik praktikara pasatzea luze eta zail izaten zaigula, traba egiten diguten eta oztopoak jartzen dizkigutenean arazo asko baitaude anartearen. Horien artean, jada "Estatu subiranoen klubean" dauden estatuak, herrien subirautzak beraien ongizatea eta status quoa eraldatzea ekarriko baitu herrien demokratizazioak. Aurka daude ere kapitalismoaren defendatzaile sutsuak diren enprese multinacionalak eta inork ezagutzen ez ditugun baina bere eragina sufritzen dugun merkatuak eta botere ekonomikoak. Kapitalak ofentsiba gogorra antolatu izan du beti demokraziaren aurka, izan ere sistema demokratiko sendo batek sistema kapitalista ahultzea dakar. Eta noski, sistema heteropatriarkalak ere badu zer esanik guzti honetan, izan ere biolentzian oinarritutako komunitatea sortzeko sistema aproposena baita. Gizon eta emakumeen arteko ezberdintasunak eta sexu bereizketan oinarritutako estratifikasiak differentzia ekonomikoa haztea dakar, beti gizon zuri, heterosexual, 40-55 urte arteko, lan eta soldadadunaren alde noski. Herri baten identitatea sortzeaz ari garenean, adibide hau hartu ohi izaten da paradigmatzat, errealtitatean gutxiengoaren gutxiengoa denean.

Modelo guzti hauen gainean eraiki dira orain arte gizarteak, eraiki dira estatu-nazioen figurak. Prozesu berri bati hasiera eman nahi diogu guk; demokratizazioaren iraultzari hain zuzen ere, eta armatzat dugu autodeterminazio eskubidea. Gure burua nortasunez janzteko, gure herria determinatzeko, eta gure geroa aukeratu ahal izateko. Horretarako, beldurra galdu behar diogu lakuaren dauden beste izakiek esaten dietenari: "Non biziko zarete hemen baino hobeto?", "Nazioarteko erakunde guztietatik kanpo geratuko zarete", "Ekonomikoki galduko zarete" eta horrelakoak hamaika esan dizkigute, baina akaso beldurtuta daudenak beraiek dira, lakuaren forma eraldatu dezakegula ikusten dutenean, guztiontzat onuragarriagoa dela jabetzen direnean, itsaso askera garamatzan errekan zehar nabigatzten hasten garenean.



THE POLITICAL CARTOONING OF CORNISH SELF- DETERMINATION

Dr John Tredinnick-Rowe, Prof Seema Khanwalkar
Mebyon Kernow, Cornwall

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the concept of Cornish self-determination through political cartooning. A selection of images from a range sources and dates has been chosen to reflect the variety of vested interests in the debate around self-determination in Cornwall. We have applied semiotic analysis to the visual and textual content of the cartoons, to explain the multimodal representation of self-determination in a Cornish context.

CORNWALL AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The politics of self-determination in Cornwall have been addressed primarily in the works of (Willett, 2013, Willett and Giovannini, 2014, Tregidga, 1999, Sandford, 2006). The works mainly contextualise the

KARTOUNWEYTH POLITEK A OMERVIRANS KERNEWEK

Dr John Tredinnick-Rowe, Prof Seema Khanwalkar
Mebyon Kernow, Kernow

KOMENDYANS

An chaptra ma a hwither an konsayt a omervirans kernewek dre gartounweyth politek. Dewis a imajys dhyworth pennfentynnyow ha dedhyasow a lies kinda re beu dewisys dhe dhastewynnya an eghennow a bernyow personel y'n dhadhel a-dro dhe omervirans yn Kernow. Ni re weytha dielvannans sinoniethek dhe dhalgh gwelesek ha testennek an kartounyow, rag styra an portrayans liesgisek a omervirans yn kettesten gernewek.

KERNOW HAG OMERVIRANS

An bolitegith a omervirans yn Kernow re beu dyghtys kyns oll y'n oberow a (Willett, 2013, Willett and Giovannini, 2014, Tregidga, 1999, Sandford,

place of Cornwall in regards to other nations and regions of the UK that have been successful and unsuccessful in achieving devolution of political power. Whilst the movement for self-determination in Cornwall can be traced back many centuries, this chapter will focus on the media from 1970 onwards. Presently, Cornwall is the only Celtic-nation in UK without political devolution.

POLITICAL CARTOONING

It has been suggested by Plumb (2004, p432) that political cartoons are “*one of the most powerful weapons in the journalistic armoury*” as it helps to expose a “*certain kind of truth*” (ibid). The political cartoonist’s work has often been said to act as a depictive rhetoric, when strategic pictures, verbal or non-verbal visualizations correspond with the memory of the audiences. Even though occupying relatively small space in publications, cartoons have a certain semiotic density, and in this chapter the compact visual and linguistic modalities of the images will be explored.

Political cartoons are composed of two elements: caricature, which parodies the individual and allusion, which creates the situation or context into which the individual is placed. Caricature is said to have originated around the Mediterranean, and cartoons of a more editorial nature developed in Germany, a chillier climate.

The rise of cartoons was linked to the visual propaganda by Martin Luther’s socio-religious reforms. The appeal of the cartoons to the emerging merchant class and their rise to leadership, and the largely illiterate public was due to the distribution of simple broadsheet posters or illustrated pamphlets through population centres. Cartooning uses a range of stylistic devices including distortion, cliché, exaggeration, simplification, caricature, double meaning, allusion and irony to highlight a political point or message (Seymour-Ure, 2001). What may seem surreal and small in size often hides a well-defined target. Cartoons share rhetorical devices with Poetry, and one of them is ‘dialogism’, literally ‘double-voicedness’ because the sole purpose of acartoonists is to persuade readers to think critically about current political situations in society.

2006). An oberow a gettesten dre vras an le a Gernow ow tochya gwlasow ha ranndiryow erel an RU re beu sewen ha heb sewena yn unn gowlwul digresennans a allos politek. Kynth yllir sewya a-dhelergh an omsav rag omervirans yn Kernow dres lies kansvledhen, an chaptra ma a wra fogella war an media dhyworth 1970 hag alena rag. Y’n jydh hedhyw, Kernow yw an unn wlas keltek y’n RU heb digresennans politek.

KARTOUNWEYTH POLITEK

Y feu profyes gans Plumb (2004, f.432) bos kartounyow politek “*onan a'n arvow an moyha gallosek y'n arvji jornalyasek*” awos ev dhe weres diskudha “*unn eghen a wiryonedh*” (ibid). Y leverys yn fenowgh y hwra ober an kartounydh politek servya avel retorek portrayus, pan omdhesethio lymnansow stratejek, dismyg yansow, kyn fons i war anow po heb geryow vyth, gans kov an woslowysi. Kyn hwrons i kevanedhi yn perthynek spys byghan yn dyllansow, kartounyow a's teves unn dosedh sinoniethek, hag y'n chaptra ma modholethow gwelesek ha yethoniethek kesstrothys an imajys a vydhw ithrys. Kartounyow politek yw komposys a dhiw elven: gesdresas, hag a barod an unigyn, ha kampol, hag a great an studh po kettesten, ynno mayth yw gorrys an unigyn. Y leverir y tallathas gesdresas a-dro dhe'n Kresvor, ha kartounyow a natur moy pennskrifek a veu displegys yn Almayn, hin yeynna. Y feu tevyans a gartounyow keskelmys dhe'n plontyans gwelesek gans amendyansow socyo-kryjyk Martin Luther. An tenvos a gartounyow dhe'n renkas marchont ow sordya ha'ga tevyans dhe'n soodh a ledyoreth, ha'n poblans dre vras anlettrys, o awos bos an lesrannans a skrisellow sempel po folenigow lymnys dre gresennow an poblans. Kartounweytha dhevnydh kadon a dhevisyow gisek y'ga mysk omgammans, krindith, gorliwans, sempelheans, gesdresas, styr dewblek, kampollans ha gesedh dhe wolowboynya mater po messach politek (Seymour-Ure, 2001). An pyth a hevel bos gorwir ha byghan yn myns yn fenowgh a gudh kosten kler hy styr. Kartounyow a gevren devisyow retoregel gans Bardhonieth, hag onan anedha yw ‘omgowsieth’, mayth yw styr y bennfenten ‘dewblek-levegneth’ drefen bos a unn acheson a gartounydh dhe berswadya redyoryon dhe brederi yn freusel a-dro dhe studhow politek a-lemmyn y'n bys ledanna.

ANALYSIS METHOD

This chapter will apply the approach of Moeran (2005) and his use of *frames* to highlight the perspective of those *inside* and those *outside* a community. The concept itself can be traced back to Bateson (1972) and more directly to the pioneering work of Goffman and Bennett (1986) in Framework Analysis. The community in this case being those who are pushing for Cornish self-determination. This community has over the years come to encompasses a wide variety of groups. The cartoons used in this short text, have been sourced from political parties such as Mebyon Kernow, housing campaign groups such as Cornwall Concern Group, independent research organisations such as Cornish Social and Economic Research Group (CoSERG), pamphleteers like Nowodhow an Mytyn (Morning News), and social media based satire groups such as Bulloverman's Tomb of the Bizzare. The list of other potential sources of data could go on, but due to space restriction in this text, these will be the primary items upon which we will draw. The reason frames are so useful as a theoretical devices is encapsulated by Van Leeuwen (2004) in his descriptions of the role of metaphor:

"The essence of metaphor is the idea of 'transference', of transferring something from one place to another, on the basis of a perceived similarity between the two 'places'." P30

These *two places* will be explored in a chronological order so that the development of different themes and styles of cartoon on the topic of self-determination can be seen to emerge.

POLITICAL CARTOONING OF CORNISH SELF-DETERMINATION: CORNWALL - INTERNAL FRAME

PRE 1970S

The movement for self-determination in Cornwall in the modern era can be traced to the formation of Celtic societies and political pressure groups after WW2 and into the 1960's, hence the authors wished to include work from these earlier periods. Take for example the primitive pamphlet in Figure 1 from a little known organisation calling itself Nowodhow an Mytyn (Morning News). The exact date is unknown but it is likely to be before

METHOD DIELVENNANS

An chaptra ma a wra gweytha an maner a Moeran (2005) ha'y us a *framyyow* dhe wolowboynya gologva an re na *a-ji dhe* ha'n re na *a-ves* kemeneth. Y hyllir sewya a-dhelerg an konsayt y honan bys dhe Bateson (1972) ha moy syth dhe'n ober ragresek a Goffman ha Bennett (1986) yn Dielvennans Framweyth. An gemeneth y'n kas ma yw an re na usi owt omherdhya rag omervirans kernewek. An gemeneth ma re dheuth dres an vledhynnnyow dhe gylghya kemmysk efan a vagasow. An kartounyow devnydhys y'n tekst berr ma re gavas aga fennfenten dhyworth partioù politek kepar ha Mebyon Kernow, bagasow kaskyrgh anedhans kepar ha Bagas Bern Kernow, kowethyansow hwithrans anserghek kepar ha Bagas Hwithrans Erbysek ha Kowethasek Kernewek (CoSERG), folenigoryon kepar ha Nowodhow an Mytyn (Morning News), ha bagasow ges selys yn media socyal kepar ha Bulloverman's Tomb of the Bizarre. An rol a bennfentynnyow a vanylyon potencyal aral a yll pesya, mes dre strothans a spys y'n tekst ma, an re ma a vydh an taklennow gwreydhek anedha may tennyn ni. An acheson mayth yw framyyow mar 'vas avel devisyow tybiethel yw berrskrifys gans Van Leeuwen (2004) yn y dheskrifansow a'n rann a vetafor:

"An sugen a vetafor yw an konsayt a 'dreusworran', dhe dreusworr neppyth dhyworth unn le dhe le aral, war sel a hevelepter klewys ynter an dhew le." P30

An *dhew le* ma a vydh hwithrys yn ordyr amseroniethel may hyllir gweles sordya an dispelyans a themow ha gisow a gartoun war an desten a omervirans.

KARTOUNWEYTH POLITEK A OMERVIRANS KERNEWEK: KERNOW – FRAM PERVEDHEK

KYNS AN DHEGVLEDHEN 1970

Y hyllir sewya an omsav rag omervirans yn Kernow y'n osweyth arnowydh dhe'n furyans a gowethasow keltek ha bagasow-ynia politek wosa Nessa Bresel an Bys ha bys y'n 1960ow, ha rakhenna an awtours a vynna komprehendya ober dhyworth an spysow a-varra ma. Kemmer rag ensampel an folenik sempel yn Figur 1 dhyworth kowethyans le aswonys hag

1970, as the price is written in a pre-decimal currency which ended into the United Kingdom in 1971.



Figure 1 is written solely in the Cornish language, the use of the indigenous Celtic language functions as a form of literary activism. There are various cartoons in this satirical pamphlet including:

- Mocking BBC radio Cornwall for its Anglicisation of speech,
- The lack of Cornish language content in newspapers,
- Republican sentiment issued towards Prince Charles, the Duke of Cornwall

Moving into the 1970's with Figure 2, the quality of the illustration can be seen to improve. This cartoon is taken from Cornish Nation, the official publication that is attached to Mebyon Kernow – the party for Cornwall. A political party that has been central to the self-determination movement in Cornwall (Cole et al, 2011). Throughout the 1970's Cornish Nation used the same masculine figure to signify the struggles Cornwall and its people were facing. The text reads: *Embodiment of the spirit of Cornwall, Guardian of Cornish interests. With Mebyon Kernow a new Kernow Arise!*

a omhenwys Nowodhow an Myttin. An dedhyas poran nyns yw godhvedhys mes yth yw gwirhaval y vos kyns 1970, drefen bos an pris skrifys yn mona kemmyn rag-degedhek an pyth a dheuth dhe benn y'n RU yn 1971.



Figur 1 yw skrifys yn tien y'n yeth kernewek, us an yeth teythiek keltek a ober avel furv a weythresieth liennek. Yma kartounyow divers y'n folennik esek ma a comprehend:

- Gul ges a Gorteb Radyo Kernow rag ysowsnekheans a gows,
- Fowt a dhalgh an yeth kernewek y'n paperyow nowodhow,
- Klewans poblogethek dylls troha Pennsevik Charlys, Duk Kernow

Owth avonsya bys an 1970ow gans Figur 2, y hyllir gweles gwellheans gnas an lymnansow. An kartoun ma yw kemerys dhyworth Kenedhel Gernewek, dyllans sodhogel hag yw stegys dhe Vebyon Kernow – an parti rag Kernow, parti politik re beu kresel dhe'n omsav omervirans yn Kernow (Cole et al, 2011). Dres an 1970ow Kenedhel Gernewek a dhevnydhyas an keth person gorow dhe styra an strifow esa Kernow ha'y fobel orth aga enebi. An tekst a red: *Personegyans an spyrys a Gernow, Gwithyas a lesow kernewek. Gans Mebyon Kernow, Kernow nowydh a sav!*

1970S

The breaking of the chains in the image relates to the 3 characters dressed in top hats shown to be running out of Cornwall. The labels on the characters read: Tory, Labour and Liberal.

Figure 2 - Male figure as an embodiment of Cornwall Source: (Cornish Nation, 1970)



Figure 3 - Masculine Figure as a Clay Miner opposing the image of a rich industrialist Source: (Cornish Nation, 1971)



Figures 3 depicts a clay pit worker opposing an industrialist. The terms Kernow and Pow Saws are the Cornish words for Cornwall and England respectively. There is a clear association with the Cornish worker as a proletariat suffering unemployment at the hands of an English capitalist. A continuation of the themes echoed in Figure 2.

AN DHEGVLEDHEN 1970

Terri an chaynys y'n imach a sin orth an 3 ferson gwiskys yn hattow owlin, diskwedhys ow ponya yn-mes a Gernow. An labelyow war an bersons a red: Tori, Lavur ha Livrel.

Figur 2 - Person gorow avel personegyans a Gernow. Pennfenten: (Kenedhel Gernewek, 1970)



Figur 3 - Person gorow avel Den Bal Pri Gwynn owth enebi imach a dhywsysansydh rych. Pennfenten : (Kenedhel Gernewek, 1971).



Figur 3 a dhiskwedh oberor pri gwynn owth enebi dywsysansydh. An termys Kernow ha Pow Saws yw an geryow kernewek a-gettep rag Cornwall hag England. Yma kevren gler gans an oberor kernewek avel den gwerinek ow perthi diweythieth orth diwla chatelydh sowsnek. Hemm yw pesyans a'n testennow daslevys yn Figur 2.

Figure 4 - Masculine figure demanding autonomy for Cornwall from the political establishment
Source: (Cornish Nation, 1972)



Figure 4 shows the same character – the personification of Cornwall – demanding autonomy from the Crowther Commission. A commission set up to investigate the constitutional structures of the United Kingdom.

The cartoons from the 1970's clearly have socialist and emancipatory overtones. Figures 2,3 and 4 shows a character who is not only seeking freedom from a political system but also an economic one as well.

1980S

Figure 5 - Depictions a London immigrant to a new house in Cornwall
Source: (Deacon et al, 1988)

Figure 5 is taken from a Cornish research and campaign group with a focus on housing issues. The sign reads: Sold Trefaust & Sons. Trefaust being a Cornish-English portmanteau meaning house of Faust. Suggesting a Faustian pact between property developers



Figur 4 - Person gorow ow chalenja omrewl rag Kernow dhyworth an fondyans politek.
Pennfenten: (Kenedhel Gernewek, 1972)



Figur 4 a dhiskwedh an keth unigyn – an personegyans a Gernow – ow chalenja omrewl dhyworth an Desedhek Crowther. Desedhek fondys rag hwithra strethurow korf laghel an Ruwananeth Unys.

An kartounyow a'n dheguledhen 1970 a's teves yn efan hyntyansow socyalythek ha livresonel. Figury 2,3,ha 4 a dhiskwedh unigyn na hwil rydhses dhyworth system politek hepken mes keffrys dhyworth onan erbysek.

AN DHEGVLEDHEN 1980

Figur 5 - a dhiskwedh ynvroyas a Loundres dhe ji nowydh yn Kernow.
Pennfenten: (Deacon et al, 1988)

Figur 5 yw kemerys dhyworth bagas hwithrans ha kaskyrgh, ha'ga fog war vaters a anedhans. An arwodh a red: Gwerthys – Trefaust & Mebyon. Trefaust yw ger portmantel Kernewek-Sowsnek a styr Tre a Faust, ow pro-



in Cornwall and external influences. The cartoon highlights the issue of Cornwall not having control over its own planning laws. A situation that exists to this day. Note the use of the London dialect of English in the speech bubble.





Figure 6 - Mebyon Kernow Leader as Superman
Source: (Peninsula Voice, 1988)

Figure 6 continues the theme of the political übermensch, with a parody of Superman. Here a former leader of Mebyon Kernow is shown lifting Cornwall to safety away from an angry dragon. A vexillological symbol of the Wessex region of England. This figure whilst maintaining the superhero theme, does so with an evident amount of satire. Whereas Figures 2, 3

and 4 being taken from the magazine of a political party, entirely avoid satirising themselves. Due to the restriction on space here other cartoons from this period cannot be displayed. For example, also from the 80's, the Cornwall Concern group used cartoons of a bulldozer driving into the Cornish peninsula, running over its national flag and destroying Celtic crosses. Emblazoned on the side of the bulldozer are the words *Heritage Demolition*, behind the bulldozer is a picture of an industrial scene. With the associated text reading: *Sale of the century...2000 years of Celtic Heritage* surrounding by an image of Cornwall.

fya akord Faustel yntra displeyoryon anedhans yn Kernow ha awedhyan-sow a-ves. An kartoun a wolowboyst an mater ma na's teves Kernow kontrol a'y laghys towlenna hy honan, studh hag a bes bys y'n jydh hedhyw. Merk an devnydh a'n ranniyeth Loundres a Sowsnek y'n hwythen gows.



Figur 6 - Ledyer Mebyon Kernow avel Superman. Pennfenten: (Lev an Konna Tir)

Figur 6 a bes an thema a'n übermensch politek gans parodi a Superman. Omma yma diskwedhys kyns-ledyer Mebyon Kernow ow trehevel Kernow dhe sawder dhyworth dragon serrys. Arwodh vanerel an ranndir Wessex a Bow Sows. Kyn hwra an figur ma mentena an thema ughworour, ev a'n gwra gans ges fest kler: bytiegyns, Figuryr 2, 3 ha 4, kemerys dhyworth lyver

termyn a barti politek, a wra goheles yn tien omesya. Awos strothans a spas omma ny yllir displetya kartounyow erel dhyworth an termyn ma. Rag ensampel, dhyworth an dhegvedhen 1980 ynwedh, an bagas Bern Kernow a wrug devnydh a gartounys a jynn-herdhya a rol bys yn Kernow, ow skwatty a baner kernewek ha distrui Krowsow Keltek. Tenewen an jynn-herdhya yw afinskyans gans an geryow *Distruyans Ertach*, yma a-dryv an jynn-herdhya delinyans a wel diwysyansel. An desten kelmys orto a red: *Gwerth an Gansuledhen ... 2000 vledhen a Ertach Keltek*, ow kerghynna imach a Gernow.

2010'S

Figure 7 - Mebyon Kernow's leader Dick Cole depicted next to his hero namesake
Source: (Bulloverman's Tomb of the Bizzare, 2015)





Figure 7 shows the current leader of Mebyon Kernow Dick Cole (circa 2015) next to an image of the 1940's American comic character Wonder Boy, whose name in the comic series is also Dick Cole. This Figure once more continues the super hero theme, but as with Figure 6 the satire is evident even if it is meant in support. Figure 7 is the first noted use of colour in a political cartoon about Cornish self-determination.

Figure 7 is also the first example political cartooning related to self-determination that was sourced from social media. It comes from a satirical Facebook group known as Bulloverman's Tomb of the bizarre. Who produce surrealist politically themed cartoons and memes.

AN DHEGVLEDHEN 2010

Figur 7 - Ledyer Mebyon Kernow Dick Cole diskwedhys ryb y worour keshenwys.
Fenten: (Bulloverman's Tomb of the Bizarre, 2015)



Figur 7 a dhiskwedh ledyer Mebyon Kernow a-lemmyn Dick Cole (a-dro dhe 2015) ryb imach an person y'n komik Wonder Boy, neb yw henwys Dick Cole keffrys y'n kevres komik. Unnweth arta an person ma a bes an thema ughworour, mes par dell yw yn Figur 6, playn yw an ges kynth usi ena avel skoodhyans hogen. Figur 7 yw an kynsa devnydh a liwyow merkys yn kartoun politek a-dro dhe omrewl kernewek.

Ynwedh, Figur 7 yw an kynsa ensampel a gartounweydh politek kelmys orth omrewl ha devedhys dhyworth media socyal. Ev a dheu dhyworth bagas Facebook henwys Bulloverman's Tomb of the Bizarre neb a askor kartounyow ha mimys, gorwir ha politek aga themow.

OUTSIDE OF CORNWALL - EXTERNAL FRAME

The external framing of Cornish self-determination is also important to consider when illustrating the political cartooning concept. Here external sources are taken from media outlets based outside of Cornwall. For example Figure 8 from The Cagle Post (2012) which portrays Alex Salmond, former first minister of Scotland and leader of the SNP enthroned as a king, in front of a crowd of adoring Cornish Nationalist.

Figure 8 depicts Alex Salmond, former first minister of Scotland enthroned as king, in front of a crowd of Cornish Nationalist. Source: (The Cagle Post, 2012)



Figure 8 is designed to mock the deficiencies of the Cornish self-determination movement in comparison to the success of the SNP. The text in the top left hand corner labels the political party a *secret English devolution society*. Similar themes can easily be detected in Figure 9.

MES A GERNOW – FRAM A-VES

Pan lynnir an konsayt a gartounweyth politek, yth yw posek dhe brederi a-dro dhe'n framyans a-ves a omervirans kernewek. Omma, pennfentynnyow a-ves yw kemerys dhyworth tardhellow media selys yn mes a Gernow. Rag ensampel Figur 8 dhyworth The Cagle Post (2012) a dhiskwedh Alex Salmond, kyns kynsa menyster Alban ha ledyer an SNP, a'y esedh avel myghtern, a-rag routh a Genedhlogoryon Gernewek orth y wordhydha.

Figur 8 a dhiskwa Alex Salmond, kyns kynsa menyster Alban, war se avel myghtern, a-dherag bush a genedhlogoryon. Pennfenten: (The Cagle Post, 2012)



Desinys yw Figur 8 dhe skornya difygyow an movyans omervirans kernewek kehevelys orth sewena an SNP. An tekst y'n gornel a-wartha kledh-barth a henow an parti politek *kowethas digresennans sowsnek kevrinek*. Themow haval a yll bos dismygys yn Figur 9.



Figure 9 Cornish border guard explains the new currency
Source: (Telegraph, 2014)

The caption in Figure 9 reads We've ditched the £ and adopted fudge as our currency. Fudge being a sweet confectionary associated with Cornwall, the word is also a verb that means to fail to complete a task properly. The cartoon is mocking the economic situation of Cornwall as a poor region, whose people are backwards (see Figure 8). The themes found in the external framing of Cornish self-determination function along more traditional political cartooning lines. The

difference framings of the issue of Cornish self-determination however are abundantly clear, and presumably not dissimilar to most representations of self-determination in other European Union member states.

DISCUSSION

We can see that as we move through the different decades up to 2015 how the visual modality of the cartoons change, noting the reduced articulation of detail, depth, colour and shade in the 1960, 70s and 80s (Van Leeuwen, 2004), until we reach the full technicolour of 2015. Beyond this there is a trend that runs throughout all the cartoons in this chapter that should be explored – politicians as superheroes.

POLITICIANS AS SUPERHEROES

The cartoons in the internal and external frames both utilised the conception of politicians as superheroes but to different ends. The depiction of politicians as superheroes is well documented by Plumb (2004) who suggests that they are a suitable topic for cartoons as they are indexed in the public psyche. The internal vs. external framing acts as a perfect example in the context of political heroes. Figures 2, 3 and 4 can clearly be seen to be portraying a serious male character, aspiring to raise a pertinent issue. Figures 6 and 7 again present strong masculine personas but with the addition of satire. Whereas Figure 8, and 9 show the trivialisation of self-



Figur 9 Gwithyas Oryon kernewek a glerha an mona nowydh. Pennfenten: (Telegraph, 2014)

Yn-medh gwithyas oryon orth Figur 9 “Ni re skonyas an £ ha degemeris fujj avel agan mona kemmyñ”: fujj yw hwegyn junys orth Kernow, mes an ger yw verb keffrys hag a styr ‘fyllel kowlwul oberen yn ta’. Yma’n kartoun ow kul ges a studh erbysek Kernow avel ranndir boghosek, mayth yw an bobel anodho talsogh (gwel Figur 8). An themow kevys yn framyans a-ves a omervirans kernewek a weyther moy a-hys linennow hengovek politek a gartounweyth. Byttiegyns, an framweythyow dyffrans a’n mater a omervirans kernewek yw fest kler, ha dres lycklod nyns yns i dihalav orth portrayansow omervirans yn statys-esel erel an Unyans Europek.

DADHEL


Ni a yll gweles, ha ni ow kwaya dres an degyledhynnyow bys yn 2015, fatej janj gologva welesek an kartounyow, owt attendya an diskwedhyans lehes a vanylyon, downder, liw ha skeus y'n 1960ow, 700ow, ha 800ow (Van Leeuwen, 2004), bys pan dhrehedhyn an liwyow leun a 2015. Dres hemma yma tuedh a res der oll an kartounyow y'n chaptra ma a dal bos hwithrys – politegoryon avel ughorwer.

POLITEGORYON AVEL UGHORWER

An kartounyow y'n framyow hag a-bervedh hag a-ves a wre devnydh a'n tybyans a bolitegoryon avel ughorwer, mes gans amkanow dyffrans. Kovadhyñs yn ta yw an portrayans a bolitegoryon avel ughorwer gans Plumb (2004), neb a brof aga bos testen wiw rag kartounyow drefen aga bos menegys y'n brys poblek. An framyans a-bervedh erbyn ar framyans a-ves yw ensampel perfydh y'n gettesten a ughorwer bolitek. Y hyllir gweles yn kler bos Figurys 2,3 ha 4 ow portraya person gorow ha sad, ow medra sordya mater longus. Figurys 6 ha 7 a dhiskwa arta tus worow ha krev mes keworrays yw ges. Byttiegyns Figurys 8 ha 9 a dhiskwa

determination issues in Cornwall. That is to state, from the internal frame political cartooning of self-determination attempts to give importance to issues that are considered trivial by others, whereas those from the external viewpoint tend to trivialised issues of self-determination. Which tends to be of high importance to those who live secessionist regions. Both frames use hero motifs to do this, but to different ends. Perhaps the best example of this is Figure 8 describing Mebyon Kernow as a *secret English devolution society*. Beyond the deliberate misrepresentation of the political party as English, the idea of a secret political party becomes humorously absurd. In conclusion we can return to Van Leeuwen's idea of the '*two places*' (passim), that is in sum this chapter shows the shift from the external to the internal frame in political cartooning represents the shift from the iconoclast to the idolisation of political heroes.

an truflangs a vateryow omervirans yn Kernow. Henn yw dhe leverel, dhyworth an fram a-bervedh, kartounya politek a omervirans a assay ri roweth dhe vateryow hag yw gwelys avel trufel gans tus erel, mes an huni dhyworth an welva a-ves a's teves tuedh a drufla materyow a omervirans. Ha'n materyow ma a's teves an tuedh a vos a roweth bras dhe'n dus a drig yn ranndiryow omdhibartheek. An dhew fram a dhevnydh motifow a worwer rag gul hemma, mes gans amkanow dyffrans. Martesen an gwella ensampel a hemma yw Figur 8 a dheskrif Mebyon Kernow avel *kowethas digressenans sowsnek kevrinek*. Dres an kammdheskrifans a-borpos a'n parti politek avel sowsnek, an tybyans a barti politek kevrinek a ha bos heb reson ha hwarthus. Avel gorfen y hyllyn ni dehweles dhe dybyans Van Leeuwen a'n '*dhew dyller*' (passim): henn yw, yn berrskrif, an chaptra ma a dhiskwa an dreylva dhyworth an fram a-ves dhe'n fram a-bervedh yn kartounya politek dhe representyta an dreylva dhyworth an ikonoklast dhe'n gordhyans a worwer bolitek.



SELF-DETERMINATION AND WALES

Aled Morgan Hughes, Matthew Woolfall-Jones
Plaid Cymru Youth, Wales

Tryweryn. Few words in the Welsh Language tense the fist and quicken the pulse to the same degree as this one. Three syllables that have come to represent loss, hatred and conquest. Eight letters- an open scar on the face of Welsh nationhood and identity- a rallying point for slogans, protests and unrest.

Despite the raw emotion and rapport generated by a mere mention of the word to a Welshman, notably it offers a stunning contrast from the

location itself in the heart of North Wales. Today, Tryweryn is a place of reflection- with the lake's soft waves and frigid depths- a relaxing retreat in the rolling hills of Meirionnydd. However, beyond the beauty and harmony, the clear water's merely a graveyard- a monument of a Wales now lost.

The Celyn that we will recall will not be a lake, but a local community drowned by indifference and by foreign interference.

(Gwynlliw Jones)

HUNAN-BENDERFYNIAID A CHYMRU

Aled Morgan Hughes, Matthew Woolfall-Jones
Plaid Cymru Ifanc, Cymru

Tryweryn. Ni cheir llawer o eiriau yn yr iaith Gymraeg a ddirdynnai'r dwrn ac a ferwai'r gwaed i'r un raddau â'r enw tyngedfennol hwnnw. Tair sillaf a ddeuai i gynrychioli colled, casineb a choncwest. Wyth llythyren sy'n graith agored ar wyneb hunaniaeth a chenedligrwydd Cymreig- yn sbardun am sloganau, protestiadau a gwrdyystiadau.

Er y fath emosiwn ac ymdeimlad a gynhyrchai i Gymro wrth glywed y gair yn unig, trawiadol yw'r gwrtgyferbyniad y ceir gyda'r safle ei hun yng nghalon y gogledd. Bellach, lle o lonyddwch yw Tryweryn, gyda thonau ysgafn y llyn a'i ddyfnderoedd oeraidd, yn ddim ond rhyw gilfach baradwysaidd ym mryniau gwyrddion Meirionydd. Fodd bynnag, tu hwnt i'r harddwch ar harmoni, dim llai na mynwent ddŵr croyw ydyw, yn gofgolofn oeraidd i'r Gymru a gollwyd.

***Nid llyn fydd Celyn
'n y co' Ond offrwm
ddaeth i'n deffro, O oes
i oes fe fydd sôn Am
ystryw a grym estron.***

(Gwynlliw Jones)

Half a century or so ago, the lake was absent- Tryweryn valley was instead a home and a community- and that to the residents of Capel Celyn. It was a village similar to any other post-Second World War Wales- a post office, chapel, cemetery and twelve or so houses and farms, with Welsh the natural language of the village. The village, and Wales on a whole was shaken to its foundations in 1956 with increasing rumours of the destruction of the village in order to create a water reservoir under the sponsorship of Liverpool Corporation in order to provide the city with water. Despite the fierce protests such plans spawned on the Welsh community- with Gwynfor Evans and Plaid Cymru leading the charge- decisively, the campaign failed. Capel Celyn's residents were parcelled from their habitats to other parts of Wales; 12 farmhouses and homes were destroyed; corpses were disinterred from the cemetery, whilst others were left there; a dam was built. By 1965, 800 acres of the valley was under a watery grave.

However, Capel Celyn and Tryweryn wasn't the first example of a Welsh community to suffer such a fate at the hands of foreign capitalists. At the end of the Nineteenth Century, the village of Llanwddyn and the Elan Valley in Powys were destroyed and flooded to provide Birmingham with water. In 1923, David Lloyd George- the most outstanding Welsh politician of his generation would exclaim- *"It is a monstrous thing for English Corporations to come to Wales and drown our historic and beautiful valleys"*. Despite such declarations, throughout the Twentieth Century, such drowning would continue- with Tryweryn swiftly followed by the flooding of Clywedog Valley in the mid-1960s. Time after time, Welsh homes, communities and historic habitats were lost in the name of the progress and development of another county's cities.

A symbol of conquering by a foreign power, the drowning of the valleys came to represent something greater- sadder even, possibly- being the failure of Welsh self-determination. This was highlighted at its most obvious around the political battle which engulfed the Tryweryn question. Welsh political parties, many local authorities and every Welsh Member of Parliament (bar one) were unified in their objection to the Parliamentary Measure to drown the valley. Despite their resistance, Wales was proven to be completely powerless to stop the plans, with the Conservative Government- alien to Wales' interests, desperate to push the Measure through Westminster. Not a single Welsh institution or authority existed that could challenge the decision. Liverpool was free to do as it wanted with the water.

yn absennol; yn hytrach cymdeithas a chartref y bu dyffryn Tryweryn - a hynny i drigolion pentref Capel Celyn. Digon tebyg i unrhyw bentref Cymreig ôl-Ail Ryfel Byd arall ydoedd - swyddfa bost, capel, mynwent a thua dwsin o dai a ffermdai cyfagos, gyda'r Gymraeg yn iaith y pentref. Ysgytiwyd seiliau'r gymuned a Chymru gyfan i'r carn yn 1956 gyda thwf sibrydion a grybwylai dinistrio a boddi'r pentref er budd creu cronfa ddŵr dan nawdd Corfforaeth Lerpwl i gyflenwi'r ddinas â dŵr. Serch y protestio tanbaid a ddilynodd yn erbyn math benderfyniad gan y gymdeithas Gymreig - gyda Gwynfor Evans a Phlaid Cymru ar flaen y gad - colli bu hanes eu hymdrehch. Parselwyd trigolion Capel Celyn o'u cynefin i ardaloedd eraill o Gymru; dinistriwyd 12 ffermdy a thŷ; datgladdwyd rhai o'r meirw o'r fynwent, tra gadwyd eraill yno; adeiladwyd argae. Erbyn 1965 roedd 800 erw o'r dyffryn wedi ei amlyncu gan ddŵr.

Nid Capel Celyn a Thryweryn bu'r enghraift gyntaf a brofwyd yng Nghymru o ddinistrio a boddi er budd grym cyfalafol estron ychwaith. Ar ddiwedd y Bedwaredd Ganrif ar Bymtheg, boddwyd pentref Llanwddyn a Chwm Elan ym Mhowys i gyflenwi dŵr i Birmingham, yn Lloegr gyfagos. Erbyn 1923, gwelwyd David Lloyd George - un o wleidyddion Cymreig fwyafr adnabyddus ei genhedaeth - yn ebychu; *"It is a monstrous thing for English Corporations to come to Wales and drown our historic and beautiful valleys"*. Serch y fath wrthwynebiad, trwy gydol yr Ugeinfed Ganrif, parhau gwnaeth y boddi - gyda thrasiedi Tryweryn yn cael ei olyn u yn ddiweddarach gyda boddi Cwm Clywedog yn y 1960au. Dro ar ôl tro, collwyd cartrefi, cymunedau a chynefinoedd hynafol Cymreig yn enw cynnydd a datblygiad dinasoedd gwlaid arall.

Yn symbol o ormes gan rym estron, daeth boddi'r dyffrynnoedd i gynrychioli rhywbeth pellach, tristach o bosib; sef methiant hunan-benderfyniad Cymreig. Crisiaiwyd hyn ar ei amlycafyrn yr ormes wleidyddol a amgylchynai Tryweryn. Bu'r pleidiau gwleidyddol Cymreig, sawl awdurdod lleol a phob Aelod Seneddol Cymreig (ond un) yn bendant eu gwrthwynebiad i'r Mesur Seneddol i foddi'r dyffryn. Serch eu gwrthwynebiad, profodd Cymru i fod yn gwbl ddi-rym i atal y cynllun, gyda Llywodraeth Geidwadol, dieithr i Gymru a'u diddordebau, yn benderfynol o lywio'r Mesur drwy'r Senedd. Ni fodolai unrhyw sefydliad nac awdurdod yng Nghymru a fedrai herio'r penderfyniad. Roedd Lerpwl yn rhydd i wneud fy y dymunent gyda'r dŵr.

Datblygai Tryweryn, Llanwddyn, Clywedog ac eraill felly i ymgorffori ymdeimlad o wladychiaeth mewn gwleidyddiaeth a chenedligrwydd

Tryweryn, Llanwddyn, Clywedog and others have developed to embody a sense of colonization which has existed in Welsh politics and nationhood for centuries- and to some degree still present today. In the 1980s, at the height of Thatcherism, the Welsh historian Gwyn Alf Williams would refer to the Welsh as nothing but “*naked people under acid rain*”- defenceless to the wrath of the Conservative Government in Westminster. Such vulnerability was echoed through a damning “*democratic deficit*” which existed in Wales throughout the decade. Time and time again, the majority of the Welsh would vote against Thatcher and the Conservatives- however, every time they were condemned to their control, as England returned them comfortably every time- as Williams would suggest; “*Wales had finally disappeared into Britain*”.

Under Thatcher’s reign, a strict agenda of privatisation and cuts was followed, injuring Wales. It’s resources and institutions were placed under the control of never-ending QUANGOs, whilst the Welsh Secretary- Wales’ only voice in the Westminster Government, became a portfolio represented time and time again by individuals both absent from Wales geographically, and politically.

With the 1990s bringing an end to Conservative rule (for the time being!), as well as the joy that followed the narrow victory for devolution in 1997, leading to the opening of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999, Wales finally came to win her own political voice- and this covering 20 fields, including education, health and culture. Such voice was strengthened yet again in 2011, with another successful referendum leading to primary legislation powers for the Assembly/

Despite the slight sprinkle of self-determination devolution has offered the Welsh people and politicians, it still remains a long way from ideal. The legislative settlement remains to be third-rate compared to the powers and responsibilities boasted by Scottish and Northern Irish counterparts. Westminster continues to undermine the interests of the Welsh people through her pursuance of economic and social measures unhelpful to Wales- for example the Bedroom Tax, and their unwillingness to reform the Barnett Formula- thus guaranteeing Wales remains under-funded.

Such tendencies were highlighted at the dawn of the Twenty First Century, with Blair’s New Labour government dragging Wales into an unlawful war in Iraq- a bloody war a vast majority of the Welsh public shared no

Cymreig a fodolai ers canrifoedd- ac sydd dal yn wir heddiw. Yn yr 1980au ar uchafbwynt Thatcheriaeth, nodai'r hanesydd Gwyn Alf Williams fu'r Cymry yn ddim ond “*naked people under acid rain*” grym San Steffan. Atseiniwyd hyn drwy'r “*democratic deficit*” damniol y profodd Cymru drwy gydol y degawd. Tro ar ôl tro, pleidleisiodd mwyafrif o boblogaeth y wlad yn erbyn Thatcher a'r Ceidwadwyr, ond condamniwyd y wlad o dan eu rheolaeth, wrth i Loegr eu dychwelyd i rym yn gyfforddus bob tro - fel nodai Williams; “*Wales had finally disappeared into Britain*”.

Dan ddigofaint Thatcher, olynwyd agenda llym o breifateiddio a thoriadau a niweidai Cymru. Gosodwyd adnoddau ac awdurdodau'r wlad mewn CWANGOau di-ben-draw, tra daeth Ysgrifennydd Gwladol Cymru- unig lais y wlad yn Llywodraeth San Steffan- yn bortffolio a gynrychiolwyd tro ar ôl tro gan unigolion di-gymraeg: yn ddaearyddol a meddyliol.

Gyda'r 1990au yn dod a chlo i rym y Ceidwadwyr (am y tro!) ynghyd â'r llawenydd a ddilynodd y fuddugoliaeth ymylol dros ddatganoli yn 1997, ac agoriad Cynulliad Cenedlaethol yn 1999, daeth Cymru i ennill llais gwleidyddol hir ddisgwylledig dros 20 maes - gan gynnwys addysg, iechyd a diwylliant. Cryfhawyd y fath lais yn 2011 gyda refferendwm arall llwyddiannus yn gwobrwo Cymru â phwerau deddfu cynradd.

Serch rhyw elfen ymylol o hunan-benderfyniad a gynigai datganoli i gyhoedd a gwleidyddion Cymru, nid yw ychwaith yn berffaith o bell ffordd. Mae'r setliad deddfwriaethol yn ei hun yn drydydd-radd, gyda'r Alban a Gogledd Iwerddon yn brolio cyfrifoldebau a dyletswyddau llawer mwy swmpus. Rydym yn parhau i weld San Steffan yn tanseilio diddordebau a phobl Cymru drwy ei pholisiau economaidd a chymdeithasol unlygeidiog megis y Dreth Llofftudd a'u hamharodrwydd i ymafael a diwygio Fformiwla Barnett, gan felly sicrhau fod Cymru yn parhau i gael ei dan-gyllido.

Cafwyd yr enghraift amlycaf o fath sefyllfa yn nyddiau cynnar yr Undef Ganrif ar Hugain, wrth i Lywodraeth Llafur Newydd Blair lusgo Cymru gydag ef mewn i ryfel anghyfreithlon yn Irac- rhyfel waedlyd nad oedd gan nifer o Gymry unrhyw ddiddordeb na dymuniad ymuno. Gall fath sefyllfa gael ei hail-adrodd unwaith yn ragor yn y dyfodol agos yn achos aelodaeth Cymru o'r Undeb Ewropeaidd. Serch y ffaith bod Cymru yn elwa'n gymdeithasol, ddiwylliannol ac yn fwy na dim, economaidd drwy ei aelodaeth o'r Undeb Ewropeaidd, drwy gynlluniau arfaethedig Cameron

interest or desire to join. Such a scenario could very well surface again in the near future with the question of Britain's membership of the European Union. Wales is a country that benefits greatly from its membership of the EU- both socially, culturally, and vitally economically. However, under Cameron and the Conservatives proposed plans of a referendum on Britain's membership of the Union, we could very well be seeing a scenario where the people of Wales could vote unanimously in favour of staying in the European Union, only to be plucked out against our will due to a substantial no vote within the rest of the United Kingdom.

From the tragedy of Tryweryn, to Thatcherism's brutality, to the uncertain future of Wales' European Union membership- one key theme returns every time; the domination of Westminster and the United Kingdom over the interests of Wales. It's very likely, if Wales would be an independent nation, we wouldn't have had to face such torture and heartbreak over the past centuries.

As exclaimed by Leanne Wood, leader of Plaid Cymru in a recent speech- "*Independence is the natural state of a nation*"- however in Wales over the centuries, such impulses of self-determination have been continually trampled. In the days of Llywelyn and Glyndŵr, their dreams of a free Wales were halted by the brutality and force of the English- by today rather than physical force, it's rather psychological control that undermines the dream of an independent Wales- assertions that Wales is too poor, too small- scaremongering to defend the crumbling foundations of the British institution- a legendary "*dependency culture*". Such lies and oppression have kept Wales under the thumb of Britain for centuries- and uncomfortable *Stockholm Syndrome*- a condition that sees the country's resources and people affronted and mistreated by a foreign agenda of colonization.

It's about time to shatter such quaint visions of obedience- the days of the all-powerful Empires are now over. Now more than ever, we are living in the world of the small nations- with the self-determination experienced during the Twentieth Century and beyond key to the redrawing of the atlas of the World. It's time for Wales to be able to stand proud side by side with our international counterparts. As the ghostly shores of Tryweryn lake remind us, Westminster's oppression has failed- its about time for the people of Wales to realize- who better than to look after a nations interests, than the actual people living there? As Alun Rees' famous verses reads:

ar Ceidwadwyr am refferendwm ar aeoladaeth y Deyrnas Unedig o'r Undeb, posib y gellir wynebu canlyniad lle buasai mwyafri o Gymru'n pleidleisio o blaid aros ynaelod, ond serch fath benderfyniad, buasai pleidlais nacaol sylweddol yng ngweddl y Deyrnas, yn medru plicio Cymru allan o'r Undeb yn groes i'w dymuniad.

O drasiedi Tryweryn, i ffyrnigrwydd Thatcheriaeth, i ddyfodol ansicr aeoladaeth Cymru o'r Undeb Ewropeaidd- ceir un prif thema yn ymddangos dro ar ôl tro- sef dominyddiaeth San Steffan a gweddill y Deyrnas Unedig dros ddymuniadau'r Cymry. Mae'n debyg iawn, pe bai Cymru yn wlad annibynnol ar y llwyfan rhwngwladol, na fyddai wedi gorfol wynebu math artaith a thorcalon dros y canrifoedd diwethaf.

Ebychai Leanne Wood, arweinydd Plaid Cymru yn un o'i areithiau diweddar; "*Independence is the natural state of a nation*"- ond yng Nghymru, ers canrifoedd ceisiwyd sathru fath ysgogiadau o hunan-benderfyniad. Yn nyddiau Llywelyn a Glyndŵr, sathrwyd math obeithion am Gymru rydd gan ormes a grym y Sais, erbyn heddiw- nid grym corfforol- ond hytrach meddyliol a geisiai chwalu'r freuddwyd o annibyniaeth- honiadau fod Cymru rhy dlawd; rhy fach- rhyw godi bwganod yn y gobaith o achub seiliau sigledig Prydeindod- rhyw "*dependency culture*" chwedlonol. Fath gelwydd a gormes sydd wedi cadw Cymru dan fawd Prydeindod am ganrifoedd- rhyw *stockholm syndrome* anffodus- cyflwr a welai'r wlad, adnoddau a'i phobl yn cael eu sarhau a'u cam-drin gan rym estron a'i hagenda wladychol.

Mae'n hen bryd chwalu math ddelfryd llywaeth o uffud-dod- mae dyddiau'r Ymerodraethau oll-bwerus drosodd. Rydym bellach yn byw ym Myd y gwledydd bychain- gyda hunan-benderfyniad yr Ugeinfed Ganrif a thu hwnt wedi dod i ail-drefnu atlas y Byd yn gyfan gwbl. Mae'n hen bryd i Gymru gael sefyll yn falch ac yn dal ar fath llwyfan gyda'i chyfeillion rhwngwladol. Fel y ceir tystiolaeth ar lannau llyn Tryweryn heddiw, mae trefn San Steffan wedi ein methu- mae'n hen bryd i Gymru ddeffro a sylweddoli- pwy well i ofalu am ddiddordebau a datblygiad y wlad, ond y bobl sydd yn byw ynndi? Fel atseiniad penillion adnabyddus Alun Rees:

*“Now Taffy is a fighter
when he hears the bugle call.
Name any war since Agincourt:
Taffy’s seen them all.
He’s fought in France and Germany
and many another land:
he’s fought by sea and fought by air
and fought on desert sand
He’s fought for many a foreign flag
in many foreign part,
for Taffy is a Welshman,
proud of his fighting heart.”
He’s fought the wide world over,
he’s given blood and bone.
He’s fought for every bloody cause
except his bloody own.”*

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Aled Morgan Hughes
Cadeirydd Cenedlaethol Plaid Cymru Ifanc 2015-6



TOWARDS A SOVEREIGN FAROE ISLANDS

Johanna Roos Slættanes, Tráin Petursson Nónklett,
Fríði Paulason Hentze
Unga Tjóðveldið, Faroe Islands

The Faroe Islands is an autonomous island country in the North Atlantic Sea. It is situated between Iceland, the Shetland Islands and Norway. There are 18 islands which are home to approximately 50.000 inhabitants. The Faroe Islands is a part of the Danish Kingdom, like Greenland. The Faroe Islands has its own parliament called Føroya Løgting – literally translated as the ‘Law Thing of the Faroe Islands’. The parliament decides on issues such as taxes, the healthcare system and infrastructure and has 33 members in the parliament elected every four years. In addition to this, the Faroe Islands also have two members in the Danish parliament, elected in Danish General Elections. Each year the Faroe Islands get a 642 million DKK subsidy from Denmark.

In 1948, the Faroe Islands got the Home Rule Act. This law made us autonomous and gave us the possibility to take charge of competences. There still are competences that we do not control our self, such as the airspace, immigration policy, the police, defence, currency, family affairs, judicial

FRAM MÓTI EINUM SJÁLVBJARGNUM FØROYUM

Johanna Roos Slættanes, Tráin Petursson Nónklett,
Fríði Paulason Hentze
Unga Tjóðveldið, Føroyar

Føroyar er sjálvstýrandi oyggjaland í Norðuratlantshavinum og liggur millum Ísland, Hetland og Noreg. Føroyar eru 18 oyggjar og har liva uml. 50.000 fólk. Føroyar eru partar av Danska Kongaríkinum, eins og Grønland er. Føroyar hevur egið lögting, sum m.a. avger okkara skattapolitikk, heilsuverk og infrastruktur. Í Føroya Løgtingið sita 33 tingfólk, sum verða vald fjórða hvort ár. Umframt hetta, hevur Føroyar tveir limir í danska fólkatinginum, sum verða valdir, tá ið Danmark hevur val. Føroyar fær á hvørjum árið 642 miljónir danskar kr. í blokkstuðli frá Danmark. Føroyar brúkar danske gjaldoyer.

Í 1948 varð Heimastýrlógin sett í gildið í Føroyum. Hendan lög gav Føroyum stórrri sjálvstýrið enn áðrenn, og möguleika fyri at yvirtaka summi málsoðir. Tað eru tó summi økir, sum vit ikki hava ræði á. M.a. kann nevnast lofrúmið, útlendingamál, löggreglu, hervald, gjaldoyra, familjumál, dómsvald og uttanríkismál. Summi av hesum málum kunnu yvirtakast undir núverandi skipan, meðan fyri summi økir krevst av vera fullveldi.

authority and foreign affairs. Some of these issues could be transferred to us with further autonomy, but for some of the issues it is necessary to be a sovereign state. The Faroe Islands' biggest export is fish and farmed salmon. The Faroe Islands are a welfare state where education, healthcare systems, infrastructure and social services are mostly funded through a progressive tax structure; value added tax and taxes on companies.

The beginning of the Faroese National Movement is at the Christmas Meeting held on the 26th of December 1888. The Faroese spoke Faroese amongst themselves but all teaching was in Danish at this time. The children did not either learn about Faroese history and culture, and church services were also held on Danish. It was the Danish government that had decided this. The intention of the meeting was to preserve the Faroese language tradition and as a result gave rise to a movement called the Føringafelag (The Faroese Association). The purpose of the association was to preserve the Faroese language and gain independence for the Faroe Islands. It was not until 1937 that the Faroese language became the first language taught in school. There was also a folk high school started in 1899, which taught in Faroese, Faroese history and had church services in Faroese.

Another important national struggle was the struggle to have our own flag. The flag we use today is called Merkið. It was already made in 1919 and was designed by three young students. But it was not until World War Two that Merkið became our national flag. Denmark was occupied by Nazi-Germany on the 9th of April 1940. Three days later, the Faroe Islands was friendly occupied by Great Britain. On 25. of April Merkið was approved as our national flag. The Faroe Islands were not allowed to use its own flag under Danish rule. When the war was over Great Britain left the Faroe Islands and we became under the Danish Kingdom again. However, after the war there were a lot of Faroese people who wanted independence. 14th September 1946 there was a referendum whether we should be independent or not. The questions were:

1. Do you approve the Danish Government bill?
2. Do you approve separation between Denmark and the Faroe Islands?

The Faroese unionists were sure that the Danish Government's Bill would get a huge majority. However, the results showed that the second proposal got a majority. 47.2% of the people voted for the first proposal and 48.7% voted for the second proposal. The Faroese people had voted for independence.

Føroyingar útflyta serliga fisk og alilaks. Vit eru eitt vælferðarsamfelag, har skúli og útbúgving, heilsuverkið, infrastrukturur og sosialar tænastur í stórra mun verða goldnar gjøgnum eina progressiva skattaskipan umframt skatt á gerandisvørur og fyritøkur.

Føroyska tjóðskaparrörslan byrjar av álvara á Jólfundinum 2. jóladag 1888. Føroyingar tosaðu føroyskt sínamillum, men öll undirvísing í skúlunum var á donskum hesa tíðina. Børnini lærdu heldur ikki um føroyska søgu, men bert danska. Eisini vóru gudstænastur hildnar á donskum, og ikki føroyskum. Hetta var danske stjórnin, sum tók hesa avgerð. Ætlanin var at verja føroyska málid og teir føroysku siðirnar. Úrslitið av hesum fundi var, at "Føringafelag" varð stovnað. Felagið hevði til endamál at verja føroyska málid og at skipa Føroyar sjálvbjargnar. Ikki fyrr enn 1937 gjordist føroyskt undirvísingarmál í fólkaskúlanum. Tó vóru tað summar fóroyiskir lærarar, sum undirvístu á føroyskum áðrenn hetta, tó at tað ikki var loyvt. Eisini var ein háskúli stovnaður í 1899, sum undirvísti á føroyskum og í føroyiskari søgu og helt gudstænastur á føroyskum.

Eitt annað týdningarmikið tjóðskaparstríð er stríðið fyrir egíð flagg. Flaggið, sum vit nýta í dag, eitir Merkið. Hetta var longu boríð fram í 1919. Tað vóru tríggir ungir studentar, sum sniðgóvu flaggið. Tað var tó ikki fyrrenn undir Seinna Heimsbardaga, at Merkið gjordist alment. Hetta komst av, at Danmark ikki loyvdu okkum at hava egíð flagg. 9. apríl 1940 verður Danmark hersett av Týsklandi, og tríggjar dagar seinni, 12. apríl, verða Føroyar hersettar av Stóra Bretlandi. Hetta var ein vælmeint herseting. 25. apríl 1940 verður Merkið góðkent sum føroyska tjóðarmerkið. 16. maí 1945 fer Stóra Bretland úr Føroyum og Føroyar verða aftur ein partur av Danska Kongaríkinum. Nú er tó stórur vilji millum føroyska fólkid fyrir loysing. 14. september 1946 hava føroyingar fólkatkvøðu um framtíðar støðu landsins. Spurningarnir ljóða soleiðis:

- I. Ynskja tygum danske stjórnaruppskotið sett í gildi?
- II. Ynskja tygum loysing Danmarkar og Føroya millum?

Føroysk sambandsfólk og danske stjórnin vóru víss í, at danske stjórnaruppskotið fór at verða sett í gildið. Tað vísti seg tó, at ein lítil meiriluti av føroyska fólkinum valdi seinna uppskotið. 47,2%, valdu fyrra uppskotið, meðan 48,7% valdu seinna uppskotið. Hetta merkti, at tað var ein lítil meiriluti til uppskot um loysingina. Danski kongurin valdi tó at ógildiga fólkatkvøðuna og senda Løgtingið til hús við teirri

However, the Danish King cancelled the referendum and dissolved the Faroese parliament. His argument was that the turnout the referendum was too low, at 67.5%. This equals to 11624 people of 17216, that had voting rights. Today we have our own flag, language and culture, but we are still not a sovereign country. We still struggle for cause. Unga Tjóðveldið (Young Republicans) believes in a self-sustained and independent Faroe Islands. We want an egalitarian society, ensuring each individual's wellbeing. The main goal for the Faroese political parties supporting independence is to have a referendum on sovereignty. There are some complications as the support for independence spreads out between several different parties. In the Faroe Islands we have a left wing party for independence (Tjóðveldið), a conservative party (Fólkaflokkurin) and a liberal party (Framsókn) as well as a few smaller parties that wish for more self-government.

Established in 1948, Tjóðveldi is campaigning to get a Faroese constitution. However, the Danish government does not allow us to have our own constitution, despite the general support that the idea has amongst the population. The constitution would guarantee democracy and equal rights for all citizens.

As pointed out earlier in the article, the Faroe Islands receives a subsidy of 642 million DKK from Denmark. This amount used to be greater. In 2002, the Pro-Independence Coalition (Fullveldissamgongan) managed to decrease the subsidy by a third. Our suggestion is that the subsidy should be phased out as the Faroese economy grows. During the last few years, the Faroese economy has experienced growth of about 5% a year. Our suggestion is that we use half of this growth, in this case 2.5%, to lower the subsidy. This would make it possible for us to get rid of the subsidy within 8 to 10 years.

We also have the opportunity to take over various competences. For example, we plan to gain control of airspace and immigration policies. It is estimated that we would profit from control on airspace and would create jobs. Immigration policy would cost a few million DKK a year, but we would be able to control it ourselves.

We believe there to be many opportunities for the Faroe Islands if we become a sovereign country. Our constitutional status makes it impossible for us to be members of international organisations such as EFTA, the United Nations and WTO. These organisations demand that countries

grundgeving, at ov fá fólk høvdu atkvøtt. Luttókan á fólkaatkvoðuni var 67,5%. Hetta svarar til 11.624 fólk útav 17.216, sum høvdu atkvøðurætt. Í 1948 verður Heimastýrslógin sett í gildið í Føroyum, og hevur verið tað síðani. Tjóðveldisflokkurin verður stovnaður í 1948 fyri at seta fólkaatkvoðuna frá 1946 í gildið. Í dag hava vit egið flagg, egið mál og ega mentan. Vit eru tó enn ikki eitt fullveldi. Hetta berjast vit enn fyri. Unga Tjóðveldið trýr uppá einar sjálvbjargnar og frælsar Føroyar. Vit ynskja at skipa eitt samhaldsfest samfelag, har øll hava tað gott. Størsta málið fyri føroyska loysingarvongin er at hava eina fólkaatkvoðu um fullveldi. Ein trupulleiki er tó, at loysingarvongurin er spjaddur. Í Føroyum er ein vinstravendur loysingarflokkur(Tjóðveldi), konservativur sjálvtýrisflokkur(Fólkaflokkurin) og ein liberalur loysingarflokkur(Framsókn). Eisini eru nakrir smærri flokkar, sum ynskja storrri sjálvtýrið.

Í lötuni arbeiðir Tjóðveldi serliga við at fáa eina føroyska grundlög. Danska stjórnin vil tó ikki loyva okkum hetta. Tað tykist tó at vera vilji í stórum parti av føroyska fólkini at fáa egna grundlög. Í hesari grundlögini vilja vit m.a. tryggja fólkaraði og rættindi hjá øllum borgarum.

Sum vit byrjaðu greinina við, so fær Føroyar á hvørjum árið 642 miljónir danskar kr. í blokkstuðli frá Danmark. Hetta hevur verið væl hægri fyrr. Í 2002 lækkaði Fullveldissamgongan danske blokkstuðulin við ein triðing. Okkara uppskotið í dag er, at vit gerast leys av danske blokkstuðlinum so hvort okkara inntókur vaks. Seinastu árini hava vit havt ein vökstur á uml. 5% um árið. Vit skjóta upp, at helvtin av vökstrinum, í hesum fóri 2,5%, fer til at lækka blokin. Hetta ger tað möguligt at gerast leys av blokinum innan uml. 8-10 ár.

Vit hava eisini möguleika næstu árini at yvirtaka ymisk málsókir. M.a. ætla vit at yvirtaka loftrúmið og útlendingamál. Hesi økir eru ikki so kostnaðarmikil. Mett verður at loftrúmið gevur yvirskot og arbeiðspláss, meðan útlendingamál kosta nakrar miljónir um árið at reka.

Vit meta at tað eru nógvir fyrimunir við at Føroyar gerst eitt fullveldi. Ríkisrættarliga stóðan Føroyar er í, hevur við sær, at vit ikki kunnu fáa limaskap í altjóða felagsskapir so sum EFTA, Sameindu Tjóðir og WTO. Hesir felagsskapir krevja, at lond eru sjálvtøðug. Hesir felagsskapir høvdur verið til at ment okkara land. M.a. hevði EFTA limaskapur givið okkum eina rúgvu av handilssátmálum. Hetta kann vera við til at skapa storrri ríkidömi til føroyska fólkioð, og tí er ikki neydugt við danska blokinum. Vit

are independent. As members of such organisations, we would be able to improve the situation of our country. For example membership in EFTA would provide us with numerous trade treaties. This would rid the Faroese people of dependency on subsidies received from Denmark. We want to represent ourselves abroad, from the United Nations to the Olympic Games. We want Faroese sportspeople to represent the Faroese flag, Merkið, and not Denmark. We want independence.

ynskja at umboða okkum sjálvi úti í heimi. M.a. kunnu vit ikki luttaka sum sjálvstöðug tjóð til Altjóða Leikirnar. Vit hava havt rógvvara og svimjara, sum hava verið noydd at umboða Danmark til OL. Vit ynskja, at fóroyingar skulu umboða Merkið. Vit ynskja loysing.



ABOUT TRANSYLVANIA

Toke Erwin
Transylvania

Transylvania is situated in Central Europe, surrounded by the arc of the Carpathian mountain chain, in the Eastern part of Carpathian Basin, which is in the Romanian state. Its name in Romanian is Transilvania or Ardeal, in German it is Siebenbürgen, in Latin, it is Transsilvania. Unfortunately, today, Transylvania can be considered distinct only due to its historical traditions and its specific culture. This territory is comprised of Partium, the most part of Eastern Banat, Inner Transylvania and, in its eastern part, Szeklerland.

According to the last census, 1,200,000 ethnic Hungarians live today in Transylvania, and half of them live in Szeklerland. Despite this, Transylvanian Hungarians' rights as a community are insufficient and are unrecognised. There are, in theory, smaller scale rights, but these are rarely put in practice.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY - HOW THE HUNGARIANS BECAME PART OF ROMANIA'S TERRITORY

During their conquest in 895 of the Carpathian Basin, the Hungarians

ERDÉLYRŐL

Toke Erwin
Erdély

Erdély a Kárpátok gyűrűjében található Közép-Európában, a Kárpát-medence keleti részén, ma Románia területén. Neve románul Transilvania vagy Ardeal, németül Siebenbürgen, latinul Transsilvania. Sajnos ma már csak történelmi hagyományai és sajátos kultúrája miatt tekinthető önállónak. Ez a terület magában foglalja a Partiumot, a Bánság keleti nagyobb részét, Belső-Erdélyt és annak keleti részén Székelyföldet. Erdélyben jelenleg az utolsó népszámlálás nyomán hozzávetőleg 1.200.000 magyar él, amelynek fele Székelyföldön. Ennek ellenére az erdélyi magyar közösség jogai komolyan csorbulnak a minden napokban. Kisebb jogok, engedmények ugyan vannak, viszont nagyon sok esetben nem alkalmazzák.

TÖRTÉNELMI ÁTTEKINTŐ. HOGYAN KERÜLTEK A MAGYAROK ROMÁNIA HATÁRAIN BELÜL

A magyarok 895-ös honfoglalásukkor a Kárpát-medencében találtak egy magyar nyelvet beszélő népet, ők a székelyek, akik ma Erdély keleti részén élnek. A székelyek magukat a hunok leszármazottainak tartják. Ezt a hitet őseiktől örökítétek, ősi hagyományuk, melyhez ehhez szívósan ragaszkodnak.

founded a Hungarian speaking community – these were the Szeklers, who now live in the East of Transylvania. The Szeklers consider themselves as descendants of the Huns. This belief was inherited from their ancestors, and it is a heritage that they deeply cherish.

In 1003, Transylvania became a part of the Kingdom of Hungary. This part of the territory was led by a voivode appointed by the King of Hungary.

In 1568, the Torda Diet signed the Edict of Torda, by which religious freedom was proclaimed for Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed Christians and Unitarians. This was the first of its kind in the world.

The Transylvanian Principality ruled, besides the historical Transylvania territory, other lands of the once Kingdom of Hungary. This other large territory was called by the Latin name of Partium.

In 1699, after the Austrian-Ottoman Peace Treaty of Karlowitz, Transylvania was reattached to Hungary, ruled by the Habsburgs. However, government-wise, Transylvania was separate from the other parts of the country, as it was ruled by a governor from Vienna.

In 1712–1713, the Verwaltungsgericht – the Austrian administrative authority – released the official estimation of demographic breakdown in Transylvania, and according to that estimation, the ethnicity of its inhabitants was 47% Hungarian, 34% Romanian and 19% Saxon and Swabian.

In 1848, March 15th, the last point of the Budapest 12 Point petition sent to the Habsburgs requested that Hungary be reunited with Transylvania. Increasing Romanian nationalism led to separatist claims like Avram Iancu's. This also led the Transylvanian Romanians to turn against the Hungarian struggle for independence, and with this, the relationship between the Hungarians and Romanians living in Transylvania was sealed. During the First World War, the Romanian irredentist movements grew even stronger. Romania – formerly considered as being in a peaceful relationship with the Center rulers, went to War as an Entente ally, because France and England promised the Romanian leaders that the country would get Transylvania back.

In 1918, the National Assembly in Alba Iulia declared the Union of Transylvania with Romania, and this union was stressed also by the Entente in 1920 in the Treaty of Trianon.

Erdély 1003-ban a Magyar Királyság részévé vált. Az országrészt a király helytartója, az erdélyi vajda irányította.

Az 1568-as tordai országgyűlésen a világban elsőként törvényben rögzítette a lelkismereti és vallásszabadságot a négy hivatalos felekezet (katolikus, lutheránus, református, unitárius) számára.

Az Erdélyi Fejedelemseg a történelmi Erdély területén kívül a volt Magyar Királyság más területeit is birtokolta. Ezt a széles területsávot nevezték latin szóval Partiumnak.

Az 1699-ben kötött osztrák-török karlócai béke értelmében Erdélyt visszacsatolták a Habsburg uralom alatt álló Magyarországhoz, de közigazgatásilag különállt az ország többi részétől, mert a Bécs által kinevezett kormányzó irányította.

1712–1713-ban a Verwaltungsgericht – az osztrák közigazgatási hatóság – által végzett becslés szerint Erdély lakóinak nemzetiségi megoszlása: 47% magyar, 34% román, 19% német (szász és sváb).

1848. március 15-én a Habsburgok felé intézett pesti 12 pont záró pontja az Erdélyvel való egyesítést követelte. Az éledő román nacionalizmus az Avram Iancu-féle szeparatista törekvésekhez vezetett, s szembefordította az erdélyi románokat a magyar szabadságharccal, és ezzel megpecsételtél az Erdélyben élő magyarok és románok viszonyát.

Az első világháború alatt még jobban felerősödtek a román irredenta mozgalmak. Az addig a központi hatalmakkal barátinak tekintett Románia az antant oldalán szállt háborúba, mivel Franciaország és Anglia részéről igéretet kapott Erdély megszerzésére.

1918. december 1-jén tartott gyulafehérvári román nagygyűlés kimondta Erdély egyesülését Romániával, amit 1920-ban az antant hatalmak a trianoni békedenktáttummal szentesítettek.

Az 1940-ben, Erdély északi és keleti része (43 492 km²-t) 4 évre visszakerült Magyarországhoz, benne a 90%-ban magyarok által lakott Székelyfölddel.

SZÉKELYFÖLD

Székelyföld alatt az Erdély területén található, történelmi székely székek

In 1940, The Eastern and Western part of Transylvania (43.492 square kilometers) became part of Hungary again for four years, and that territory included the Szeklerland, comprised by 90% ethnic Hungarians.

SZEKLERLAND

Szeklerland is the territory situated in Transylvania, comprised of the historical szekler seats (székek) - Marosszék, Gyergyószék, Csíkszék, Udvarhelyszék, Kézdiszék, Orbaiszék, Sepsiszék és Erdővidék.

Szeklerland struggled to obtain autonomy throughout centuries. It is the only region – among Transylvania's historical-ethnographical regions – where ethnic Hungarians are in a majority (71.4% in 2002, 71.72% in 2011). 800,000 people were moved to Transylvania from Moldova, but also many were moved from the southern side of the Carpathian Arc. The planned settling of the Romanians in Transylvania included Szeklerland, and one of the most affected cities was Târgu Mureş.

According to the 1910 census, in the cities and towns of Transylvania, the percent of ethnic Romanians was 19%, but this changed in a few decades. The “romanisation” of Szeklerland began with the county capital cities, but the process did not affect the rest of the Hungarian regions in Szeklerland.

AUTONOMIST AND FEDERALIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TRANSYLVANIA

The Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania

At the beginning of the 2000s it became clearer that the most important political subject – the issue of autonomy in Transylvania – was left without representation.

Therefore, in 2003, under the leadership of Tőkés László, the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania was founded. The fundamental goal of the organization has been to fight by peaceful means for different forms of autonomy (cultural and territorial), to protect rights and interests, to consolidate civil society, democracy, and political pluralism.

During the winter of 2010 the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania

(Marosszék, Gyergyószék, Csíkszék, Udvarhelyszék, Kézdiszék, Orbaiszék, Sepsiszék és Erdővidék) területét kell érteni. Székelyföld önrendelkezéssel bírt, az évszázadok folyamán. Erdély történelmi-etnográfiai régiói közül jelenleg csak itt vannak a magyar anyanyelvűek többségben (arányuk 71,4% volt 2002-ben, 71,72% 2011-ben).

Moldvából 800 ezer románt telepítettek Erdélybe, de Havaselléről is sokan érkeztek. A tervszerű betelepítés Székelyföld városait sem kímélte, melynek első áldozata Marosvásárhely lett. Az erdélyi városokban az 1910-es népszámlás adatai szerint a románok számaránya csak 19 százalék volt, ez néhány évtized alatt megváltozott. Székelyföld románosítása a megyeközpontok betelepítésével kezdődött, de a tömbmagyar térség etnikai fellazítására már nem került sor.

AUTONOMISTA ÉS FÖDERALISTA SZERVEZETEK ERDÉLYBEN

Az Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt

A 2000-es évek elejére világossá vált, hogy az erdélyi magyar politikai közbeszéd egyik legalapvetőbb és megkerülhetetlen téma, az autonómia ügye, képviselet nélkül marad.

Ezért 2003-ban Tőkés László vezetésével, megalakult az Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, melynek alapvető célja, hogy hozzájáruljon az erdélyi magyar nemzeti közösség törekvéseinek megvalósításához, jogainak és érdekeinek védelméhez, a civil szféra, a demokrácia, a jogállamiság és a politikai pluralizmus megszilárdulásához, a régiók gazdasági, szociális, kulturális és intézményi fejlődéséhez.

2010 telén az EMNT az Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt létrehozásáról döntött. A párt bejegyzése meg is történt 2011. szeptember 15-én.

A Néppárt első Országos Küldöttgyűlését 2012. február 25-én Csíkszeredában tartották, ahol elfogadták alapszabályzatát és politikai programját, valamint megválasztották a párt első elnökét Toró T. Tibor személyében.

Az Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt nem valami ellen, hanem valamiért jött létre: tételesen azért, hogy az autonómiának, a föderalizmusnak, a kisebbségvédelemnek, az erdélyiségnak legyen egy hiteles képviselője.

(HNCT) decided to establish the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (HPPT). The party's registration was accomplished on 15 September 2011.

The first HPPT congress was held in Csíkszereda/Miercurea Ciuc on 25 February 2012, where its statutes and its political program were adopted, and the delegates elected Toró T. Tibor as party president.

The Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania was not founded against but rather in favour of something. The main goal was to found a party which is the most authentic representative of autonomy, of federalism, and of minority protection in Romania.

The HPPT wishes decision-making rights to be transferred to a local level thus promoting the development of forms of autonomy, and also desires the practice of modern European federalism applied in Romania. Romania is a highly centralized nation state. This is the main reason why our country is deeply corrupt which causes huge losses in the annual budget. We want a European modernisation of the country based on the best practices of federalism, regionalism and autonomies.

HPPT'S PARTNERS AND ALLIES

Besides our alliance with the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania, the HPPT also has a close partnership with the Szekler National Council, who of course we fully support in their struggle for autonomy. In addition, we foster good relations with the currently ruling parties from Hungary, while in the international field our best ally is the European Free Alliance. We also have partnerships with Romanian civil organizations and public figures who share Transylvanian values.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY DURING THE LAST 10 YEARS

- 2004, January 17: the SZNT – The Szekler National Council - finalises and accepts the Autonomy Statute Plan of Szeklerland, which was presented to the Romanian Parliament on the 1st of March by Parliament members Birtalan Ákos, Kovács Zoltán Attila, Pécsi Ferenc, Szilágyi Zsolt, Toró T. Tibor and Vekov Károly. The law proposal was rejected, without any debate, by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
- 2006, March 15: Szekler Assembly in Székelyudvarhely/Odorheiu

Ezen túlmenően alapértékeinek közé tartozik: a szabadság, a család, az erdélyiség, a nemzet, és a keresztenység morális értékeire alapozó demokrácia. A Néppárt egy modern, európai és hatékony néppárt, melynek tagjai egy alternatív utat választottak: határozottan Erdély-központú, munkaadó és felelősségteljes politikát kívánnak folytatni.

Nem hiszünk a Bukarest-központú politizálásban. Bukarestből nem lehet dönteni a helyi közösségek sorsát érintő igazán fontos kérdésekben. A Néppárt Erdélybe, helyi színtekre akarja áthelyezni a döntéshozatal súlypontját, így segítve elő az autonómiaformák kialakulását is. A helyi képviselet, az Erdély-szintű politizálás elkötelezettséje vagyunk. Magyar politikai képviseletként az erdélyi magyarság jövőjét biztosító közjogi kereteket – a belső önréndelkezés elvén alapuló közösségi autonómiaformák törvény általi szavatolását – akarjuk megteremteni.

AZ ERDÉLYI MAGYAR NÉPPÁRT PARTNEREI ÉS SZÖVETSÉGESEI

A Néppártot életre hívó Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács mellett szoros szövetséget kötöttünk a Székely Nemzeti Tanáccsal, melyet autonómiatörekvéseiben maximálisan támogatunk. Emellett a Néppárt jó viszonyt ápol a Magyarországon aktuálisan kormányzó pártszövetséggel, nemzetközi téren első sorban pedig az European Free Alliance al. Továbbá, az erdélyi értékeket felmutató és azokat képviselő romániai civil szervezetekkel és közéleti szereplőkkel.

AZ AUTONÓMIAKÜZDELEM ELMÚLT 10 ÉVE

- 2004. január 17.: a SZNT véglegesíti és elfogadja Székelyföld autonómiájának statútumtervezetét, amelyet március 1-jén Birtalan Ákos, Kovács Zoltán Attila, Pécsi Ferenc, Szilágyi Zsolt, Toró T. Tibor és Vekov Károly országgyűlési képviselők terjesztettek Románia parlamentje elé. A törvényjavaslatot a képviselőház és a szenátus is megvitatás nélkül elutasította.
- 2006. március 15.: Székely Nagygyűlés Székelyudvarhelyen. A tömeggyűlésen 20 000 ember követeli Székelyföld autonómiáját. A résztvevők közzelkiáltással egy kiáltványt fogadnak el, amely lényegében egy közösségi akaratnyilvánítás az autonómia mellett.
- 2006. október 7.: a SZNT nem hivatalos népszavazást tart. 254 település 395 008 szavazatra jogosult polgárának nyílt lehetősége szavazni

Secuiesc. The 20,000 people present request the autonomy of Szeklerland. The participants support a proclamation which basically summarises the will for autonomy that the community manifests.

- 2006, October 7: the SZNT holds an unofficial referendum. 395,008 people from 254 cities, towns and villages can vote for the autonomy of Szeklerland. 209,304 citizens voted, and, among these, 207,864 – 99.31% - voted in favour for autonomy.
- Local administrations in many Szekler towns and villages planned referendums for March 15, 2009. They planned to consult the citizens on whether they agreed that the borders of the counties should change so that all the towns and villages in those areas become part of a single autonomous Szeklerland administration. The referenda did not take place after all, because the prefects took the project to court, and they were ruled unconstitutional.
- 2009, September 4: The Szekler Grand Assembly takes place. They agree to the Szekler Autonomy Statute, and the official symbols: the flag, the coat of arms, and the anthem. Also, the map of Szeklerland is shown, comprising 8 seats - Maros, Udvarhely, Seps, Orbai, Bardoc-Miklósvár, Csík, Gyergyó, Kézdi. It was on this territory that the referendum was organised.
- 2013, March 10: On the Szekler Martyrs Memorial Day, in Marosvásárhely – Târgu Mureş, 30,000 people marched for the autonomy of Szeklerland.
- 2013, October 27: following the example of the 1963 March of Washington, and marches in Baltic states and Catalonia, the Szekler Great March was organised – a human chain measuring 54 kilometers, between Bereck and Kökös. The march was organised in order to protest against the regionalisation project proposed by the Romanian Government, and to request once more the autonomy of Szeklerland. This was the biggest mobilisation in the history of the Szekler autonomy struggle: more than 120,000 people participated in the event. According to the 2011 census data, the population of Szeklerland (having the borders declared by the The Szekler National Council) was 810,367 people. The ethnic structure of the population was the following: 581,159 (71.72%) Hungarians (Székely), 183,511 (22.65%) Romanians, 32,809 (4.04%) Roma and 12,888 (1.59%) other ethnicities.

Székelyföld autonómiájáról. 209 304 állampolgár ment el szavazni, ebből 207 864 mondott igent az autonómiára. Százalékban kifejezve tehát, az igenek részaránya 99,31%.

- Több székelyföldi település önkormányzata népszavazást írt ki 2009. március 15-ére. A referendumon arról kérdeznék meg a polgárokat, hogy akarják-e, hogy a jelenlegi megye határok úgy módosuljanak, hogy az illető települések a létrehozandó Székelyföld autonóm közigazgatási egységhez tartozzanak. A népszavazásokat nem tartották meg a kijelölt dátumon, ugyanis a prefektusok mindegyiket megtámadták a bírósagon, ahol ezeket alkotmányellenesnek minősítették.
- 2009. szeptember 4.: megrendezésre került a székelyek önkormányzati nagygyűlése. Elfogadták Székelyföld Autonómia Statútumát, Székelyföld hivatalos jelképeit: a zászlót, címert, illetve a himnuszt. Ugyanekkor mutatták be Székelyföld jelenlegi térképét, amelyen a leendő autonóm terület közigazgatásilag 8 székre van felosztva (Maros, Udvarhely, Seps, Orbai, Bardoc-Miklósvár, Csík, Gyergyó, Kézdi). Ezen a területen zajlott a véleménynyilvánító népszavazás is.
- 2013. március 10.: A székely vöröstanúk emléknapján, Marosvásárhelyen 30.000 ember követelte Székelyföld autonómiáját.
- 2013. október 27.: Székelyek Nagy Menetelése, Bereck és Kökös között, egy 54 kilométeres szakaszon élőláncot szerveztek, az 1963-as Washingtoni Menetelés, illetve a balti államok és a katalánok élőláncai mintájára tiltakozásul a Romániában tervezett közigazgatási átalakítás ellen, és egyúttal Székelyföld területi autonómiája mellett tüntettek. Ez volt a Székely autonómia harc legnagyobb meghozzájárulása, amelyen több mint 120.000 ember vett részt.

A 2011-es népszámlálási adatok alapján, az SZNT által behatárolt területen Székelyföld népessége 810 367 fő. A lakosság etnikai összetétele a következő: 581 159 fő (71,72%) magyar (székely), 183 511 fő (22,65%) román, 32 809 (4,04%) roma és 12 888 (1,59%) egyéb nemzetiségi.



HOW TO BE YOUNG, BRETON AND LEFT-WING WITHOUT AUTONOMY?

Mael Garrec

Union Democratique Bretonne Jeunes, Brittany

BRITTANY, A MARGINALIZED TERRITORY IN A CENTRALISED FRANCE

Like many Celtic nations, Brittany historically suffered from a significant lack of development until the last quarter of the 20th century. Low levels of industrialisation, a poor connection to the rest of Europe and the relative lack of interest from Paris for a region without mineral nor agricultural wealth (in the past), explain the lack of public investment in the region and the abandonment of the region that was once called the "Peru of France." Deprived of political autonomy since the beginning of the French Revolution, Brittany underwent a period marked by the impoverishment of rural populations, a major migration of its workers the economic powerhouses of France and abroad. Breton and Gallo cultures has suffered directly from a policy of cultural eradication from the Parisian centralist movement and a lack of interest by its elites who swear by French culture,

COMMENT ÊTRE JEUNE, BRETON ET DE GAUCHE, SANS ÊTRE POUR L'AUTONOMIE DE L'HOMME ?

Mael Garrec

UDB Yaouank, Breizh

LA BRETAGNE, TERRITOIRE MARGINALISÉ DANS UNE FRANCE CENTRALISÉE

Comme de nombreuses régions celtes, la Bretagne subit un retard de développement flagrant de la région jusqu'au dernier quart du XX^{ème} siècle. La faible industrialisation, une mauvaise connexion avec le reste de l'Europe et le relatif désintérêt de Paris pour une région sans richesses minières ou agricoles (à cette époque) explique le manque d'investissement publics dans la région et l'appauvrissement d'une région qui fut autrefois le « Pérou de la France ». Privée de d'autonomie politique depuis le début de la Révolution française, la Bretagne connaît alors une période marquée par l'appauvrissement des populations rurales, une migration importante de sa main-d'œuvre vers les bassins d'emplois en France et à

a supposed symbol of ‘modernity’.

The gradual awakening of conscience in Brittany was due to the Emsav (Breton movement) in the 20th century. Emsav was a political, linguistic and cultural movement in which intellectuals affirmed the interest of Breton culture and the takeover of its history by a region marginalized by the centralist power.

Popular awareness is marked by episodes of challenging Parisian central power: CELIB in 1960, the revolt of Plogoff in the late 70s. More recently it was the events for the languages defense Brittany, against the new airport of Nantes, the movement of Bonnets Rouges or the red caps, demonstrations for the reunification of Brittany and against the dismantling of the administrative region of Brittany.

Nevertheless, despite cultural and economic renewal, Brittany remains a marginalised region (not just in the geographical sense) and a victim of extreme centralisation, where all ministries and major administrations as well as the vast majority of the headquarters of large companies are in the Parisian region.

THE UDBYOUTH : YOUTH, AUTONOMIST AND LEFT-WING

Member of EFAY, the UDBYouth (Unvaniezh Demokratel Breizh Yaouank in Breton) is defined as an organisation of young activists of the Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB), independent from the federations of the UDB which advocates autonomy for Brittany.

The UDBYouth asks in the Breton political landscape: how can we be young, left-wing, environmentalist, and not autonomist?

Marked by political and economic marginalisation and cultural persecution of the Breton and Gallo cultures, we set self-determination of Brittany as a cornerstone of the emancipation of the Breton society out of the shackles of its past.

As autonomists, we claim the right of Bretons to decide for themselves and in a true democracy that respects the freedoms of the people on each and every level. For too long, the choices in political and economic matters have been taken from Paris by governments, administrations and economic leaders regardless of our opinion and our concern.

l'étranger. Les cultures de langue bretonne et gallo subissent une politique d'éradiation culturelle de la part du mouvement centraliste parisien ainsi qu'un désintérêt de la part de ses élites qui ne jurent plus que par la culture francophone, symbole de modernité.

Le réveil des consciences en Bretagne se fait progressivement au travers de l'Emsav au XX^{ème} siècle, un mouvement politique, linguistique et culturel qui voit des intellectuels affirmer l'intérêt de la culture bretonne et la nécessaire reprise en main de son histoire par une région marginalisée par le pouvoir centraliste. La prise de conscience populaire est, elle, marquée par des épisodes de remise en question du pouvoir centralisateur parisien : CELIB dans les années 1960, la révolte de Plogoff à la fin des années 70. Plus récemment ce furent les manifestations pour la défense des langues bretonnes, contre le nouvel aéroport de Nantes, le mouvement des bonnets rouges, les manifestations pour la réunification de la Bretagne et contre le démantèlement de la région administrative Bretagne.

Malgré cela, malgré un renouveau culturel et économique, la Bretagne demeure une région marginalisée (et non simplement périphérique au sens géographique) dans une France toujours centralisée à l'extrême où tous les ministères et les grandes administrations ainsi que la grande majorité des sièges de grandes entreprises se situent dans la région parisienne.

L'UDB JEUNES : JEUNES, AUTONOMISTES ET DE GAUCHE

Membre de l'EFAY, l'UDB Jeunes (Unvaniezh Demokratel Breizh Yaouank en breton) se définit comme une organisation de jeunes militants de l'Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB) indépendante des fédérations de l'UDB qui prône l'autodétermination de la Bretagne. L'UDB Jeunes pose la question suivante dans le paysage politique breton : comment peut-on être jeune, de gauche, écologiste, et ne pas être autonomiste ?

Marquée par une marginalisation politique et économique et un persécution culturelle à l'égard des cultures bretonnes et gallo, nous posons l'autodétermination de la Bretagne comme pierre angulaire de l'émancipation de la société bretonne de ses carcans passés.

Autonomistes, nous réclamons le droit des bretons à décider par et pour eux-mêmes dans une démocratie véritable qui respecte à chaque

Political autonomy should break with centuries of centralism, which is the characteristic of French political practice since the end of the Middle Ages (regardless of monarchical or republican regime). Up until 1981, prefects (unelected governors) representing the government on French territory, were the only ones to decide the regional and departmental policy to implement. We campaign for a true democracy. A democracy that respects the principle of subsidiarity, such as pressurizing the European Union to recognise the freedom of the people to decide on which level of government they wish to see policies being decided upon. Our votes, our elected officials must match our choices, and our problems must be offered solutions that are specific to the Breton context.

How can a few notable centralists, living in Paris throughout the year take into account our requests and our choices from the halls of power? How can they proclaim to be legitimate in a system favoring bipartisanship and not proportional representation?

WHAT LEGITIMACY FOR REGIONAL POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE PREFECT, NON-ELECTED OFFICIAL REPRESENTING THE PARISIAN GOVERNMENT?

Economically and socially, the young people are the first victims of the lack of autonomy of Brittany. Our territory is a maritime region with enormous economic potential and it remains discredited by a Parisian political and economic elite. This lack of economic development to the extent of our potential, as well as the centralising of skilled jobs in Paris obliges tens of thousands of young people to migrate to Paris or abroad each year, while our region is the first in terms of educational success. Even more seriously, in the university sector, the most high-level training involves moving to Paris because of a disproportionately high concentration of universities in the capital. An economic model imposed by Paris, based on the overproduction of low quality food products, crushes young rural farmers in debt and locks workers in under-skilled and underpaid jobs. Ecologically, this outdated economic strategy is extremely harmful to the environment.

Culturally, Breton and Gallo cultures are still considered subcultures and too few young people have the opportunity to learn their language and their history due to the low capacity of regional institutions.

Furthermore, we affirm and defend the empowerment of humankind in

échelle les libertés du peuple. Trop longtemps, les choix en matière politique et économique ont été fait depuis Paris par des gouvernements, administrations et dirigeants économiques sans tenir compte de notre avis et de nos préoccupation.

L'autonomie politique doit rompre avec les siècles de centralisme, qui sont le marqueur de la pratique politique française depuis la fin du moyen-âge (indépendamment du régime monarchique ou républicain). Là où jusqu'en 1981 encore, les préfets, gouverneurs non-élus, représentant le gouvernement sur le territoire français, étaient les seuls à décider de la politique régionale et départementale à mettre en place, nous militons pour une démocratie véritable. Une démocratie qui respecterait le principe de subsidiarité, telle que la promeut l'Union Européenne, reconnaîtrait la liberté du peuple de voter au plus près de lui pour décider au plus près de lui. Nos votes, nos élus doivent correspondre à nos choix, nos problèmes et nos solutions qui sont spécifiques au contexte breton.

Comment quelques notables centralisateurs, vivant à Paris à l'année peuvent-ils prendre en compte nos demandes et nos choix depuis les salons du pouvoir ? Comment peuvent-ils clamer être légitime dans un système favorisant le bipartisme et non la représentation proportionnelle ?

QUELLE LÉGITIMITÉ À DES DÉCISIONS DE POLITIQUE RÉGIONALE PRISES PAR PRÉFET, FONCTIONNAIRE NON-ÉLU REPRÉSENTANT LE GOUVERNEMENT PARISIEN ?

Economiquement et socialement, les jeunes sont les premières victimes de l'absence d'autonomie de la Bretagne. Notre territoire est une région maritime au potentiel économique énorme qui reste déconsidérée par un pouvoir politique et économique parisien tourné vers sa capitale et la dorsale européenne. Cette absence de développement économique à la mesure de notre potentiel et une centralisation des emplois qualifiés à Paris oblige chaque année des dizaines de milliers de jeunes à migrer à Paris ou à l'étranger, alors que notre région est la première en termes de réussite éducative. Pire, dès l'université, la plupart des formations de haut-niveau impliquent une expatriation vers Paris du fait d'une concentration anormale des universités dans la capitale. Un modèle économique imposé par Paris, basé sur la surproduction de produits agroalimentaires de basse qualité, écrase les jeunes agriculteurs ruraux sous les dettes et les ouvriers dans des emplois sous-qualifiés et sous-payés. Ecologiquement,

all its diversity, including the liberation of women and LGBT people, and wish to shed the societal shackles they suffer.

We need autonomy for people so that we can all live freely, free from the constraints that exist at all levels. It is also to be free to live and work in the country with decent conditions of employment and without being forced into exile that live their culture and language without restriction in public spaces. It is to live freely regardless of gender, skin color or sexuality. For this, the UDBYouth struggle for autonomy, which naturally involves the empowerment of Breton society and the taking control of our own politics to decide our own future : a real Assembly of Brittany, including the Nantes area, with the financial and humans resources in order to give Bretons the power to fer païs, or to nation-build, a common Catalan concept. We need to build the country just as we Bretons perceive it, a country that respects the Breton society and its aspirations.

THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN UNION TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM OF PEOPLES

In a French context where the temptation of isolationism and authoritarianism remains clear, and is represented by support for the Front National, we offer a positive alternative for Bretons. The recentralising temptation is always there : the redistribution of the regions in 2015 was made in the halls of government, for and from elected politicians and Parisian technocrats. At no occasion did regional demands or even the option of a referendum amongst the people in the areas affected were raised. The fight against metropolitanisation and recentralisation of powers, the dismemberment of the Regions, the struggle for the reunification of Brittany are many struggles that we fight against, for a Brittany open to the world, democratic and egalitarian.

The struggle for political autonomy of Brittany remains, therefore, important for UDBYouth and must be transposed in all struggles against oppression which call into question the freedom to fully be one's self among others.

cette stratégie économique dépassée se révèle extrêmement nocive pour l'environnement.

Culturellement, les cultures bretonne et gallèse sont toujours considérées comme des sous-cultures et trop peu de jeunes ont la possibilité d'apprendre leur langue et leur histoire en raison des faibles moyens dont disposent les institutions régionales.

Au delà, nous affirmons que c'est l'autonomisation de l'humain dans toutes ses acceptations, y compris la libération des femmes et des homosexuels des carcans sociétaux qu'ils subissent, que nous défendons.

Une autonomie de l'humain pour que tous puissent vivre librement, libérés des contraintes qui existent à tous niveaux. C'est autant être libre de vivre et travailler au pays avec des conditions d'emplois décentes et sans être contraint à l'exil, que vivre sa culture et sa langue sans restriction dans l'espace public. C'est vivre librement sans que son sexe, sa couleur de peau ou sa sexualité sans discrimination. Pour cela, l'UDB Jeunes lutte pour l'autonomie, qui passe naturellement par l'autonomisation de la société bretonne et la conquête du contrôle politique de sa destinée : une vraie assemblée de Bretagne, incluant le pays nantais, avec les moyens financiers et humains de pouvoir donner aux bretons le pouvoir de « fer pais », selon les mots de Jordi Pujol. Faire le pays tel que les bretons le conçoivent, un pays qui respecte la société bretonne et ses aspirations.

LA NÉCESSITÉ D'UNE UNION EUROPÉENNE GARANTE DES LIBERTÉS DES PEUPLES

Dans un contexte français où la tentation du repli sur soi et de l'autoritarisme reste importante et symbolisée par le vote FN, nous proposons une alternative positive aux bretons. La tentation recentralisatrice est toujours là : le redécoupage des régions en 2015 s'est fait dans les salons du gouvernement, par et pour des élus et des fonctionnaires parisiens. A aucun moment les revendications régionales ou même l'option d'un vote des habitants de ces régions n'a été évoqué. La lutte contre la métropolisation et la recentralisation des pouvoirs, le démembrément des régions, la lutte pour la réunification de la Bretagne sont autant de combats que nous portons pour une Bretagne ouverte au monde, démocratique et égalitaire. La lutte pour l'autonomie politique de la Bretagne demeure, de ce fait, importante pour l'UDB Jeunes et doit se transposer à toutes les luttes contre les oppressions qui remettent en cause la liberté d'être pleinement « soi parmi les autres ».



THE AUTONOMY GENERATION

Anne Tomasi

Partitu di a Nazione Corsa Ghjuvnetù, Corsica

The first time I attended an EFAy General Assembly, I met a young man from Northern Catalonia (the part in the French state). When he heard I was from Corsica, his first reaction was the following: "You're so lucky in Corsica. You have a very generous statute of autonomy, which is especially good for your language!" I wondered if I had heard him properly. For me, regarding all these European peoples represented next to me, it seemed to me that Corsica was slightly behind in the game. But what was a poor situation for me, was a dream for him. This got me thinking: what exactly does autonomy mean?

According to the dictionary, the definition is '*The condition or right of a state, institution, group, etc., to make its own laws or rules and administer its own affairs, free from the interference of the central power*' (Larousse Dictionary). In Corsica, according to this definition, autonomy hardly exists, due to the French state's constant interference!

Our region has a particular status. Since 1992, some competences have been transferred to its assembly, the *Cullettività Territoriale di Corsica* (CTC). These include land planning, economic development, culture

GENERAZIONE AUTONOMIA

Anne Tomasi

Partitu di a Nazione Corsa Ghjuvnetù, Corsica

A prima volta ch'e sò andata à l'Assamblea Generale d'EFAy, aghju scontru un giovanu di a Catalunia di u nordu (a parte chì hè in Francia). Quand'ellu hà intesu ch'e venia di Corsica, a so prima reazzone fù (in francese bella sicura...) : "Woua, vous avez de la chance, vous en Corse. Vous avez un super statut d'autonomie, surtout pour la langue !" Mi dumandava s'e sentia bè ! Per mè, à fianc'à tutti sti populi d'Europa, mi si paria d'esse in ritardu assai assai. Ma ciò chì per mè ùn era nunda, era per ellu un sonniu. Allora, mi sò dumandata : ma chì vole dì Autonomia ?

Sicondu à u dizzunariu, a definizione hè questa quì : "situazione d'una cullettività o d'un istituzione chì pò amministrà i s'affari senza ch'ellu interferisca u pudere centrale" (Dizziunariu Larousse). À stu contu quì, in Corsica, autunumia ùn ci n'hè, chì u pudere francese interferisce tutti i cinque minuti ! Ghjè vera chì a nostra regione hè un statutu particolare.

Dapoi u 1992, certe cumpetenze sò state trasferite à a so assemblea, a *Cullettività Territoriale di Corsica* (CTC) : l'accuciamentu di i lochi, u sviluppu economicu, a cultura è u patrimoniu, a lingua, l'educazione è a formazionu, è l'ambiente. Detta cusi pare assai interessante, ma a realtà

and heritage, language, education and training, and the environment. In theory, it seems positive, but the reality is quite different. For example, CTC is preparing its Development Planning (PADDUC) for the next 20 years. It's a good thing to be able to choose our model of development for the future of our island, but in the end, if there is something the State doesn't like, it will be able to force its modifications on us. The following is another example of this constant interference. The CTC has the responsibility and the competence to promote the Corsican language and culture, but it is not allowed to make the Corsican language, the native language of our island, official in its territory. It can't even make Corsican language compulsory, even if education is one of its competences. It increasingly seems that the State says to Corsica: "Do what you want... as long as we agree!"

And they don't tend to agree very often. Since 2010, Corsican councillors have voted several measures in favour of the recognition of the Corsican people, the preservation of the language, and a particular fiscal status for the island. Although our party believes these measures to have been a little weak, they are a step in the right direction. The French response has always been the same – a resounding No! But, as the well-known Corsican song goes "À populu fattu, bisognu à marchjà!" (A living people needs to march forward!). We can't stay any longer here waiting. If we wait too long, there will be nothing left to save. Despite the different ways of interpreting the concept of autonomy, what is important to us today is to become masters of our own destiny. The only way to do that is for Corsican institutions to have more power in all domains: legislative, regulative, fiscal, financial and administrative power. This is the only way that our people will live!

I understand very well that what we have could be viewed as an inspiration or a goal for others. But for us, it's time now to move forward. Self-determination is not a purpose, neither an end in itself - it's a process, an evolution. Some are only at the beginning of this journey, simply demanding recognition, and others are considering the question of independence. But whatever our current situation, the important thing is to do progress, and everyone at their own pace. In Corsica, the next step for 2015 is real autonomy, and we are the ones who will achieve it. We are the Autonomy Generation!

ùn hà nunda à chì vede... Per esempiu, a CTC pripara in stu mumentu u so Pianu d'Accuiamentu è di Svilippu (PADDUC) per i 20 anni chi venenu. Ghjè bë di pudè sceglie i so medii di sviluppu per l'avvene, è ciò chè no vulemu fà di a nostra isula... Ma à a fine, s'ellu ci hè qualcosa chi ùn cunvene micca à u Statu, hè a possibilità d'imponaci e so mudifiche. Altr'esempiu, a CTC hè cum'è missione di luttà per a salvezza di a lingua è di a cultura corsa, ma ùn pò micca decide di rende a lingua corsa (a so lingua !) ufficiale à nantu à u so territoriu. Ùn pò mancu generalizà u so insignimentu, ancu s'ella hè a cumpetenza di l'educazione... In fatti, mi pare chì u Statu dice à a Corsica : "Fà puru ciò ch'ella ti pare... fin tantu ch'e sò d'accusentu!"

È d'accusentu, ùn l'hè micca à spessu... Dapoi u 2010, l'eletti corsi anu vutatu parechje misure à favore di a ricunniscenza di u populu, di a salvezza di a lingua, d'un statutu fiscale particolare, è ancu s'è tutte ste misure eranu appena debbule à u nostru parè, si facia un passu in davanti. A risposta francese hè sempre stata a listessa : INNÒ ! Ma, cum'ella dice una canzona corsa "À populu fattu, bisognu à marchjà !" Ùn si pò più stà quì à aspettà. S'è no aspettemu troppu, ùn ci sarà più nunda da salvà... Allora, pocu impreme ciò chì omu face dì à a parolla Autonomia, oghje ciò chì conta per noi hè di pudè esse maestri di u nostru destinu. È a sola manera di ghjunghjeci hè d'ottene un pudere bellu più maiò in tutti i dumini : legislativu, regulamentare, fiscale, finanziariu è amministrativu. Ùn c'hè chè cusì ch'ellu pò campà un populu !

Capiscu bë chè ciò chè n'avemu seria digià bë per certi, ma per noi, avà, ci vulerebbe à avanzà. L'autodeterminazione, ùn hè ne un scopu, ne una fine, hè una strada, un evoluzione. Certi ne sò à u principiu è dumandanu ghjustu un pocu di ricunniscenza, è d'altri ne sò à piglià a so indipendenza. Ma pocu impreme u livellu, l'importante hè di fà prugressi, ognunu à u so ritimu. In Corsica, a tappa di u 2015 hè l'autonomia, è simu noi quelli chi a camperemu. Noi simu a Generazione Autonomia !



SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE SILESIAN ISSUE

Marta Bainka, Jacek Tomaszewski
Ruch Autonomii Śląska, Śląsia

Self-determination means “the right of every nation to determine its political fate”.

The definition of self-determination indicates, that in order for it to apply to a given group, this group must constitute a nation. In the preamble of the Polish Constitution, along the lines of a political concept of understanding a nation, it means the same as “all citizens of Poland”, which is contradictory to the universally accepted separation of terms “nationality” and “citizenship”. It is therefore a good idea to provide a definition of nation in a much broadly used cultural concept, e.g. in accordance with the dictionary of Polish Scientific Publishers (PWN), which states that a nation is “a stable community of people created historically, established on the grounds of common historical fate, culture, language, territory, and economic life, which manifests itself in the national identity of its members”. In this concept it is important to differentiate between the aforementioned terms, with nationality pertaining to our self-determination, an inner feeling, while citizenship pertains to a legal state of things.

SAMOSTANOWIENIE A SPRAWA ŚLĄSKA

Marta Bainka, Jacek Tomaszewski
Ruch Autonomii Śląska, Śląska

Samostanowienie znaczy „prawo każdego narodu do stanowienia o swoim losie politycznym, samookreślenie”.

Definicja samostanowienia wskazuje, że aby mogło się ono odnosić do danej grupy, musi ona stanowić naród. W preambule Konstytucji RP, w myśl koncepcji politycznej rozumienia narodu, jest on tożsamy ze „wszystkimi obywatelami RP”, co kłoci się z powszechnym rozdzieleniem pojęć „narodowości” i „obywatelstwa”. Warto więc przytoczyć definicję narodu w znacznie szerzej stosowanej koncepcji kulturowej, np. za słownikiem PWN, według którego naród to „trwała wspólnota ludzi utworzona historycznie, powstała na gruncie wspólnoty losów historycznych, kultury, języka, terytorium i życia ekonomicznego przejawiająca się w świadomości narodowej jej członków.”. W tej koncepcji istotnym jest rozróżnienie wspomnianych pojęć, przy czym narodowość odnosi się do naszego samookreślenia, wewnętrznego poczucia, a obywatelstwo do prawnego stanu rzeczy.

The Polish Constitution does not assume that a person who does not feel as a member of the Polish nation, can become a citizen of Poland. Silesians are often such persons. In order to confirm this, it is not necessary to conduct broad sociological research. It is enough to point out the popularity of t-shirts with the slogan “Not a Pole, not a German, Silesian”.

However, the matter is not that simple. We are discussing something which is extremely personal and individual. The complexity of which we speak is best illustrated by a table showing the results of the national census from the year 2002.

*Table 1
Declarations of nationality and language spoken at home according to voivodeships*

Nationality, language spoken at home	Total	Silesian	Polish	Lower Silesian
German nationality	152 897 (100%)	31 882 (20,85%)	106 855 (69,89%)	2 158 (1,41%)
German language	204 573 (100%)	48 241 (23,58%)	88 804 (43,41%)	10 932 (5,34%)
‘Silesian nationality’	173 153 (100%)	148 544 (85,79%)	24 199 (13,97%)	99 (0,06%)
‘Silesian language’	56 643 (100%)	40 179 (70,93%)	16 398 (28,95%)	22 (0,04%)

As can be seen, in order to define a given group as a nation, it must fulfill several requirements. What then, should be done with a group which possesses all the traits specified in the definition of nation, but as of today has not been defined as such?

In 2005, the Polish Parliament passed an Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on Regional Languages, where it defined the terms national minority and ethnic minority. According to this law, a national minority is a group of Polish citizens which fulfills all of the following criteria:

- 1) is numerically smaller than the rest of the population of the Republic Poland;
- 2) significantly differs from the remaining citizens in its language, culture, or tradition;

Konstytucja RP nie zakłada, iż obywatelem RP może być osoba nieczująca się członkiem narodu polskiego. Takimi osobami są często Ślązacy. Aby to stwierdzić, nie trzeba prowadzić szeroko zakrojonych badań socjologicznych. Wystarczy wskazać na popularność koszulek z napisem „Nie Polak, nie Niemiec, Ślązak.”.

Sprawa nie jest jednak aż tak prosta. Mówimy bowiem o czymś niezwykle osobistym i indywidualnym. Zawiłość, o której mowa, najlepiej ilustruje zestawienie tabel zawierających wyniki spisu powszechnego z 2002 roku.

*Tabela 1
Deklaracja narodowości i języka domowego według województw*

Narodowość, język domowy	Ogółem	Śląskie	Opolskie	Dolnośląskie
narodowość niemiecka	152 897 (100%)	31 882 (20,85%)	106 855 (69,89%)	2 158 (1,41%)
język niemiecki	204 573 (100%)	48 241 (23,58%)	88 804 (43,41%)	10 932 (5,34%)
‘narodowość śląska’	173 153 (100%)	148 544 (85,79%)	24 199 (13,97%)	99 (0,06%)
‘język śląski’	56 643 (100%)	40 179 (70,93%)	16 398 (28,95%)	22 (0,04%)

Jak widać, aby móc określić jakąś grupę jako naród, musi ona spełniać kilka wymagań. Co jednak z grupą, która spełnia wszystkie cechy wymienione w definicji narodu, ale jak do tej pory nie została w ten sposób określona?

W 2005 roku polski parlament przyjął ustawę o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym, w której zdefiniował pojęcie mniejszości narodowej i etnicznej. Według ustawy mniejszość narodowa to: grupa obywateli polskich, która spełnia łącznie następujące warunki:

- 1) jest mniej liczebna od pozostałe części ludności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej;

- 3) strives to preserve its language, culture, or tradition;
- 4) is aware of its own historical, national community, and is oriented towards its expression and protection;
- 5) its ancestors have been living on the present-day territory of the Republic of Poland for at least 100 years;
- 6) identifies itself with a nation organised in its own state.

An ethnic minority differs from a national one according to this law, only by the content of paragraph 6, in which the word "identifies" is changed to "does not identify".

The Polish legal system recognizes 9 national minorities: Belarusian, Czech, Lithuanian, German, Armenian, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Jewish, 4 ethnic minorities: Karaite, Lemko, Roma and Tatar, as well as a regional group which uses a regional language: Kashubians. The act does not include Silesians, who fulfill all of the conditions of the definition of an ethnic minority contained within it.

THE UPPER SILESIAN AWAKENING

After the fall of Communism in 1989, one can observe a phenomenon concerning the building of a political and cultural identity of Silesians. This is an "Upper Silesian awakening" as it is referred to by Dr. Tomasz Ślupik from the University of Silesia. The establishment of such a movement was caused by several factors. The first and most important was of course the fall of the Communist system in 1989. The others are a kind of a cultural capital and historical recollection, which despite the period of communist rule, have been preserved, albeit in a misshapen form, for example the image of interwar autonomy in the Silesian Voivodeship within the boundaries of the Second Republic of Poland. Furthermore, the existence and the emergence, especially at the end of the XX century, of elites which were able not only to articulate political aims, but also to effectively fight for them – says Ślupik. In its more than 26-year history it has undergone several phases. The first of these was the period from 1989 to 1997, when in the framework of the freshly regained freedom there was a veritable plethora of Silesian organizations, among those as it would later turn out, the two most important: The Silesian Autonomy Movement and the Upper Silesian Association.

The second period falls between the years of 1997-2002 and is first and

- 2) w sposób istotny odróżnia się od pozostałych obywateli językiem, kulturą lub tradycją;
- 3) dąży do zachowania swojego języka, kultury lub tradycji;
- 4) ma świadomość własnej historycznej wspólnoty narodowej i jest ukierunkowana na jej wyrażanie i ochronę;
- 5) jej przodkowie zamieszkiwali obecne terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej od co najmniej 100 lat;
- 6) utożsamia się z narodem zorganizowanym we własnym państwie. Mniejszość etniczna od narodowej w ustawie różni się tylko brzmieniem punktu 6, do którego w tym przypadku na poczatku dopisano przeczenie „nie”.

Polskie ustawodawstwo uznaje 9 mniejszości narodowych: białoruską, czeską, litewską, niemiecką, ormiańską, rosyjską, słowacką, ukraińską i żydowską, 4 mniejszości etniczne: karaimska, lemkowską, romską i tatarską, oraz grupę regionalną posługującą się językiem regionalnym: Kaszubów. W ustawie nie znalazło się miejsce dla Ślązaków, którzy wypełniają wszystkie przesłanki definicji mniejszości etnicznej zapisanej w ustawie.

GÓRNOŚLĄSKIE PRZEBUDZENIE

Po upadku komunizmu w 1989 roku można zaobserwować zjawisko dotyczące budowania tożsamości politycznej i kulturowej Ślązaków. To górnośląskie przebudzenie jak nazywa je dr Tomasz Ślupik, politolog z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. Powstanie takiego ruchu ma kilka przyczyn. - Pierwszą i najważniejszą był oczywiście upadek systemu komunistycznego w 1989 roku. Pozostałe to swoisty kapitał kulturowy oraz pamięć historyczna, które mimo okresu PRL przechowały w formie zapewne zniekształconej, chociażby obraz międzywojennej autonomii w województwie śląskim w granicach II RP. Istnienie oraz pojawienie się, szczególnie pod koniec lat dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku, elit, które były w stanie nie tylko wyartykułować cele polityczne, ale również skutecznie o nie walczyć – mówi dr Ślupik. W swojej ponad 26-letniej historii miało ono kilka faz. Pierwsza z nich to okres od 1989 roku do 1997, kiedy to w ramach dopiero co odzyskanej wolności nastąpił prawdziwy wysyp śląskich organizacji w tym, jak się okaże z perspektywy czasu dwóch najważniejszych: Ruchu Autonomii Śląska i Związku Górnospolskiego. Okres drugi w latach 1997-2002 to przede wszystkim batalia o

foremost the struggle for registering the Union of People of Silesian Nationality, as well as the case of recognizing Silesian nationality. The results were from one side an intensified discussion about the ethnic identity of Silesians, and from the other side a greater interest shown by ordinary citizens. The results of the National Census from 2002, where over 173 thousand people declared Silesian nationality, turned out to be of principal importance for this period.

The next phase is years between 2002-2010, when besides discussions about identity, the postulate to recognize Silesian language as a regional language, appeared. The moment which is described is also interesting due to a political invigoration, which resulted in SAM members being elected to the Silesian Regional Assembly in 2010, as well as formation of a coalition along with Civic Platform and Polish People's Party on the level of the voivodeship board.

Finally, the last period after 2010, is the most intense moment of the phenomenon known as the Upper Silesian awakening, resulting both in the struggle for recognition of Silesians as an ethnic minority as well as recognition of Silesian language as a regional language by the Polish Parliament, through initiatives conducted by Representative Marek Plura and a citizens' initiative from 2014, in support of which 140 thousand signatures were gathered. The next National Census from 2011 brought about a significant increase in the number of people declaring Silesian nationality, since it turned out that there were almost 850,000 such people. Meanwhile, on the political scene SAM increased its number of representatives to 4 and once again became part of the ruling coalition this time with Civic Platform, Polish People's Party and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) on the level of the voivodeship board. The above-described phenomenon is of course multi-dimensional and also concerns recovering historical truths, especially when it comes to the newest history and the more and more interesting and more and more dynamic phenomenon of the emergence of literature in the Silesian language. The most important figures in this literary movement include: Zbigniew Kadłubek, Alojzy Lysko, Mirosław Syriawa, Marcin Melon, and Szczepan Twardoch. There are also numerous meetings, discussions and conferences regarding the history, identity, culture, and future of Upper Silesia.

zarejestrowanie Związku Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej i sprawa uznania narodowości śląskiej. Zaowocowało to z jednej strony ożywioną dyskusją na temat tożsamości etnicznej Ślązaków, z drugiej zaś coraz większym zainteresowaniem ze strony zwykłych obywateli. Kluczowe dla tego okresu okazały się wyniki Spisu Powszechnego z 2002 roku, gdzie ponad 173 tys. osób zadeklarowało narodowość śląską.

Kolejna faza to lata 2002-2010, kiedy oprócz dyskusji dotyczącej tożsamości pojawił się postulat uznania języka śląskiego za język regionalny. Opisywany moment jest również ciekawy ze względu na ożywienie polityczne, które zaowocowało wejściem przedstawicieli RAŚ do sejmiku samorządowego województwa śląskiego w 2010 roku oraz utworzeniem wraz z PO i PSL koalicji w zarządzie tegoż województwa.

Wreszcie ostatni okres po 2010 roku to najbardziej intensywny moment przejawiania się zjawiska zwanego „górnouśląskim przebudzeniem”, skutkujący zarówno walką o uznanie Ślązaków mniejszością etniczną i języka śląskiego językiem regionalnym na arenie parlamentu polskiego poprzez inicjatywy - poselską Marka Plury czy obywatelską z 2014 roku, na poparcie której zebrano ponad 140 tys. podpisów. Kolejny Spis Powszechny z 2011 roku przyniósł zasadniczy wzrost osób deklarujących narodowość śląską, bowiem okazało się, że takich osób jest prawie 850 tys. Z kolei na sowiej politycznej RAŚ powiększył swój stan posiadania w sejmiku śląskim do 4 mandatów i ponownie wszedł w koalicję tym razem z PO, PSL, SLD na szczeblu zarządu województwa. Wyżej opisywane zjawisko jest oczywiście wielowymiarowe i dotyczy także odkłamywania historii, szczególnie tej najnowszej, coraz ciekawszego i coraz bardziej dynamicznego zjawiska powstawania literatury w języku śląskim. Do najważniejszych postaci tego nurtu należą: Zbigniew Kadłubek, Alojzy Lysko, Mirosław Syriawa, Marcin Melon, Szczepan Twardoch. Organizuje się również niezliczoną liczbę spotkań, dyskusji, konferencji na temat historii, tożsamości, kultury, przyszłości Górnego Śląska.

ŚLĄZACY, ZALEGALIZUJMY SIĘ

W 2014 roku górnouśląskie przebudzenie weszło w kulminacyjną fazę swojego rozwoju. 13 stycznia Ruch Autonomii Śląska, wspólnie z posłami Markiem Plurą, Piotrem Chmielowskim i senatorem Kazimierzem

SILESIANS - LET'S LEGALIZE OURSELVES!

In 2014 the Upper Silesian awakening reached the final phase of its development. On January 13th The Silesian Autonomy Movement, along with Representatives Marek Plura, Piotr Chmielowski and Senator Kazimierz Kutz, as well as with other Silesian organizations, announced that it will begin preparations for the biggest public campaign in the history of Upper Silesia.

Silesians, taking advantage of their constitutional right to a citizens' legislative initiative, established a committee with the aim of amending the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on Regional Languages, by adding Silesians to the list of ethnic minorities. SAM member, Jacek Tomaszewski became the legal representative of the Committee.

On the 18th of April 2014, Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, received notification about the formation of Legislative Initiative Committee of the bill on amending The Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on Regional Languages.

In order for the initiative to be considered in the Polish Parliament, within three months it was necessary to collect 100 thousand signatures supporting the bill. An intense campaign was begun. Hundreds of volunteers, as well as ordinary people went out on the streets of Upper Silesia. Each day, regardless of the weather they persistently encouraged people to sign. Public involvement yielded 140 thousand signatures. In order to understand, the great mobilization of Silesians, it suffices to say that if the event had taken place in all of Poland and not only in the two Upper Silesian voivodeships, then 1 200 000 signatures would have been collected.

On 18th July 2014, a Silesian delegation led by Silesian Autonomy Movement Chair Jerzy Gorzelik, took the collected signatures in 22 packages to the Polish Sejm (parliament).

THE SILENCE IS BROKEN

On the 9th of October 2014, in the Polish Sejm, the first reading of the civic bill on act amendment took place. Silesians were represented by professor Zbigniew Kadłubek. – Master Wincenty Kadłubek, bishop and chronicler, in his "Polish chronicle" written at the beginning of XIII century, several

Kutzem oraz innymi śląskimi stowarzyszeniami, ogłosił, że rozpoczyna przygotowania do największej w historii akcji społecznej na Górnym Śląsku.

Ślązacy, korzystając z konstytucyjnego prawa obywatelskiej inicjatywy ustawodawczej, zawiązali komitet, którego celem jest nowelizacja ustawy o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym poprzez dopisanie Ślązaków do listy mniejszości etnicznych. Pełnomocnikiem Komitetu został członek RAŚ - Jacek Tomaszewski.

18 kwietnia 2014 roku premier Ewa Kopacz przyjęła zawiadomienie o utworzeniu Komitetu Inicjatywy Ustawodawczej projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym.

Aby inicjatywa była rozpatrzona w ciągu trzech miesięcy, należało zebrać 100 tysięcy podpisów poparcia pod projektem. Rozpoczęła się intensywna akcja. Setki wolontariuszy a także zwykłych ludzi, ruszyły na ulice Górnego Śląska. Każdego dnia, niezależnie od pogody, wytrwale zachęcali mieszkańców do złożenia podpisu. Zaangażowanie społeczne zaowocowało zebraniem ponad 140 tysięcy podpisów. Aby uzmysłowić sobie wielką mobilizację Ślązaków, wystarczy powiedzieć, że gdyby zbiórka miała miejsce w całej Polsce, a nie tylko w dwóch górnośląskich województwach, to zebrano by ponad 1 200 000 podpisów.

18 lipca 2014 roku delegacja Ślązaków na czele z przewodniczącym Ruchu Autonomii Śląska, Jerzym Gorzelikiem, zawiozła do Sejmu zebrane w 22 paczkach podpisy.

MILCZENIE ZOSTAJE PRZERWANE

9 października 2014 roku w Sejmie RP odbyło się pierwsze czytanie obywatelskiego projektu nowelizacji ustawy. Ślązaków reprezentował profesor Zbigniew Kadłubek. – Mistrz Wincenty Kadłubek, biskup i kronikarz, nazwał kilka razy Śląsk w swojej „Kronice polskiej” napisanej na początku XIII wieku Sancta Silentii Provincia – Świętą Krainą Milczenia. Ale dzisiaj jest dzień, w którym to milczenie zostaje przerwane, nie wypada bowiem, żebym milczał przed państwem. Mówię ustami 140 tys. obywateli Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, którzy złożyli swoje podpisy pod obywatelskim projektem nowelizacji ustawy o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym – zaczął swoją przemowę prof. Kadłubek.

times referred to Silesia as Sancta Silentii Provincia – Holy Land of Silence. ‘However, today is the day when this silence is broken, for it would be a shame if I remained silent in front of you. I speak with the voices of 140 thousand Polish citizens, who have signed the civic bill on the amendment of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on Regional Languages’ – began professor Kadłubek’s speech.

In his speech professor Kadłubek referred to the term self-determination, as well as to the slogan “Europe of regions”. – Without such aspirations as those of Silesians, Europe will disappear and become silent. Stanisław Vincenz, a great writer, often repeated that: “Europe will stop being Europe when regions become used up, will stop being spontaneous. It will become weak, faded, rhetorical, and pseudo-universal” – continued Kadłubek.

Professor Kadłubek’s presentation was greeted with applause. However, the fact that only 30 out of 460 representatives to the Polish Sejm of the VII term were present, must be viewed as blatant disregard shown by representatives, who were elected by Polish citizens

Representatives sent the bill for further work in commissions of: National and Ethnic Minorities, Administration and Digitalization, as well as Education, Learning and Youth. It took almost a year for them to come together and begin working on the proposal. On 22nd July 2015 at a joint session of these commissions, a decision was made to transfer further work to a special subcommission which was established just for that purpose.

A MORAL VICTORY

Regardless of the final fate of this bill, Silesians have won a moral victory. Despite all the obstacles, they have shown their determination in attaining their right to self-determination and to legal recognition as an ethnic minority. As professor Kadłubek said: “Recognition of Silesians as a minority is the practice of democracy, which is not only a beautiful idea, but a wise practice and a way of coexistence. It is about people, who desire to be persons and live as loyal citizens of the Polish state, which they have confirmed many times even to the point of spilling blood, citizens who identify with the Republic of Poland, but do so through a cult of distinctiveness and constant offering of the wealth which is its result.”

Will the Polish State turn out to be democratic? Time will tell.

W swoim wystąpieniu profesor Kadłubek odniósł się do pojęcia samostanowienia a także hasła „Europy regionów”. - Bez takich dążeń, jak właśnie to śląskie, Europa zniknie i zamilknie. Stanisław Vincenz, wielki pisarz, powtarzał, że: „Europa przestanie być Europą, gdy wyczerpią się regiony, przestanie być spontaniczna. Stanie się słaba, wyprasowana, retoryczna i pseudouniwersalna” – mówił Kadłubek.

Wystąpienie profesora Kadłubka nagrodzone zostało brawami. Jednak za wyraz lekceważącego stosunku wybranych przez obywateli RP posłów trzeba odebrać fakt, że na sali plenarnej zasiadło raptem 30 z 460 posłów Sejmu RP VII kadencji.

Posłowie skierowali projekt do dalszych prac w komisjach: Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych, Administracji i Cyfryzacji oraz Edukacji, Nauki i Młodzieży. Potrzeba było prawie roku czasu, aby te się spotkały i rozpoczęły pracę nad wnioskiem. 22 lipca 2015 roku na wspólnym posiedzeniu komisji podjęta została decyzja o przekazaniu dalszych prac specjalnie do tego powołanej podkomisji.

MORALNE ZWYCIĘSTWO

Bez względu na dalsze losy projektu, Ślązacy odnieśli moralne zwycięstwo. Na przekór wszelkim przeciwnościom pokazali swoją determinację w dążeniu do prawa do samostanowienia, do prawnego uznania za mniejszość etniczną. Jak mówią prof. Kadłubek: „Uznanie Ślązaków za mniejszość to uprawianie demokracji, która nie jest już tylko piękną ideą, lecz mądrą praktyką i sposobem współistnienia. Chodzi o ludzi, którzy pragną być osobami i żyć jako lojalni obywatele polskiego państwa, co poświadczali niejednokrotnie aż do przelania krwi, obywatelami utożsamiającymi się z Rzecząpospolitą Polską, ale poprzez kult odrębności i ciągle oferowanie bogactwa z niej wynikającej.”

Czy państwo Polskie okaże się państwem demokratycznym? Czas pokaże.



THE VALENCIAN COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Amadeu Mezquida

Translated from Catalan by David Navarro, Alejandro de Lamo

Joves del País Valencià, Valencian Country

GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT

We live confusing times regarding the organisation of our societies. The nation-states born from liberal revolutions provide increasingly insufficient structures to tackle the needs of an increasingly globalised world. The global economy has broken all borders; classical national markets have melted down in economical macro-regions needing cooperation among states to defend their companies' interests and strategical sectors. In the case of the European Union and Eurozone countries, states have even lost their regulatory capacity, in addition to pooling powers in several matters, such as agriculture, fisheries and certain aspects of environmental politics.

The European states 'independences' have become 'interdependences' with one another and all together with the rest of the world. And this

EL PAÍS VALENCIÀ I EL DRET D'AUTODETERMINACIÓ

Amadeu Mezquida

Joves del País Valencià, País Valencià

EL CONTEXT GLOBAL I EUROPEU

Vivim temps confusos pel que respecta a l'organització de les nostres societats. Els estats-nació sorgits de les revolucions liberals es mostren cada vegada més com estructures insuficients per respondre a les necessitats d'un món cada vegada més globalitzat. L'Economia ha trencat totes les fronteres, els clàssics mercats nacionals s'han fusionat en macroregions econòmiques que necessiten de la cooperació entre els estats per fer valdre els interessos de les seues empreses i sectors estratègics. Pel que respecta a la Unió Europea i els països de la zona Euro, els estats han perdut, fins i tot, la seua capacitat reguladora a través de la política monetària, a més de cedir competències en matèries diverses, com l'agricultura, la pesca o certs aspectes de la gestió mediambiental.

Les "independències" dels estats europeus s'han tornat "interdependències" dels uns amb els altres i de tots plegats amb la resta del món. I aquesta interdependència, amb la crisi econòmica, s'ha convertit en alguns casos

interdependence, with the economic crisis, has become in some cases total and stifling dependence. This is witnessed clearly in the Greek case. Greece is the mirror that confronts all those people occupied and concerned with the national question. Greece, a nation with state, a classical nation-state, is the clearest evidence these days that something has changed in the world regarding nation-states and their role.

We who claim sovereignty for our respective countries are witnessing the attempt to strip the Greeks, a sovereign people, of almost every tool the exercise of sovereignty should entail. Greece is not free, it is trapped in an impasse. Greece does not control its fate in its own hands; it is a country sold to guidelines marked by external and undemocratic bodies. The rest of European southern states found themselves in the same impasse: Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, where previous pompous “national sovereignty” has been reduced to the bitter obligation of choosing between a misery-generating obedience or an uncertainty-generating disobedience.

Therefore, when we speak of self-determination we must be aware of its real meaning in the current state of things and in our geopolitical region. It means keeping depending on others. Self-determination is a lie. Or rather, the current economic system and the current system of relations among states in the European Union and the world do not allow effective sovereignty, because this sovereignty ends when the people concerned starts a change of course which the globalised economic powers dislike, those powers which actually enjoy full independence and freedom in this world order, even freedom to deprive others of their freedom. We could say that we are witnessing a sovereignties clash; classical national sovereignties on one side and on the other the self-proclaimed economic power sovereignty that, through lobbies, rating agencies and undemocratic bodies such as the IMF, has been given legitimacy to claim the mantle of source of that sovereign will, everything from a supremacist, technocratic and aseptic view of its politic procedure.

THE VALENCIAN CONTEXT

Each time the national question regarding the Valencian country is discussed in an international forum, an introduction to the topic becomes necessary due to the special degree of complexity involved in “the Valencian question”. In the Valencian Country we can find a priori every minimally

en dependència total i asfixiant. Ho estem veient en el cas grec. Grècia és l'esplí al que ens enfronta la Història a totes aquelles persones que ens preocupej i ocupem per la qüestió nacional. Grècia, una nació amb estat, un estat-nació clàssic, és l'evidència més clara dels nostres dies que alguna cosa ha canviat al món pel que fa als estats-nació i el seu paper.

Els qui reclamem la sobirania pels nostres respectius països assistim a l'intent de despollar a un poble sobirà, com és el grec, de pràcticament totes les eines que l'exercici de la sobirania hauria de comportar. Grècia no és lliure, està atrapada en un atzucac. Grècia no controla les regnes del seu destí, és un país venut a les directrius que marquen organismes externs i no-democràtics. Al mateix atzucac es troben la resta d'estats del sud d'Europa: Espanya, Itàlia, Portugal i Irlanda, on l'abans pomposa “sobirania nacional” s'ha vist reduïda a l'amarga obligació de triar entre una obediència que genera misèria o una desobediència que genera incerteses.

Quan parlem d'autodeterminació, per tant, hem de ser conscients que en l'actual estat de les coses i en la nostra regió geopolítica això vol dir, en realitat, continuar depenent d'altres. L'autodeterminació és mentida. O millor dit, l'actual sistema econòmic i l'actual sistema de relacions entre estats de la Unió Europea i del món, no permeten una sobirania efectiva, doncs aquesta acaba quan el poble en qüestió enceta un rumb que no agrada als poders econòmics globalitzats, eixos que sí gaudeixen en aquest ordre mundial de total independència i llibertat, fins i tot llibertat per privar de llibertat als altres. Podríem dir que assistim a un xoc de sobiranies, on per una banda tindriem les sobiranies nacionals clàssiques i per l'altra la sobirania autoproclamada del poder econòmic que, a través de lobbies, agències de qualificació i organismes no-democràtics com l'FMI es veuen legitimats per reivindicar-se com a font mateixa de la voluntat sobiranana, tot des d'una visió supremacista, tecnocràtica i asèptica del seu procedir polític.

EL CONTEXT VALENCIÀ

Cada vegada que es parla en un àmbit internacional de la qüestió nacional referida al País Valencià, es fa adient una introducció al tema degut a l'especial grau de complexitat de “la qüestió valenciana”. A priori el País Valencià compta amb pràcticament tots els elements mínimament

objective element that has traditionally determined the existence of a national minority or a distinct nation. This is to say, the Valencian Country has a history which allows it to be treated as a distinct political subject as it was a confederated independent kingdom for the first 500 years of its existence (1238-1707) and has enjoyed political autonomy since 1978. We also find its own linguistic and cultural elements: a language, Valencian (Catalan), shared with other territories, a unique and rich festive tradition, a particular idiosyncrasy, a literary tradition, etc.

Nonetheless, the Valencian identity has been never identified as a strong one and has lived hierarchically subordinated to the Spanish identity that has been majoritarian within the Valencian country borders since the birth of the Spanish national project. This phenomenon is commonly attributed to the substitution of the Valencian elites –first, the nobility and the higher clergy, and afterwards the bourgeoisie – elites from Castile itself or Valencians clearly attached to the Spanish identity. According to this perspective, the same elites that should have lead the way to national recovery, as was the case, for instance, in Catalonia. But in the Valencian Country, the elites contributed to exactly the opposite option; the inclusion of valencian identity in the hierarchically higher Castilian-Spanish identity. However, there are other elements that we must be highlighted, such as the preexistence of a plural social base in its origin: in the Valencian Country Castilian(Spanish)-speaking areas and Valencian(Catalan)-speaking areas have historically lived together and certain areas have received strong cultural influences from other bordering territories such as Catalonia, Aragon or Murcia. Furthermore, we shall keep in mind that the Valencian Country has been a host territory of immigration for the last decades: not only from the rural world to the main cities but also big migrations coming from Castilian regions in the years 1960s and 1970s and international migrations at the beginning of the 21st century. All these elements combined shape a plural society where the hegemonic Spanish identity takes the role of umbrella identity, where the Valencian identity plays a stagnant and entirely subordinate role.

THE CHALLENGE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

Despite the Valencian people's complex identity and the small influence played until now by Valencian nationalism in society and politics, since 2011 we have witnessed a dramatic electoral growth of the unique strictly

objectius que, tradicionalment, han determinat l'existència d'una minoria nacional o una nacionalitat diferenciada. És a dir, el País Valencià té una història que permet parlar d'ell com un subjecte polític diferenciat en tant que va ser un regne independent confederat durant els primers 500 anys de la seua existència (1238-1707) i ha gaudit d'autonomia política des de 1978 fins l'actualitat. També trobem elements lingüístic-culturals propis: una llengua, el valencià-català, compartida amb altres territoris, una rica tradició festiva pròpia, una idiosincràsia particular, tradició literària etc.

Malgrat això, la identitat valenciana mai ha estat una identitat forta i ha viscut subordinada jeràrquicament a la identitat espanyola que, des del naixement del projecte nacional espanyol, ha estat majoritària dintre les fronteres del País Valencià. Normalment, s'atribueix aquest fenomen a una substitució de les elits valencianes – noblesa i alt clergat primer i burgesia després – per elits d'origen castellà o clarament adscrites a la identitat espanyola. Segons aquesta perspectiva, les elits que haurien d'haver fet d'avantguarda de la recuperació nacional, tal i com va passar, per exemple, a Catalunya. Al País Valencià però les elits haurien contribuït a tot el contrari: la incardinació de la valencianitat dins la identitat jeràrquicament superior castellano-espanyola. Hi ha altres elements però que caldria destacar, per exemple, la preexistència d'una base social plural en el seu origen: al País Valencià han conviscut històricament zones castellanoparlants amb zones valencianoparlants i determinades comarques han rebut influències culturals fortes d'altres territoris limítrofs com Catalunya, Aragó o Múrcia. A més, cal tindre present que el País Valencià ha estat en les últimes dècades territori d'acollida migratòria: no sols del món rural cap a les capitals sinó també grans migracions vingudes des de regions de matriu castellana en els anys 60 i 70 del segle XX i migracions internacionals a principis del segle XXI. Tot plegat conforma una societat plural on la identitat hegémònica espanyola fa el paper d'identitat refugi o identitat paraigua i on la identitat valenciana roman estancada i en un plànon subaltern.

EL REpte DE LA SOBIRANIA POPULAR

Malgrat la complexitat identitària del poble valencià i el pes escàs que fins ara havia jugat el nacionalisme valencià en la societat i la política valencianes, des de 2011 hem assistit a un creixement electoral espectacular de l'única força política estrictament valenciana i valencianista del

Valencian and valencianist political party in the Valencian political landscape: Compromís. Compromís (Valencian/Catalan word for ‘commitment’) is a coalition of 3 political parties open to the citizenship where the 4 fundamental pillars of its ideology are progressive valencianism, the plural left, political ecology and democratic regeneration.

What explains that in a such difficult identity context a valencianist option is in position to rule both the country and its capital city? The explanation is probably related to a lot of factors that would be difficult to explain in such a little space, but we would like to highlight the influence of the democratic regeneration discourse, the fight against corruption and the will to change of paradigm in the success of Compromís. Since 2011 and due to the economic, social and political crisis, Valencian society, as Spanish society, has changed from a political system where the left-right axis prevailed to a two-axis scenario where the left-right axis is combined with the democratic regeneration-statu quo axis. The new axis’ irruption has led to the existence of a new space, that some call space of rupture, which draws a new social and political majority in the left-regeneration quadrant. In the Valencian Country, Compromís has been the political party which has proved most successful in articulating this new social and political majority.

In this way, political valencianism has capitalised the will of change, placing itself in an optimal position to propel the identity transition of Valencian people from pro-Spanish to pro-Valencian stances. The democratic regeneration discourse, to a great extent based on citizenship right to choose on issues which concern them, raises a new democratic order where a worn out representative democracy leads to a liquid democracy combining parliamentary representation with direct democracy elements and recall and dismissal elements. We are discussing a way forward of peoples opposite to the clash of sovereignties we suffer –between failing national sovereignties and an attacking self-proclaimed sovereignty of economic power– based on popular empowerment, democratic deepening and the political power decentralization with the ultimate goal of subverting the current economy>politics>citizenship order giving way to a new order where the citizenship plays a role of real control over politics and politics is able to restrict and regulate economic power (citizenship>politics>economy).

Therefore, the challenge for valencianism is associating the claim for

panorama polític valencià: Compromís. Compromís és una coalició de 3 partits oberta a la ciutadania on els 4 pilars bàsics del seu corpus ideològic són el valencianisme progressista, l'esquerra plural, l'ecologisme polític i la regeneració democràtica.

Què explica que en un context identitari tan difícil una opció valencianista estiga en posicions de govern tant al país com a la capital? L'explicació es deu probablement a molts factors que seria difícil explicar en tan poc d'espai, però volem destacar el pes que el discurs de la regeneració democràtica, la lluita contra la corrupció i la voluntat de canvi de paradigma han tingut en l'èxit de Compromís. La societat valenciana, com l'espanyola, han passat, des de 2011 ençà i a causa de la crisi econòmica, social i política, d'un sistema polític on primava l'eix esquerra-dreta a un escenari de dos eixos on l'esquerra-dreta es combina amb l'eix regeneració democràtica – statu quo. La irrupció del nou eix ha propiciat l'existència d'un nou espai, que alguns anomenen espai de ruptura, que dibuixa una nova majoria social i política en el quadrant esquerra-regeneració. Al País Valencià, Compromís ha estat la força política capaç d'articular de manera més reeixida eixa nova majoria social i política.

D'aquesta manera, el valencianisme polític ha capitalitzat la voluntat de canvi, col·locant-se en una posició òptima per impulsar la transició identitària dels valencians i valencianes des de postures pro-espanyoles cap a posicionaments pro-valencians. El discurs de la regeneració democràtica, en gran mesura basat en el dret a decidir de la ciutadania sobre les qüestions que els afecten, planteja un nou ordre democràtic on una democràcia representativa esgotada done pas a una democràcia líquida que combine la representació parlamentària amb elements de democràcia directa i elements revocatoris o de destitució. Estem parlant doncs d'una eixida cap endavant dels pobles front al xoc de sobiranies que patim – entre unes sobiranies nacionals defallides i una sobiranía autoproclamada del poder econòmic a l'ofensiva– basada en l'apoderament popular, en l'aprofundiment democràtic i la descentralització del poder polític que ha de tindre com a objectiu final subvertir l'actual ordre economia>política>ciutadania donant pas a un nou ordre on la ciutadania tinga control real sobre la política i la política siga capaç de limitar i regular l'acció del poder econòmic (ciutadania>política>economia).

El repte per al valencianisme doncs està en lligar les demandes de regeneració democràtica amb les demandes del valencianisme. Vincular

democratic regeneration with its own claims. Connecting the popular sovereignty discerned in the regeneration discourse with the Valencian People, in such a way that Valencian citizens have an increased capacity of decision-making on the issues which concern them, as Valencian people but also as citizens.

Should a change of paradigm in which the idea and the applications of popular sovereignty are developed be achieved, the possibility for Valencian people to self-determination would be open in the first stage to issues related to particular aspects of social, economical or political organisation, opening through this way the door to self-determination in a classical sense in a future and a set of conditions that Valencian citizens should determine through the expression of their collective will.

Ultimately, to the extent that political valencianism is able to associate the project of national construction with the existing will of regeneration, it will be possible to succeed to build public awareness among Valencians. It will be through the empowerment of the concept of the capacity to decide, its who and its where that valencianism will be able or will not be able to drive a wedge expliciting the Valencian identity conflict which may allow the irruption of a third axis –centre-periphery– in Valencian polities. It will be through the exercise of popular sovereignty as a Valencian matter that an increased collective conscience and cohesion will be achieved among Valencian people. This will allow, in the future, full conscience of the people as a distinct political subject with sovereignty and a capacity of self-determination as far as possible in the context of global interdependence in which we live.

***The future is to be done and the future is now.
Visca el País Valencià, long live the Valencian Country!
Long live the peoples!***

la sobirania popular que s'albira en el discurs regenerador amb el Poble Valencià, de tal manera que els valencians i les valencianes tinguin major capacitat de decisió sobre les qüestions que els hi afecten, com a valencians però també com a ciutadans.

D'aconseguir un canvi de paradigma en el qual el concepte i les aplicacions de la sobirania popular s'aconsegueixen dur a terme, s'obriria per als valencians i valencianes la possibilitat d'autodeterminar-se en un primer estadi en qüestions relatives a aspectes concrets de l'organització social, econòmica o política obrint així la porta al dret a l'autodeterminació en un sentit clàssic en un futur i unes condicions que els mateixos valencians i valencianes haurien de determinar a través de l'expressió de la seu voluntat col·lectiva.

En definitiva, en la mesura que el valencianisme polític siga capaç de lligar el projecte de construcció nacional amb la voluntat regeneradora existent, serà possible l'èxit en la presa de consciència nacional per part dels valencians i les valencianes. Serà a través de la potenciació del concepte capacitat de decisió, el seu qui i el seu on que el valencianisme podrà o no, obrir una escletxa que explicite el conflicte identitari valencià permetent així la irrupció d'un tercer eix – centre-perifèria – en la política valenciana. Serà a través de l'exercici de la sobirania popular en clau valenciana que s'avancarà cap a una major consciència i cohesió col·lectiva entre els valencians i valencianes que permeta en un futur la consciència plena del poble com a subjecte polític diferenciat i per tant amb una sobirania i una capacitat d'autodeterminació el més amplies possible en el context d'interdependència global que vivim.

***El futur està per fer i el futur és ara.
Visca el País Valencià
Visquen els pobles***



LIBERTY FOR BAVARIA

**Nadine Holzner, Andreas Niedermeier, Bernhard Neumann,
Alexander Hilger, Helmut Freund, Lucas Hotter, Marina Ettl,
Markus Meidinger
Jungbayernbund, Bavaria**

Amongst the 27 EU member states, if we include Bavaria, it would come ninth as measured by its population and would also one of the most significant states within Europe. Bavaria on its own would be represented in the European Parliament by 24 delegates, it would have its own EU Commissioner and equally be entitled to vote in the Commission.

The government of an independent Bavaria could exclusively concentrate on the will and the needs of its citizens without being restricted by the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.

We claim what other countries regard as normal – the freedom to decide on our own in what kind of society we wish to live.

There are no alternatives. If we do not take action now, we will lose the heritage of more than 1,500 years of Bavarian history, tradition and statehood.

Although federalism received far more attention in the original version

FREIHEIT FÜR BAYERN

**Nadine Holzner, Andreas Niedermeier, Bernhard Neumann,
Alexander Hilger, Helmut Freund, Lucas Hotter, Marina Ettl,
Markus Meidinger
Jungbayernbund, Bayern**

Bayern ist unter den 27 EU-Staaten gemessen an seiner Bevölkerung der neuntgrößte und auch wirtschaftlich gesehen einer der bedeutendsten Staaten in Europa. Bayern wäre ein vollwertiger Partner innerhalb der EU und wäre im EU-Parlament mit 24 Abgeordneten vertreten. Bayern hätte einen eigenen EU-Kommissar und wäre in Kommission und Ministerrat voll stimm- und gleichberechtigt.

Die Regierung eines freien Bayern könnte sich in ihrer Politik ohne Rücksicht auf Bundeszwänge und Bundeseinheitlichkeit ausschließlich nach dem Willen und den Bedürfnissen der bayerischen Bürger richten.

Wir fordern, was für andere Länder selbstverständlich ist – die Freiheit, selbst zu entscheiden, in welcher Gesellschaft wir leben möchten. Alternativen: Gibt es keine. Wenn wir jetzt nicht handeln, verlieren wir das Erbe von mehr als 1500 Jahren bayerischer Geschichte, Tradition und Staatlichkeit.

of the German constitution than it does today, the Bavarian Landtag (parliament) rejected the constitution as too unitary in 1949. We believe that there is a great danger that Bavaria will be reduced in the future to the level of a mere province having little say, only providing money to the federal budget.

The federalism granted in the constitution is being undermined in favour of federal regulations. Germany is on its way to a completely unitary state. The responsibilities of the Länder (the states) – and consequently those of Bavaria, too – are being abolished little by little.

Particularly when it comes to important decisions regarding the EU, but also healthcare, financial or fiscal policies, the political will of the Bavarian people and of its government is too frequently ignored.

Art. 178 of the Bavarian Constitution says that Bavaria joined the Federal Republic on the basis of a voluntary union of German states, the sovereignty of which is to be preserved.

This sovereignty, however, is being increasingly jeopardised by unitary federal politics. In order to further guarantee the sovereignty of Bavaria within Europe, the separation of Bavaria is irremissible.

WE WANT A TRULY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

The decrease of the obstacles for referendums is supposed to give way to more democracy. The will of the people as well as the results of referendums must take top priority in Bavarian politics – on any political level.

WE WANT A HEAD OF STATE CHOSEN BY THE PEOPLE

We reject the common practice to elect the Bavarian Head of State by the majority of the Landtag. Our Head of State should be elected directly by the people as is the case in most democratic states.

WE WANT A FEDERAL BAVARIA

In our opinion Bavaria should be structured truly federally. That means that each political level should be responsible for the needs of its citizens as far as possible. This would vastly strengthen the importance of the Regierungsbezirke (administrative regions within certain federal states in

Obwohl der Föderalismus in der Urfassung des Grundgesetzes weit mehr Beachtung fand als dies heute der Fall ist, lehnte der Bayerische Landtag 1949 das Grundgesetz als zu zentralistisch ab. Wir sehen die Gefahr, dass Bayern künftig zur unmündigen Provinz degradiert wird, die der Bundeshaushalt lediglich noch als Finanzquelle dienen darf.

Der grundgesetzlich garantierte Föderalismus wird zugunsten bundeseinheitlicher Regelungen immer weiter ausgehöhlt. Deutschland befindet sich auf dem Weg zum Zentralstaat. Stück um Stück werden die Kompetenzen der Bundesländer – und damit auch Bayerns – abgebaut. Insbesondere bei wichtigen Entscheidungen in Bezug auf die EU, aber auch in der Gesundheits-, Finanz-, oder Steuerpolitik wird der politische Wille des bayerischen Volkes und seiner Regierung allzu häufig übergangen.

Art. 178 der Bayerischen Verfassung bestimmt, dass der Beitritt Bayerns zur Bundesrepublik „auf einem freiwilligen Zusammenschluss der deutschen Staaten beruht, deren staatsrechtliches Eigenleben zu sichern ist.“ Dieses politische Eigenleben Bayerns wird jedoch durch die zentralistische Bundespolitik immer stärker gefährdet. Um die Staatlichkeit Bayerns innerhalb Europas auch in Zukunft zu sichern, ist die Separation Bayerns unerlässlich.

WIR WOLLEN EINE WAHRHAFT DEMOKRATISCHE STAATSFORM

Eine Senkung der Hürden für Volksabstimmungen und Volksentscheide soll der Basisdemokratie mehr Raum geben. Der Wille des Volkes muss oberste Richtschnur der bayerischen Politik sein, den Ergebnissen von Volksentscheiden ist auf jeder politischen Ebene Vorrang einzuräumen.

WIR WOLLEN EIN VOM VOLK GEWÄHLTES STAATSOBERHAUPT

Die Praxis, das bayerische Staatsoberhaupt mit den Stimmen der Mehrheit des Landtags zu ernennen, lehnen wir ab. Unser Staats-oberhaupt soll direkt vom Volk gewählt werden, wie das in den meisten demokratischen Staaten üblich ist.

Germany). A Franconian self-government would also be thinkable.

WE WANT TO PRESERVE BAVARIA'S RESOURCES

The abundance of Bavaria's nature is the foundation of our existence. Technology has its limits - humankind creates and produces without assuming responsibility for its consequences. We object so-called 'green GM technology' and wish to encourage organic agriculture instead. Moreover, we aim at substituting nuclear power in the long run by using renewable power sources more intensely.

WE WANT A SOCIAL BAVARIA

Year after year, Bavaria pays several billion euros to the Federal Republic and its states without receiving sufficient investment in return. This money could, for instance, be used to support more disadvantaged regions within Bavaria, to foster education or to promote a more balanced welfare policy.

BAVARIA IS SUPPOSED TO BE AN EQUAL PARTNER

Our point is not to isolate Bavaria from the rest of the world. We would like Bavaria to be seen as an equal partner amongst the states of Europe and of the whole world.

We claim for Bavaria what is normal for any sovereign state on earth: to take political decisions according to the needs of its citizens.

WIR WOLLEN EIN FÖDERALES BAYERN

Unserer Ansicht nach sollte Bayern wirklich föderal aufgebaut sein. Das bedeutet, dass jede politische Ebene weitgehend autonom für die Belange ihrer eigenen Bewohner zuständig ist. Dies würde die politische Bedeutung der Regierungsbezirke enorm aufwerten. Denkbar wäre auch eine fränkische Autonomie.

WIR WOLLEN BAYERNS RESSOURCEN ERHALTEN

Der natürliche Reichtum der Natur ist unsere wichtigste Existenzgrundlage. Technik hat dort ihre Grenzen, wo der Mensch Fakten schafft, ohne Verantwortung für die Folgen zu übernehmen. Wir lehnen die sogenannte „grüne Gentechnik“ ab und wollen dafür den biologischen Landbau stärker fördern. Außerdem streben wir die langfristige Substitution der Atomkraftwerke durch die verstärkte Nutzung regenerativer Energiequellen in Bayern an.

WIR WOLLEN EIN SOZIALES BAYERN

Bayern führt jährlich mehrere Milliarden Euro ohne Gegenleistung an den Bund und an andere Bundesländer ab. Diese Gelder könnten z. B. für die Strukturförderung benachteiligter Gebiete in Bayern, für eine bessere Bildung oder für eine ausgewogene Sozialpolitik verwendet werden.

BAYERN SOLL GLEICHWERTIGER PARTNER SEIN

Es geht uns nicht darum, Bayern vom Rest der Welt abzukoppeln. Wir möchten, dass Bayern bei den Staaten Europas und der Welt als gleichwertiger Partner gilt.

Wir möchten für Bayern, was für jeden anderen souveränen Staat dieser Erde normal ist: Politik machen für die eigene Bevölkerung und ihre Belange.

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SOVEREIGNTY TO BUILD A GALIZA WITH THE PROMISE OF WORK AND A FUTURE FOR OUR YOUNG PEOPLE

Alberte Mera García
Galiza Nova, Galicia

The collective memory of the Galician people is imbued with a chain of illustrious names, now inscribed alongside those of over 100,000 young people who have been forced to leave Galiza over the last five years in search of work and a livelihood denied to them at home. Our country will long feel the mark left by the thousands of young people driven out of a potentially rich land whose wealth is exploited for the benefit of the Spanish oligarchy and transnational powers. Not a day goes by without a new family member, friend or classmate leaving, and it seems as if more people our age are leaving the country than those of us who are left. Young people leave the country in desperation, fleeing an extremely high youth unemployment at a rate of over 52% and in a bid to escape job insecurity,

SOBERANÍA PARA ERGUER A GALIZA DO TRABALLO E O FUTURO PARA A MOCIDADE

Alberte Mera García
Galiza Nova, Galiza

Galiza ten nomes propios na memoria colectiva do seu pobo, ten os nomes e apelidos das máis de 100 000 persoas mozas emigradas nos últimos cinco anos en busca de posibilidades de vida e traballo digno negados na súa propia terra. A nosa nación reterá sempre o exodo longo e doloroso de tantas e tantas persoas mozas que foxen dunha terra rica e próspera pero espoliada ao servizo da oligarquía española e potencias transnacionais. O noso día a día é o do adeus continuo: despedimos a familiares, amizades, compañeir@s de estudo... a situación é tan crítica que a sensación é que marcharon máis da nosa xeración d@s que aquí áinda quedamos. É unha fuxida desesperada dunha taxa de desemprego xuvenil que sobrepasa o 52%, unha fuxida da precariedade, da explotación, da pobreza e das

exploitation, poverty and the callous policies which leave people homeless in order to hand over their houses to the banks.

Galiza rings with the names of the young people forced out of the increasing privatised public higher education system by the cut-backs applied by the ruling, right-wing Spanish People's Party (PP), slashing grants whilst at the same time raising fees, all part of an elitist agenda designed to bar education to all but the ruling classes.

Galiza is also marked by the names of those who were persecuted and suffered reprisals and those who continue to pay the price for defending Galician freedom and self-government, not least the Galician nationalists who were shot, forced into exile or silenced in 1936. Our nation is branded with the names of Daniel Afonso Rodríguez Castelao who died in exile and Alexandre Bóveda, executed by a Fascist firing squad, the driving forces behind the huge rise in support for the Partido Galeguista, or the Galicianist Party, in the 1930s. This wave of support secured a Galician government for the very first time with a progressive outlook designed to make Galiza flourish as a prosperous nation.

Our nation bears the name of all of the brave people who spoke out against the established order in order to serve the interests of the Galician people. And Galiza also bears the name of all of the women who have fought against the stifling rule of patriarchy and all the women who have suffered because of it, with the name of Rosalía de Castro standing out like a beacon, lighting the way for all Galicians who love their country, men and women alike. Galiza is inspired by the name of Rosalía, the poet who blazed the trail for modern European literature, a Galician patriot who raised her voice to defend the oppressed, speaking out against the emigration which already blighted our country in her day. Rosalía, the pioneer of radical feminism. And here I would like to recall the opening lines of one of her poems published in the collection *Cantares Galegos* (1863):

*Poor Galiza, you should
never call yourself Spanish.*

These two lines underscore the condemnation of the colonisation suffered by our people which, despite the years, still continues unchanged to this day, heightened by the economic crisis which began in 2008.

Since then, time has shown just how vital national sovereignty is for Galiza

políticas inhumanas que até deixan á xente sen casa para darlle os nosos fogares á banca.

Galiza ten o nome das mozas e mozos expulsados da universidade pública (aínda que cada vez más privatizada) polas políticas do PP de recortes en bolsas e suba de taxas, esas políticas elitistas que buscan un ensino só para as clases dirixentes.

Ten o nome de quen sofre hoxe, e de quen foi represaliad@ por defeder a liberdade e o autogoberno galego, coma as persoas nacionalistas de 1936 fusiladas, exiliadas ou silenciadas. A nosa nación ten o nome de Daniel Afonso Rodríguez Castelao, morto no exilio, e de Alexandre Bóveda, fusilado polos fascistas, ambos artífices do gran avanxo en apoio popular do Partido Galeguista durante os anos 30 e que conseguiron para o noso país o primeiro autogoberno e mecanismos avanzados que permitirían facer de Galiza unha nación próspera.

A nosa Patria leva o nome das persoas valentes que desafiaron a orde establecida para revertela en beneficio do pobo galego. E, por suposto, Galiza ten nome de muller, das loitadoras contra a norma abafante e o patriarcado, ten o nome inscrito cunha estrela na fronte que leva cada galega e galego que ama o noso pobo, e ese é o nome de Rosalía e das aldraxadas. Ten o nome de Rosalía de Castro, a poeta fundacional da literatura moderna europea, a patriota galega, voz defensora das clases populares que denunciou a emigración á que se condenaba xa naquela altura ao noso pobo; Rosalía, a pioneira do feminismo radical. E quero traer ao presente un verso co que a autora inicia un dos seus poemas en *Cantares Galegos* (1863):

*Pobre Galiza, non debes
chamarte nunca española*

Un verso que expresa unha denuncia completa da situación de colonización do noso pobo, que a pesares do tempo transcorrido, continúa plenamente vixente, e que nos últimos anos tornouse con maior virulencia co estourido da crise económica en 2008.

Evidenciouse desde entón, como a soberanía nacional para Galiza é necesaria para facer frente a unha crise sistémica que abrangue de maneira estrutural todos os planos, desde o económico, o político, o social, o ambiental e o institucional. E neste contexto de crise, tamén se evidenciou

to face up to the systemic crisis structurally affecting all levels, from the economy, politics and welfare to the environment and the public bodies. The current crisis has also served to highlight the extent to which Galician young people suffer the consequences of dependency on the Spanish State, powerless without the vital tool of national sovereignty to fend off the unfair measures imposed by Madrid with its own vested interests, condemning us to further poverty, whilst at the same time bringing to bear the full weight of the Troika. For this reason, as Rosalía de Castro so rightly said, Galizans can no longer continue to live under the boot of the Spanish State which brings us nothing but misery, striving instead to achieve sovereignty for Galiza.

Spain continues to act as a colonial power, pawning our country for the benefit of the employers' lobby and the big financial oligarchy of the capital, privatising public services such as healthcare and education and plundering our country's natural resources so that other parts of the Spanish State and foreign countries can cream off the profits without Galiza ever gaining financially from this ecological pillage.

Recent years have shown all the more clearly just how detrimental it is for Galiza to be denied the capacity to take full responsibility for the decisions affecting it. Denying our rights as a nation only serves to exacerbate the social, working and environmental consequences brought about with the crisis, bringing with it the destruction and dismantling of our key production sectors (i.e. shipbuilding, the tinning industry, the metal industry, etc.) as and when they fail to conform to the whims of the Madrid-Brussels Axis, worsening the population crisis which has plagued our country for decades owing to the high rate of emigration coupled with policies which turn their back on the real needs of Galiza, leaving our industrial and economic sectors to rot and leading to the large-scale exodus from rural, in-land areas.

If we are to turn this situation around, Galician young people urgently need two main types of measures. Firstly, the Galician Government should cease to serve as the mouthpiece for the People's Party, setting up an effective employment scheme for young people, incorporating ambitious measures such as a job insertion program for young people with proper support and a working wage during the training period, whilst at the same time orienting the workforce towards sectors of strategic importance to our country. Secondly, it should promote the setting up of new activities in order to create job opportunities and to bring back young researchers forced to go abroad in

con maior clareza que a mocidade galega padece as consecuencias da dependencia de España e de non ter a valiosa ferramenta que outorga a soberanía nacional que permitiría desobedecer as inxustas medidas coas que Madrid nos sume na pobreza para o seu único beneficio, ao tempo que aplica sobre nós todo o peso brutal da Troika. Por iso, como a Rosalía avanzaba, as galegas e os galegos non podemos seguir baixo o réxime da España que tanta ruína nos trae, e debemos avanzar na conquista da nosa soberanía.

Esa España colonial continúa a pór o noso país ao servizo dos intereses da grande oligarquía financeira da metrópole central e da patronal, privatizando os servizos públicos como a sanidade ou o ensino, e practican o espolio ecolóxico do noso pobo, destruíndo o territorio para levar a riqueza a outras zonas do estado e países, ainda por riba, sen ver Galiza un peso do que esta terra produce.

Nos últimos tempos tense evidenciado con máis clareza ca nunca os prexúzos que supón para Galiza non contar con capacidade de decisión plena. A negación dos nosos dereitos como nación agrava as consecuencias sociais, laborais e ambientais da crise, supón a destrución e desmantelamento dos nosos sectores produtivos (naval, agro, conserva, metal...) -caso de non atender aos intereses do eixo Madrid-Bruxelas- e agrava a crise demográfica que atinxe o país desde hai décadas por mor das elevadas taxas de emigración e políticas non autocentradases na Galiza, que deixan esmorecer a nosa industria e sectores económicos, provocando o abandono do interior e o rural galego.

Perante esta realidade, a mocidade galega precisa con urxencia dous grandes tipos de medidas. É necesario que a Xunta de Galiza deixe de ser empregada como unha institución propagandística do Partido Popular, e atinxa un plano de emprego xuvenil que sexa realmente efectivo que incorpore medidas ambiciosas coma un programa de inserción laboral para xente moza, acompañado dunha titorización e dunha renda laboral durante o período de formación laboral, ao tempo que se guíe a forza de traballo cara a sectores estratégicos da nosa nación; se promovan novos espazos de actividade para a xeración de emprego, e a recuperación de investigadoras e investigadores novos que emigraron para que desenvolvan o seu coñecemento nos sectores estratégicos galegos.

Con estas medidas Galiza podería recuperar postos de traballo para a

order to apply their knowledge to the Galician strategic sectors.

However, while measures such as these would help make up for job losses for young people and begin to bring down the rate of youth unemployment and emigration, they will continue to fall short of the mark unless they are accompanied by other bold and pressing measures, including the repeal of the labour reforms applied by both the right-wing (PP) and the socialist (PSOE) Spanish governments, banning temping agencies and precarious contracts (a proposal tabled by the Galician Nationalist Bloc in the Galician Parliament in June 2015), outlawing overtime and bringing the working week down to 35 hours in order to ensure decent living conditions and to increase the number of jobs available. Measures should also include abolishing the law which raised the age of retirement pushed through by the Spanish government kowtowing to the demands of the European economic powers because unfairly raising the age of retirement also makes it harder for young people to enter the job market.

There is an urgent need to reclaim rural areas with the aid of a Galician agricultural policy based on our own interests and making it possible for young people to make a living out of crop and livestock farming in order to halt the on-going wave of rural depopulation. The current situation was severely worsened by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) set up and applied by the European institutions and agreed to by the Spanish and Galician governments, leading to the complete disappearance of a dynamic and productive rural area generating sustainable jobs.

What Galiza needs is social justice and its fair share of the wealth. But we also need revolutionary political activity in order to seize power for the Galician people and its working classes so that the Spanish oligarchy can no longer play at impoverishing us all the better to dominate us. In a word, breaking free from the status quo which we have suffered since the signing of the Spanish Constitution as the bedrock for the new political framework for the Spanish State following the downfall of Franco's dictatorship, once again effectively dashing all hopes of Galiza gaining any real level of self-government, denying the Galizan people the right to sovereignty and our right to a constituent process of our own. None of the Spanish political parties, including the so-called left-wing parties (namely the Spanish Socialist Party and the Spanish Communist Party) who reached an agreement with the post-Francoist right-wing regarding the new order, defended the interests of the Galizan people and our country lost out by

mocidade e comenzar a reducir a taxa de desemprego e emigración xuvenil, mais non serían nunca suficientes se non for acompañadas doutras medidas valentes e urgentes como é a derrogación das reformas laborais aplicadas polo PP e o PSOE, a prohibición das Empresas de Traballo Temporal e dos contratos precarios (como vén de esixir o BNG no Parlamento Galego no mes de xuño), a eliminación das horas extras e a redución da xornada laboral a 35 horas para avanzar nas condicións de vida dignas e aumentar o número de postos de traballo; e a derrogación do retraso da idade de xubilación promovida polos poderes económicos europeos e aplicada polo goberno español porque ademais de ser inxusto retarda o acceso ao traballo da mocidade.

Úrxenos a re-ocupación do rural e o desenvolvemento dunha política agraria propia deseñada en función dos nosos intereses e que permita á mocidade poder vivir da actividade agro-gandeira e contrarrestar o despoboamento do rural. A situación actual foi agravada pola Política Agraria Común (PAC) das institucións europeas, que conta co visto e prace dos gobernos de Madrid e da Xunta, e que supuxo a desaparición dun medio rural vivo e produtivo xerador de postos de traballo sostíbel.

Galiza precisa pois xustiza social e o reparto da riqueza. Mais tamén, acción política revolucionaria que conquiste todo o poder para o pobo galego e as súas clases traballadoras, para que a oligarquía e España non sigan xogando a empobrecernos e dominarnos. Rachar pois coa orde establecida. Esa orde que seguimos a padecer desde a aprobación da Constitución Española, coa que despois do franquismo se instaurou o marco político español que de novo volvveu truncar as posibilidades de autogoberno real para Galiza, negando a soberanía do pobo galego e o noso dereito a un proceso constituyente propio. Ningunha das forzas políticas españolas, tampouco as autoproclamadas de esquerda (PSOE-PCE) que pactaron coa dereita posfranquista a nova orde, defenderon os intereses do pobo galego e o noso país quedou excluído da posterior negociación política perdendo o tren das nacións. Esa dinámica continuou, e en todo debate. E Galiza nunca existiu, foi marxinada.

Mais a andamiaxe xurídico-política sobre a que se asenta o réxime político español, instaurado apóis a Constitución de 1978, tambaléase. As mozas e mozos deste país, as persoas que vivimos aquí e as que tiveron que marchar, estamos fartas de parches que non solucionan ningún dos problemas que padecemos. Estamos fartas da súa represión contra quen se rebela e sae á

being excluded from all of the ensuing political negotiations. This situation remained unchanged at all levels of debate: Galiza never existed, it was always relegated to the side-lines.

But today the political foundations which have served to uphold the Spanish political regime since the Constitution of 1978 look poised to collapse. Galician young people, whether we have remained in Galiza or whether we have had to go in search of work abroad, are sick of makeshift solutions which fail to solve the problems we face. We will no longer put up with the repression against anyone who dares speak out and take to the streets, convicted for exercising our right to the freedom of speech and standing up to this corrupt system. Along with members of the patriotic front, the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), activists in its youth organisation, Galiza Nova, have been the target of countless police reports, fines and sanctions for exercising our right to disagree and for defending our country. But those who hold the reins of power in Madrid and their toadies in the Galician Government have now come to realise that a policy based on fear is pointless when it targets people with no jobs and no future to lose. That is why we are raising the present, upholding our right to rebellion and our right to decide for ourselves, deciding to put an end to poverty and suffering, deciding to disobey those in power and to govern for the young people and the working classes, to map out our own future, a new Galiza to be lived to the full, with a new, fair, and participative social set-up based on solidarity where Galician young people can decide for themselves as active political subjects.

We acknowledge the need for a far-reaching change for and from Galiza, calling for a sweeping overhaul of the current situation. However, while we recognise that the current two-party system now looks likely to be coming to an end we cannot let others decide for Galiza yet again. We need a voice of our own in Galiza, Madrid and Brussels in order to move towards sovereignty so that Galiza doesn't get side-stepped as it was in 1978 when this harsh system was foisted upon us and left us without the tools of self-government we needed to stand up for ourselves.

Solutions to Galiza's problems and the problems of Galiza's young people cannot and will not depend upon the emergence of 'friendly governments in Madrid': real solutions can only come by acting independently, with a voice and a strength of our own.

The right to decide is crucial if we are to make a clean break with the situation

rúa, de que nos condenen por exercer a liberdade de expresión e enfrentar a este sistema corrupto. A militancia de Galiza Nova, ao igual que a da fronte patriótica, o Bloque Nacionista Galego, foi presa de innumerábeis denuncias e sanciós económicas e administrativas por exerceren o dereito á discrepancia e defenderen o noso país. Mais xa se percataron en Madrid e os seus vasalos na Xunta de Galiza, de que a doutrina do medo non ten sentido naquelas que nin teñen traballo nin futuro que perder. Por iso erguemos o presente, e reclamamos o noso dereito á rebelión e a decidir, para decidirmos non máis pobreza e sufrimentos, para decidirmos desobedecer aos poderosos e gobernar para a xventude e o pobo traballador, para deseñarmos o noso propio futuro, unha Galiza nova, para vivila toda, cun novo marco social e político xusto, solidario e participativo, onde a mocidade e Galiza decididan por si mesma como suxeitos políticos activos.

Pulamos desde esta nación do planta por mudalo todo. Sabemos que fai falla unha mudanza real, si, e que a mudanza do actual réxime do bipartidismo español (PSOE-PP) ten más facilidades de producirse neste tempo, pero non podemos deixar que unha vez más sexan outr@s quen decidan pol@s galeg@s. Temos que ter voz propia, na Galiza, en Madrid e en Bruxelas, para avanzar na nosa soberanía, para que non ocorra como no 78, cando Galiza foi marxinada. Dende aquela, impuxéronnos este sistema cruel e deixáronnos sen ferramentas de autogoberno real para protexernos.

A atención aos intereses de Galiza e ás problemáticas da mocidade galega non dependen da existencia ou non de "gobiernos con faciana amábel en Madrid". Depende únicamente de actuarmos con independencia, de termos voz e forza propia.

O dereito a decidir é básico para rachar co existente e crear un País novo, por iso nolo negaron durante tantos anos, porque soberanía é democracia, porque decidir é autogobernarse, sen amos nin inxerencias.

Na vida desde logo que hai múltiples camiños, e decidir por cal queremos camiñar é o que nos fai libres e permite que cambiamos o futuro. Non hai atallos nesta loita, mais úrxenos abandonar este carreiro sen saída da obediencia, e avanzarmos pola vía da independencia.

Ser soberan@s implica que @s galeg@s decidamos por nós mesm@s

as it stands and build a new country. That is precisely why they have denied us this right for so long: because sovereignty is democracy and the right to decide means the right to rule ourselves as we see fit, unfettered and free from outside interference.

Life offers many different paths and deciding which to take is what makes us free and enables us to change the future. There are no shortcuts in this struggle and we must change direction in order to get out of the dead-end of submission without delay, striding towards the road that leads to independence.

Sovereignty means that Galicians can decide for ourselves about those things that affect us every day, from industry and education to labour rights and job creation policies. By gaining sovereignty, Galiza would break free from the clutches of Capitalism and the orders dictated down from Madrid and Brussels in order to develop our country, creating jobs and well-being for all, so that no one is forced to leave, so that no one ever has to say goodbye to a loved one at the departure gate or at the coach station.

More Galician nationalism is essential - strong, dynamic and active - to stand up for this country of ours and our young people, to work and fight for Galiza until our people is free.

sobre as cousas que nos afectan a diario (a industria, o ensino, os dereitos laborais, as políticas que xeran emprego...). Dotándonos de soberanía, Galiza podería rachar co capitalismo e as ordes de Madrid e Bruxelas, e desenvolveríamos o noso país xerando traballo e benestar para tod@s, para que ninguén teña que volver emigrar, para nunca ter que decir adeus a un ser querido nun aeroporto ou nunha estación de autobús.

Queremos pois, precisamos, contar con más nacionalismo galego, con más forza propia, viva e activa, para plantar cara por e para este pobo e a súa mocidade, para pelexar e traballar por Galiza até facérmola ceibe e popular.



**'FOR A' THAT,
AND A' THAT,
IT'S COMING YET FOR A'
THAT,
THAT MAN TO MAN,
THE WORLD O'ER,
SHALL BROTHERS
BE FOR A' THAT'**

Robert Burns

Fraser Dick

Scottish National Party Students, Scotland

The theme of this collection of essays is 'self-determination'. As a collection of civic-nationalist and autonomist parties in Europe, this is a familiar topic. Whether campaigning for independence, devolution or recognition of a minority language, we all seek a greater level of self-determination for our nations and communities. In Scotland, we fought and narrowly lost a referendum on full independence last year, by a

margin of 45–55. Despite on this occasion choosing not to join the world as an independent nation, the referendum can be seen as a triumph of self-determination. Voter turnout reached over 84%, 16 and 17 year olds were given the vote for the very first time, and the country had a debate which has completely revitalised our democracy. Town hall meetings now routinely pack out venues across the country, the SNP has more than quadrupled in membership, to over 110,000, and the people of Scotland are more politically aware and engaged than they have ever been before. As a country we self-determined not to become independent, but Scotland has changed utterly, and for the better. And this festival of democracy, and the positive changes that it has brought with it, are a direct result of going through the process of self-determination which the referendum facilitated. Electorally, this led to the election of 56 SNP MPs out of a possible 59 in May's UK election. While we are disappointed that Scotland did not vote for independence last year, we respect the result, and are proud to live in a more confident and more engaged society than ever before.

Self-determination, then, is one of the most fundamental values that we can have as democrats. The extent to which a people have the ability to articulate their principles and decide together who they are, who they want to be, and how they will get to that point, is rightly one of the yardsticks by which we measure any nation that claims to be a democracy.

But this throws up problems for anyone who wants to see power in the hands of the people. For there are still too many people across our continent to whom the principle of self-determination does not appear to apply.

Take, for example, the single parent who suddenly finds out that the housing benefit she depends on is to be cut, forcing her to move back in with her own parents. Can she really be said to determine her own future? Or the zero-hours contract, minimum wage worker who waits for a phone call every day to find out if he is required to work, and who knows that if he ever refuses a shift he will be discriminated against in future. Does he practice self-determination?

Or the pensioner who worked all her life and is now unable to live on her pension. How much influence does she exert over her economic circumstances?

The bottom line is that if we seek self-determination for our countries, then that means nothing unless we seek to extend that freedom and those democratic rights to our citizens who are currently denied them. Until we achieve that, then we have at best only half-succeeded. In Scotland, and no doubt across Europe, opponents of independence routinely try to portray the independence movement as 'narrow nationalism', a kind of atavistic reflex reaction to modernity. And unless we understand that 'Scotland' is nothing but the aggregate sum of the lived experiences of all Scots, we will always run the risk of proving them right. Those of us who seek independence must never be satisfied by the lowering of one flag and the raising of another. If we achieve independence and all we do is preside over a continuation of the inequality, alienation and exploitation that went before, then what was the point? Our goal must be a radically more equal and more democratic society, with greater standards of social and economic justice.

For decades, the great social-democratic parties of Western Europe have rallied under this banner, and won major victories, including universal healthcare, redistributive taxation policies and the welfare states which did so much to improve tens of millions of lives across our continent. Today though, the traditional social-democratic parties built around trade unions a century or more ago are in crisis. Globalisation has simultaneously eroded the power of their traditional activist base in the unions and the social and economic conditions that paved the way for their rise. Moreover, the highly mobile nature of capital and the transnational status of our largest industries and richest people has left the traditional strategies of social-democratic parties increasingly impotent when they do manage to win state power. In addition, since 2008, several of

Europe's social-democratic parties have found themselves implementing highly unpopular austerity programs which have directly impacted on the people who these parties were founded to represent. PASOK, the PSOE and Scottish Labour will attest to the dangers to established parties of becoming decoupled from the economic interests of your traditional base when an alternative anti-austerity party exists.

In decades past, those of us on the left could talk confidently of 'the forward march of labour' and the inevitability of historical progress. However in recent years, our understanding of how history was supposed to work has come unstuck. We're off the face of the map that we so confidently waved as evidence of our ideological certainty. Here there be monsters. The post-2008 crisis has seen entire countries impoverished, tens of millions of people thrown on the scrapheap of unemployment, and untold lives ruined. And politically, the Right seems stronger than ever. After almost a decade of austerity and unemployment brought about by a reckless financial sector, the only left-wing party to capture state power is SYRIZA in Greece, a country which has been so battered by neoliberalism that it has lost 25% of GDP and reached 25% unemployment. If these are the only conditions under which the Left can win, then we are in trouble. And even there, we have seen anti-austerity hopes brutally snuffed out by concerted action from the Eurogroup. It is clear then, that if we are to build the more just Europe that we aim for, it will be necessary to build alliances across Europe, not just in the periphery but in the core.

Clearly this crisis of traditional social democracy provides significant opportunities for independence movements. However these opportunities come with responsibilities and challenges. The material conditions and tensions which caused the rise of social democracy in the first place have not gone away, and if we fail to succeed in devolving political and economic power to the people, then we should not be surprised if any electoral success we have is short-lived. In Scotland, after almost a century of Labour dominance in the working-class heartlands of the West of Scotland, the people of Glasgow and Lanarkshire voted for independence at the referendum last year, and followed up by electing a full slate of SNP MPs in May, leaving Labour holding only one seat in Scotland, in Edinburgh South, one of the most affluent areas of the country. Polls have consistently shown that the SNP is the most popular party among the working class, and the party commands up to 70% of the support of Scotland's young people. If the party that used to call themselves the Party of the People is no more, then it is our responsibility to pick up the

baton on behalf of those in our society who are most disadvantaged by the current system, and who have placed their trust in us (and in themselves) to build a better country.

The moral imperative to stand up to the forces of austerity and conservatism has never been clearer than 8th July, when George Osborne presented the first Conservative budget to the British parliament for almost 20 years. In it, he announced a series of attacks on the young and the vulnerable while giving tax cuts to the most privileged members of our society. Housing benefit will no longer be available to those under 21, reducing people's independence and forcing many to live with their parents for ever longer. Tax credits will only be available for up to 2 children, in a brazen example of social engineering which will contribute to children growing up in poverty through no fault of their own. The minimum wage will be increased - which is welcome - but not to the level of a living wage, and cuts to tax credits will mean that most low-income families will actually be worse off. Further, under-25s, who make up 32% of all minimum wage jobs despite only being 12% of the workforce, will not be eligible for the wage rise. The young and the poor have been hit hardest by a budget that economists agree will be regressive, with working families left out of pocket even after the minimum wage rise, thanks to the cuts to tax credits.

At the other end of the scale, the threshold for inheritance tax to apply will be increased, resulting in more inequality as wealth is passed down through the generations, giving the children of the rich an even bigger unearned advantage over the children of the poor. And given the disproportionate impact this measure will have on the south-east of England as the location of a house price bubble, this will only lead to a further concentration of economic and hence political power in this part of the country. We should remember that tax policy is not merely about revenue collection but is also an inherently political question about shaping the kind of economy and society we want to live in. Osborne's inheritance tax measure contributes to the impression that Britain is a 'rentier economy' where extracting value from an asset boom is an easier route to prosperity than creating value.

In this the devolved SNP Scottish Government in Edinburgh is doing what it can with limited powers to create a fairer tax system. Council tax, a regressive tax based not on your ability to pay but on the value

of the house you live in, which was last assessed over 20 years ago, and under which the richest in our society pay only three times as much as the poorest, has been frozen for 8 years, a policy which has benefited the poorest Scots. The government is currently consulting on a replacement for it altogether, which will result in a fairer and more progressive system of local funding, potentially based on either income or land value.

Furthermore, we are abolishing the tax exemption currently available to large shooting estates in rural Scotland, as part of a radical package of land reform. It has been estimated that half of all of Scotland is owned by only 432 people. This is not an acceptable distribution of land in a democracy and the new rules will mean that if owners of large estates are blocking economic development then they will have to sell so that the local community can reach its full potential. Our aim is to double the amount of land which is owned by local communities by 2020, so that land serves the common good of all who live and work on it, rather than a narrow section of society.

However, despite these policies, and other progressive social policies, like free university education and the abolition of prescription charges, real economic power still lies at Westminster, and as long as it does, the decisions made there by unelected Lords and Tory governments will never benefit the people of Scotland. During the referendum campaign, Scots were promised 'as close to federalism as possible' and 'a modern form of Home Rule', if they voted No. The powers which have been offered, however, fall far short of this ambition, devolving only 38% of Scottish taxes to the Scottish Parliament. For comparison, Canadian provinces manage over 60% of their own taxes, Quebec over 70% while the Basque Country and Navarre manage over 50%. Given the overwhelming mandate given by the Scottish people at the election to the SNP, who want to see the proposals strengthened, the current proposals are totally unsatisfactory. Indeed, in recent weeks we have had to watch the farcical spectacle of Scotland's single Tory MP, elected on 15% of the vote, repeatedly overruling the 56 of Scotland's 59 MPs who represent the SNP, when debating the proposals for devolution. The government is also pushing ahead with plans to exclude Scottish MPs from certain votes on the basis of their being 'English-only'. This is a mistake, as due to the funding set-up of the Scottish parliament, votes on financial matters, even if only explicitly referring to England, have a direct material impact on Scotland's budget.

Britain needs a sustainable and just constitutional settlement, and the people of England need more local control over their lives, and more devolution, but this half-hearted 'solution' being offered is nothing of the sort. Ultimately the only sustainable basis left upon which the UK can survive long into the 21st century is that of full federalism, which would necessitate an English Parliament, a written constitution, a fully elected federal upper house, and a new understanding of what Britain was for in the modern day. However, none of these seem to be forthcoming. In particular, our current Conservative government seems determined to press on ahead with the notion that Britain exists in order to transfer public wealth to private hands, to entrench inequality in society and to balance the books on the backs of the poor. This is the central question for all nationalists today across Europe. It is not enough to say 'I support Scotland'. The question must always be 'whose Scotland?'. What kind of country do we want to build? With this in mind, although we lost our first referendum on independence last year, the second one may not be too far away.



FLANDERS: ON THE ROAD TO BELGIAN STATE REFORM NUMBER 7

Christophe Bostyn
Flanders

"Will Flanders be independent soon?" That is the question I hear most frequently when talking with foreigners on the political situation in Belgium. Time and again, I sincerely answer that things won't gather that much speed. The main characteristic of Belgian politics is the negotiating and bargaining between parties to reform the state. Sudden upheavals are never part of the game.

FLANDERS' INDEPENDENCE, WHO IS IN FOR IT?

When we look at the fluctuating patterns of the opinion polls during the previous decade, we can come to the conclusion that between 10% and 30% of the Flemish population would prefer independence. In times of deep political turmoil between the Dutch- and French-speaking parties, the supporters of Flemish independence rose to 30 to 45%. The latest

VLAANDEREN: OP WEG NAAR DE ZEVENDE STAATSHERVORMING VAN BELGIË

Christophe Bostyn
Vlaanderen

"Vlaanderen onafhankelijk? Dat zal ook niet lang meer duren, nee?" Dat moet ongeveer de meest gestelde vraag zijn die ik te horen krijg wanneer niet-Belgen me vragen over de politieke situatie in Vlaanderen. Telkens antwoord ik oprocht dat het allemaal niet zo een vaart zal lopen. De Belgische politiek is er één van stapsgewijze akkoorden tussen politieke partijen om de staat te hervormen en niet één van bruiske omwentelingen.

VLAAMSE ONAFHANKELIJKHED: WIE WIL ZE?

Kijkend naar de – schommelende – opiniepeilingen van de laatste tien jaar, zien we dat een kleine 10% tot een derde van de Vlamingen onaf-

opinion poll of ISPO (Catholic University of Leuven) shows that only 6.4% of the Flemish population would definitely prefer an independent Flanders. This shows the average Flemish person is not particularly interested in Flemish independence. Why is the perception abroad that different then?

The independence movement in Flanders is not a popular movement as it is in Catalonia, for example. Political parties such as the liberal conservative New-Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, N-VA) and the extreme-right Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, formerly Vlaams Blok) have the independence of Flanders in their DNA. Their success is however not due to this ideological point - they both have another unique selling position. The N-VA presents itself as a party for change as opposed to the three classical governmental parties since WWII (conservatives, liberal democrats and social democrats). Vlaams Belang on the other hand has a typically xenophobic discourse. The majority of voters attracted to these parties are not necessarily Flemish nationalists or radically pro-independence. If a referendum would be held on Flemish independence, there would be no doubt at all that the opponents to independence would win.

The nationalist Flemish parties are aware of this. Last year, when visiting a gathering of Catalans in Brussels on the occasion of the Catalan popular consultation, I followed a conversation between a Catalan and a Flemish representative of the N-VA in the European Parliament. The Catalan asked the MEP if and when Flanders would hold a referendum on independence. The Flemish MEP feebly answered that "referenda are not part of our political traditions..." This is typical of the political culture in Belgium and Flanders, where policies are determined in the headquarters of political parties and where political participation of citizens is confined to the ballot box. In Belgium we infamously call it the 'particracy'. In other words, top-down politics.

When foreigners typically hear of the Flemish desire for independence, it is above all based on what is happening in party politics. The aim for more autonomy was and is characteristic for Flanders and its population, who first and before all sought recognition for their language and culture and at the same time, a better standard of living. At that time, Wallonia reclaimed a regionalisation of economic policies. That's why we now know a system of double regionalisation in Belgium: the regions are

onafhankelijkheid wil. In tijden van diepe politieke en communautaire crises, stijgt dit naar 30 tot 45%. Een laatste opiniepeiling van ISPO (KU Leuven) geeft aan dat nauwelijks 6,4% van de Vlamingen resoluut voor onafhankelijkheid wil gaan. De gemiddelde Vlaming ligt dus niet wakker van Vlaamse onafhankelijkheid. Waarom is die perceptie er dan?

In Vlaanderen is de onafhankelijkheidsbeweging geen volksbeweging zoals we deze in bv. Catalonië zien. Politieke partijen zoals de rechts-liberale Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) en het extreemrechtse Vlaams Belang dragen Vlaamse onafhankelijkheid in hun DNA, maar wisten of wisten de kiezer vooral te bekoren door een andere unique selling position. Zo profileert N-VA zich als de partij van de verandering tegenover de drie klassieke machtspartijen (christendemocraten, liberalen en socialisten) en gaat Vlaams Belang vooral de boer op met een antivreemdelingendiscours. Het grote deel van de kiezers die voor deze partijen stemmen, zijn echter niet per se nationalisten of sowieso voorstanders van Vlaamse onafhankelijkheid. Mocht er momenteel een referendum gehouden worden over Vlaamse onafhankelijkheid, dan zien we dat het ongetwijfeld de 'nee' is die het zou halen.

Daar zijn de Vlaams-nationalistische partijen zich ook van bewust. Vorig jaar, naar aanleiding van de Catalaanse volksraadpleging en tijdens een bijeenkomst van de Catalaanen in Brussel, volgde ik een gesprek tussen een Catalaan en een Europarlementslid van de N-VA. De Catalaan vroeg aan de man in kwestie of en wanneer Vlaanderen een referendum over onafhankelijkheid zou houden. Lauw antwoordde de N-VA'er: "Het ligt niet in onze politieke traditie om referenda te houden..." Dit is tekenend voor de politieke cultuur in België en Vlaanderen, waar het politieke beleid vooral beslist wordt in de partijhoofdkwartieren en de burgerlijke participatie aan de politiek herleid wordt tot het stemhokje. De beruchte partcratie. Om het met Engels jargon te zeggen: top-down politiek.

Wanneer men in het buitenland dan ook over het 'onafhankelijkheidsstreven' van Vlaanderen hoort, dan is dit vooral gebaseerd op wat er zich afspeelt in de partijpolitiek. Het streven naar meer autonomie was en is kenmerkend voor de Vlamingen, die eerst en vooral erkenning zochten voor hun eigen taal en cultuur en tegelijkertijd betere levensomstandigheden. Wallonië vroeg tegelijkertijd naar een regionalisering van economische bevoegdheden, waardoor we nu in België de dubbele staatsopdeling kennen in regio's (met vooral economische en grondgebonden

mostly responsible for the economic and ground-bound policies; the communities on the other hand are mostly responsible for language, culture and educational policies *inter alia*. It is only after this that also Flanders has started to claim more economic competences, as it wishes to deal with economic matters differently. Nowadays, the desire for more autonomy has become a norm: practically no parliamentary party can be found opposing it. The driving force of the political independence movement can however largely be found on the right side of the political spectrum, mainly due to historical reasons.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FLEMISH INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Before World War I, the Flemish movement desired more social, cultural as linguistic rights. The socialists, opposing to what is now a popular interpretation, were not opposed to more Flemish rights. Well on the contrary. Neither were the Walloon socialists the heralds of the Belgique à papa. Ghent, Flanders' socialist stronghold, was known for its strong Flemish movement. The Walloon socialists on the other hand, were tired of the clerical Flemish. It was characteristic for the Flemish movement in those days: a deep division between left- and right-wing, and between clerical and anti-clerical. Still, Flemish catholic, liberal and socialist politicians were able to bridge those differences to stand united in favour of education in Dutch in Flanders. A good illustration of this is the 'Dutchification' of Ghent University. As such, the university of Ghent was the first Belgian university to have an educational system completely in Dutch, in 1930.

Alas, it wasn't all plain sailing. When during the First World War a part of the Flemish movement choose to cooperate with the German occupying forces, that part was repudiated by civil society. The collaborating 'activist' part was prosecuted, while the others continued as a still socially and nationally progressive movement. It is only in the 1930s, when authoritarian right-wing and anti-democratic movements were in full swing, that the Flemish movement would change drastically. On the left side, the Internationale was sung: 'Confronting fellow blue-collar workers had to come to an end, they were never again to slaughter each other in senseless wars where only the capitalist powerful would gain. Nationality should never be used again to set comrades against each other.' The class

bevoegdheden) en gemeenschappen (met vooral persoonsgebonden bevoegdheden zoals taal, cultuur, onderwijs enz.). Pas daarna kwam ook in Vlaanderen de behoefte om een eigen economisch beleid te gaan voeren voor een regio die andere economische accenten legt dan Wallonië. Het streven naar meer autonomie is nu ook kenmerkend voor de hele Vlaamse politiek, waar zo goed als geen enkele partij tegen te vinden is. De motor achter deze beweging is aan Vlaamse zijde tegenwoordig wel eerder aan de rechterzijde van het politieke spectrum te vinden. Dat heeft zijn historische redenen.

EEN KLEINE GESCHIEDENIS VAN DE VLAAMSE ONAFHANKELIJKHEDSBEWEGING

Voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog was de Vlaamse beweging er één die zowel streefde naar sociale culturele en taalrechten. In tegenstelling tot wat nu algemeen gedacht wordt, waren de Vlaamse socialisten toen helemaal geen antiflaminganten - wel integendeel - en de Waalse socialisten ook allesbehalve de sterkhouders van la Belgique à papa. Gent, de socialistische burcht van Vlaanderen, stond bekend voor zijn flamin-gantisme. De Waalse socialisten aan de andere kant, waren het klerikale Vlaanderen moe. Het tekende ook de Vlaamse beweging van toen: een sterke interne tegenstelling tussen links en rechts, tussen klerikaal en antiklerikaal. Toch konden Vlaamse katholieke, liberale en socialistische politici deze verschillen overstijgen om jarenlang samen te strijden voor de erkenning van het Nederlands in het onderwijs in Vlaanderen. Een concreet voorbeeld hiervan is de strijd voor de vernederinging van de Gentse universiteit. Zo werd de Gentse Rijksuniversiteit in 1930 officieel de eerste volledig Nederlandstalige universiteit van België.

Het ging helaas allemaal niet van een leien dakje. Toen in WOI een – klein – deel van de Vlaamse beweging koos om samen te werken met de Duitse bezetter, kwam dat deel van de Vlaamse beweging er als verbrand uit. De collaborerende, activistische vleugel werd vervolgd en de anderen gingen door als een toen nog steeds sociaal en nationaal vooruitstrevende beweging. Het is pas rond de jaren 30, met de opkomst van rechts-autoritaire en antidemocratische stromingen, dat de Vlaamse beweging grondig zou veranderen. Aan linkerzijde klonk de Internationale: 'Het moet gedaan zijn arbeiders tegen elkaar op te zetten om dan elkaar uit te moorden in zinloze oorlogen ten bate van de kapitalistische machthebbers, waarbij

struggle was the real battle for socialists: 'Workers of the world, unite!' The Flemish movement saw in Nazi-Germany a related Germanic people who it could cooperate with to realise the goals it never could realise in Belgium, led by French-speaking elites. The Flemish movement lost all credits after collaboration during WWII. The deep post-war divisions made reconciliation impossible whereby no amnesty was given to collaborators (neither to the French-speaking collaborators). In particular the radical part of the Flemish movement would never be able to digest this, but many were able to move on. The Flemish movement reconstructed itself bit by bit, resulting in the success of the pluralistic Volksunie (Popular Union). When the Volksunie participated in government and negotiated a failed state reform in 1978, the party suffered an electoral defeat, causing the most radical part of the party to break away. The Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) was born.

It looked like Flanders was unable to turn this black page of its history. With the elections to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, the country saw a breakthrough of the far-right Vlaams Blok, with 6,6% of the nation's votes. 'Black Sunday' was born. It wouldn't be the last or worst Black Sunday. In 2004, in the elections to the Flemish Parliament, the Vlaams Blok became Flanders' biggest party, which came as a shock to many people. Only the coalition list of the Christian-democrats and the then small N-VA managed to secure barely three seats more. As a far-right and xenophobic party, radically in favour of independence, it brought the desire of Flemish independence again in disrepute, including abroad, where many still recognise the party.

A continued cordon sanitaire of all major Flemish parties against the Vlaams Blok systematically excluding the party of all power levels, led voters to the conclusion that a vote for the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) had no sense. During the crises between the Dutch- and French-speaking parties at the end of the years 2000, the N-VA presented itself as the democratic alternative for the three classical power parties and the extremist Vlaams Belang. It attracted a lot of Vlaams Belang voters and had as its biggest merit the ability to provide a democratic alternative to achieve Flemish independence. The president of the N-VA, Bart De Wever, made very clear that racism, xenophobia and extremism had no place in his party. The success of the liberal conservative N-VA at the cost of the Vlaams Belang brought with it a flow of Vlaams Belang staff and representatives, sometimes important, mostly local, to the ranks of the

nationaliteit gebruikt wordt om kameraden tegen elkaar op te zetten.' De klassenstrijd was voor de socialisten de échte strijd: 'Arbeiders aller landen, verenigt u!'

De Vlaamse beweging zag in Nazi-Duitsland een verwant Germaans volk waarmee het de doelstellingen kon verwezenlijken die het in België, geleid door Franstalige elites, niet kon verwezenlijken. De collaboratie tijdens WOII zorgde ervoor dat de Vlaamse beweging alle krediet verloor. Wegens de diepe tegenstellingen na de oorlog, kwam verzoening er niet en dus ook geen amnestie voor de collaborateurs (ook niet voor de Franstalige). Vooral het radicale deel van de Vlaamse beweging zou dit nooit verkroppen. Voor de anderen hoefde het uiteindelijk niet meer. We spreken van 2011, 66 jaar na het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Maar ook de Vlaamse beweging bouwde zich politiek gestaag weer op, wat geleidelijk aan slaagde met de pluralistische Volksunie. Toen de Volksunie na een regeringsdeelname en mislukte staatshervorming in 1978 een verkiezingsnederlaag leed, scheurde het meest radicale deel zich af: het Vlaams Blok was geboren.

Het leek erop dat Vlaanderen die zwarte bladzijde uit haar geschiedenis nooit zou kunnen omslaan. Tijdens de verkiezingen in 1991 brak het extreemrechtse Vlaams Blok door met 6,6% van de stemmen in België voor de Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. 'Zwarte zondag' is geboren. Het zou echter niet de zwartste zondag worden. In 2004, met de verkiezingen voor het Vlaamse parlement, werd het Vlaams Blok de grootste partij in Vlaanderen, tot grote ontzetting van velen. Enkel het kartel van het christendemocratische CD&V en het toen kleine N-VA haalde samen amper 3 zetels meer. Als extreemrechtse racistische partij, radicaal voor onafhankelijkheid, bracht het Vlaams Blok de Vlaamse onafhankelijkheids gedachte opnieuw in slecht daglicht, ook in het buitenland, waar velen de partij nu nog kennen.

Een aangehouden 'cordon sanitaire', waarbij de partij systematisch door de andere Vlaamse partijen uitgesloten werd op alle mogelijke bestuursniveaus, deden vele kiezers inzien dat een stem voor het – ondertussen – Vlaams Belang geen zin had. Tijdens de communautaire crisissen eind jaren 2000, presenteerde de N-VA zich als het democratische alternatief voor de drie klassieke machtspartijen én voor het extreemistische Vlaams Belang. Het trok daarbij vooral de kiezers van het Vlaams Belang naar zich toe en had daarbij als voornaamste verdienste dat het

N-VA, raising questions about the ideology of the N-VA.

WHAT NOW? THE N-VA AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF FLEMISH NATIONALISM

In any case, the N-VA presented itself as a decent right-wing party ready to govern, on the Flemish as well as on the Belgian level. As well as leading the Flemish government since 2014, it participates in the right-wing federal government of Prime Minister Michel, and to the surprise of many Flemish nationalist - without securing a state reform. The N-VA's answer was that a golden opportunity had now arisen that the right-wing forces could gather to form a government without the socialists. That way a right-wing economic programme could be put into place, as desired by most Flemish people, according to the N-VA, but also one applauded by the main employers' associations. The N-VA's leader, Bart De Wever has even gone as far to say that the Flemish Chamber of Commerce is his "real boss." As such, the N-VA participates in further reforming Belgium into a tax haven for financial elites and their multinationals, who eagerly use the many loopholes that are common and typical in Belgian fiscal constructions. The results are well-known: a fiscal tourism contributing very little to society while fiscal pressure on the Flemish middle classes and small businesses grows to astronomical heights – and small businesses who provide about 70% of Flanders' jobs. While the Flemish movement has managed to emancipate Flanders culturally and politically, the current political Flemish nationalists see no problem in putting Flanders under the tutelage of the international financial elites. A social-democrat alternative such as the Scottish National Party does not exist.

The previous year, the N-VA, as a Belgian government party, integrated itself in the Belgian state system, thereby safeguarding vested institutional and economic interests. The impassioned way it copied the 'Belgian disease' of political nepotism in the appointment of high-placed civil servants points more in the direction of a change of elites than a true change. Is the N-VA a people's party as in popular? It does present itself as a Flemish people's party, but can best be compared with the elitist British conservatives. The youth and student movements linked to the N-VA are also mainly elitist. As such, Flemish nationalism cannot be considered as a popular movement.

een democratisch alternatief voor Vlaamse onafhankelijkheid aanbood. N-VA-voorzitter Bart De Wever schonk klare wijn: racisme, vreemdelingenhaat en extremisme konden geen plaats vinden in de partij. Het succes van de rechts-liberale N-VA ten koste van het Vlaams Belang zorgde er wel voor dat vele, soms belangrijke, hoewel meestal lokale mandatarissen en personeelsleden overliepen van het Vlaams Belang naar de N-VA, wat heel wat vragen oproep over de ideologie van de N-VA.

WAT NU? DE N-VA ALS MOTOR VAN HET VLAAMS-NATIONALISME

De N-VA converteerde zich in elk geval tot een fatsoenlijk rechtse partij die klaar was voor regeringsdeelname, ook op het Belgische niveau. Naast het leiden van de Vlaamse regering, stapte de N-VA in 2014 in de rechtse regering Michel. Tot de verbazing van vele Vlaams-nationalisten: zonder een staatshervorming te bekomen. Het antwoord van de N-VA klonk dat de kans aangebroken was om nu, zonder de socialisten, een rechts economisch programma uit te voeren dat door de meerderheid van de Vlamingen gewenst zou zijn. Het economisch programma is dan wel dat van de patronale verenigingen zoals het Verbond van Belgische Ondernemers (VBO) en de Vlaamse Ondernemerskamer (VOKA), die Bart De Wever ooit als zijn "echte baas" omschreef. De N-VA doet dan ook mee aan het verder uitbouwen van België als belastingparadijs voor de financiële elites en hun multinationals, die gretig gebruik maken van de vele achterpoortjes voor belastingontwijking die de Belgische fiscaliteit kenmerken. De gevolgen zijn bekend: een fiscaal toerisme dat nauwelijks wat bijdraagt aan de samenleving en de fiscale druk tot astronomische hoogtes brengt voor de Vlaamse middenklassen en KMO's (mkb). Terwijl het net deze laatsten zijn die Vlaanderen kenmerken en ook bijdragen voor ongeveer 70% van de werkgelegenheid. Terwijl de Vlaamse beweging erin geslaagd is Vlaanderen cultureel en politiek te ontvoogden, vind het huidige politieke Vlaams-nationalisme het prima om de Vlamingen onder economische voogdij te plaatsen van de internationale financiële elites. Een sociaaldemocratisch alternatief zoals de Scottish National Party is onbestaand.

De N-VA heeft zich het voorbije jaar, als federale regeringspartij, dan ook steeds meer geïntegreerd in het Belgische staatsbestel, daarbij zowel institutionele als economische gevasteerde machten verdedigend. De fervente

BELGIUM, KINGDOM OF STATE REFORMS

Belgium's success is without a single doubt its peaceful reforms. Flanders never knew a separatist terrorist organisation and Belgium never had a civil war etc. Abroad, people sometimes pity the long negotiations to form a Belgian government. These negotiations are however key to come to state reforms. Political disputes come to a high in negotiations. A radical rupture was never envisaged in any or other way, which is very characteristic of Belgium. It is also due to its demographic composition. The Flemish may be the largest demographic group, the French-speaking and Walloons do not lag far-off behind. When comparing to Catalonia for example, we clearly see where the problem lies there: Catalonia is, as a small minority, completely dependent on the political goodwill of the Castilian majority in Spain. An inexistent goodwill, opposed to the situation in Great-Britain regarding Scotland.

And so Belgium goes on, from state reform to state reform. Since 1970 we are now undoubtedly on our way to the seventh state reform. Nobody pretends this will be the last and final state reform. This has positive and negative implications: on one hand, taboos are almost inexistent and regions can reshuffle competences whenever they deem it necessary or simply when the wish to do so. On the other hand, the structure of the Belgian state has become vastly incomprehensible. A rationalisation is needed. It is to be expected that a next reshuffle of competences will be in the benefit of the regions, which will practically turn Belgium into a confederation. The N-VA has already indicated it wishes to go that way. If the N-VA keeps on achieving the same high electoral results as it presently does, we may expect this to be the outcome. The other Flemish parties will undoubtedly follow suit. The French-speaking and the Walloons, politically considered, will not refuse. It all depends on the outcome of negotiations (again). They will defend the interests of their constituents as hard as the Flemish do - and this is of course normal.

This the general conclusion we can make of Belgium and Flanders today. Or to say it with the words of Jules Destrée, once minister of the Belgian Workers Party, who famously wrote to King Albert in August 1912:
« *Your Majesty... You are governing two peoples. In Belgium there are Walloons and Flemish. There are no Belgians.* »

manier waarop het de zogenaamde 'Belgische kwaal' aan politieke benoemingen overneemt, wijst dan ook eerder op een machtswissel dan op een echte verandering. Is de N-VA een volkspartij? Het profileert zich als Vlaamse volkspartij, maar kan best vergeleken worden met de elitaire Britse conservatieven. Ook de jongeren- en studentenverenigingen die als kweekvijver voor de N-VA fungeren, zijn grotendeels elitair ingesteld. Het Vlaams-nationalisme kan daarom niet als een volksbeweging gezien worden.

BELGIË, KONINKRIJK DER STAATSHERVORMINGEN

Het succes van België is ongetwijfeld het vreedzame karakter van de hervormingen. Vlaanderen kende nooit een terroristische afscheidingsbeweging, een burgeroorlog is er nooit geweest enz. Buiten België wordt wel eens meewarig gedaan over de lange Belgische regeringsvormingen, maar laat dit nu net de sleutel zijn om tot staatshervormingen te komen. Politieke twisten komen tot een hoogtepunt. In onderhandelingen. Nooit werd aangestuurd tot een radicale breuk in ene of andere zin. Dit is zeer kenmerkend voor België. Dit is ook te wijten aan de demografische samenstelling. Hoewel de Vlamingen de grootste bevolkingsgroep vormen, zijn de Franstaligen en Walen samen niet veraf in grootte. Wanneer men vergelijkt met bv. Catalonië, is duidelijk waar daar één van de voornaamste problemen zit: Catalonië is als kleine minderheid volledig afhankelijk van de politieke bereidheid van de Castiliaanse meerderheid in Spanje, een bereidheid die onbestaande is, in tegenstelling tot bv. Groot-Brittannië met Schotland.

Zo gaat België door, van staatshervorming naar staatshervorming. Sinds 1970 zijn we nu ongetwijfeld op weg naar de zevende staatshervorming. Niemand pretendeert dat een bepaalde staatshervorming de definitieve of laatste is, wat positieve en negatieve gevolgen heeft: aan de ene kant zijn er bijna geen taboes en kunnen de landsdelen bevoegdheden herschikken naargelang de noodzaak of de wens, aan de andere kant is de Belgische staatsstructuur er één waar men door de bomen het bos niet meer ziet. Een rationalisatie dringt zich dan ook op. Het valt te verwachten dat een verdere bevoegdheidsherverdeling opnieuw richting deelstaten zal gaan, wat van België zo goed als een confederatie zal maken. De N-VA heeft al aangegeven die richting te willen uitgaan. Indien de N-VA dezelfde hoge resultaten blijft halen, mogen we dit dan ook verwachten in de nabije

toekomst. De andere Vlaamse partijen zullen daarbij ongetwijfeld volgen. De Franstaligen en Walen, politiek gezien, staan hier niet op te wachten, maar zullen hier geen nee op zeggen. Het hangt allemaal af van het resultaat van de onderhandelingen (opnieuw). Ze verdedigen daarbij even hard de belangen van hun kiezers als de Vlaamse partijen. Wat niet meer dan normaal is.

Dit is het algemene besluit dat we van België en Vlaanderen vandaag kunnen maken. Of zoals Jules Destrée, ooit minister voor de Belgische Werkliedenpartij, schreef naar Koning Albert I met de beroemd geworden woorden, we schrijven 15 augustus 1912:

« Sire, (...) Vous régnez sur deux peuples. Il y a en Belgique, des Wallons et des Flamands ; il n'y a pas de Belges. »



THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CATALAN COUNTRIES: THE RIGHT TO DECIDE OF THREE COUNTRIES AND THEIR NATION

**Luis Alfonso Hernandez Manero, Marta Rossique,
Max Zañartu Plaza, Valentina Servera Clavell
Joventuts d'Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya,
Catalan Countries**

What is self-determination? It is the action by which a population freely decides its political future. It is a right recognised by the Charter of the United Nations in 1951 and reaffirmed by the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1970. We could consider that in the Catalan Countries we exercise our self-determination every four years in the local and regional elections of our territories, in the legislative and presidential elections of the Spanish and French state and in the elections to the European Parliament. However, for JERC (Joventuts d'Esquerra Republicana), this is not enough. We want our society to express its will in every aspect of life

EL DRET A L'AUTODETERMINACIÓ ALS PAÏSOS CATALANS: EL DRET A DECIDIR DE TRES PAÏSOS I LA SEVA NACIÓ

**Luis Alfonso Hernandez Manero, Marta Rossique,
Max Zañartu Plaza, Valentina Servera Clavell
Joventuts d'Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya,
Països Catalans**

Que es l'autodeterminació? L'acció per la qual un poble decideix lliurement el seu futur polític. Un dret reconegut per la carta de les nacions unides a l'any 1951 i reafirmat per la declaració de drets humans de les nacions unides al 1970. Podríem considerar que als Països Catalans exercim la nostra autodeterminació cada quatre anys a les eleccions municipals i autonòmiques dels nostres territoris, a les eleccions legislatives i presidencials dels estats espanyol i francès, i a les eleccions al Parlament Europeu. Tanmateix, per a les Joventuts d'Esquerra Republicana això no es prou, necessitem que la nostra societat expressi la seva voluntat en tots els temes que condicionen la

which defines its freedom - from financing, education and infrastructure, to being able to build an independent state.

We consider that the different parts our nation are at different phases in the process of self-determination. Whilst the Valencian Country and the Balearic Islands and the Pitiüses are starting to wake up after 20 years under the control of the Popular Party, Catalonia has already started its own independence process, planning a regional election for the 27th of September which will be analysed as a referendum. Despite the different levels of self-determination in the Catalan Countries, the aim remains the same: a good quality of life for all the citizens of our nation, from Salses to Guardamar and from Fraga to Maó.

In Catalonia, achieving our desire for an independent state free from Spain's domination after more than 300 years, would mean becoming capable to decide our own future, and it would offer us the tools to build a cohesive and egalitarian country. Firstly, we will be able to live fully in our language, as a living language needs its own state to be present on the global stage. We would be able to legally defend that no one is discriminated against for their sexual orientation, the colour of their skin, their gender or religion, because we do not mind where people come from, but rather where we go as a society. We want a tolerant and respectful society. We want a state for everyone, without leaving anyone behind, and we will only reach our socialist goals through the independence.

In the Valencian Country, after dealing with 20 years of corrupt and fascist governments of the conservative Popular Party, the self-determination of the people in local and regional elections have given power to the sum of the center-left political forces. The most important step for the country is now to recover the dignity lost during these years, bringing corrupt politicians who, among many other shameful actions, have been responsible for the near collapse of the Valencian financial system, which had a very negative impact for their industry. We need infrastructure that responds to our country's necessities: a Mediterranean railway corridor that connects the three main harbours of the Iberian Peninsula (Barcelona, València and Algeciras), a train between Oliva and Dénia and the improvement of the whole railway network. Unfortunately, to build this first class infrastructure it is first necessary to negotiate with the Spanish government, as the Valencian Country is the only autonomous community with a GDP below the State average that contributes more to

seua llibertat, des de la política de finançament, l'educació o infraestructures, fins la necessitat de la construcció d'un estat independent.

Considerem que ara mateix la nostra nació es troba en diferents fases del procés d'autodeterminació. Mentre el País Valencià i les Illes Balears i Pitiüses comencen a despertar després d'anys de govern reaccionari del Partit Popular, Catalunya està immersa en un procés d'independència amb unes eleccions autonòmiques programades pel proper 27 de setembre en clau de referèndum. Si bé als Països Catalans ens trobem en diferents nivells dins del procés d'autodeterminació, la finalitat acaba sent sempre la mateixa: Aconseguir que els ciutadans de la nostra nació, de Salses a Guardamar i de Fraga a Maó, tinguin una millor qualitat de vida.

Al Principat de Catalunya, l'assoliment d'un anhelat estat independent amb l'alliberament del jou de l'estat espanyol després de més de 300 anys, suposaria guanyar una capacitat de decisió que ens permetria tenir les eines per construir un país cohesionador i més equitatiu. En primer lloc podríem viure plenament en català, ja que una llengua amb un estat darrere és una llengua viva i present als estaments mundials. Podríem crear una millor legislació que impedis per a que cap persona fos discriminada per la seua orientació sexual, color de pell, gènere o religió, ja que no importa la d'on venim sinó allà on anem. Volem una societat tolerant i respectuosa amb totes les persones, volem un estat per a tothom, sense deixar enrere a ningú, i la nostra meta socialista només es pot complir amb la independència.

Al País Valencià, després de suportar 20 anys de governs feixistes i corruptes del Partit Popular, l'autodeterminació del poble en forma d'eleccions municipals i autonòmiques han donat el poder a la suma de forces de centre-esquerra. Ara el més important pel país és recuperar la dignitat perduda durant aquests anys, foragitar als corruptes que entre d'altres barbaritats, han fet caure el sistema financer valencià, fet que suposa un enorme llast per a la indústria pròpia. Necessitem infraestructures que responguin a les necessitats del nostre país: Un corredor ferroviari mediterrani que vertebrí els tres ports més importants de la península ibèrica: El port de Barcelona, València i Algesires; la construcció del tren entre Oliva i Dénia, i la millora de tota la xarxa de rodalies i regional de ferrocarrils. Malauradament per a construir aquestes infraestructures de primer ordre cal comptar sempre amb la voluntat el govern estatal ja que el País Valencià és la única comunitat autònoma amb un PIB per capita per

its coffers than it receives. Moreover, we must pay tribute to the victims of Franco's dictatorship, which brought 40 years of fear to our land. We must start by taking away fascist insignia which still adorn the streets of our towns and cities and by establishing policies of historical memory that repress the apology of this fascist dictatorship. To overcome, we must not forget, but instead remember the past.

On the islands of the Catalan Countries: Menorca, Mallorca, Eivissa and Formentera, the term 'self-determination' is expressed as the capacity of every island to independently decide its future. Every island must be able to democratically decide its relationship with the others, by breaking the centralism of the double insularity of Menorca and Ibiza, and the triple insularity of Formentera. A clear example of this double centralism of Madrid and Palma is the lack of direct flights between Menorca and Eivissa, with a stop in Barcelona the cheapest option. Therefore, the islands will need to rethink about their situation in Spain as well as in the Balearic Islands as a whole. We need to open a debate that allows the citizenship to democratically decide for the first time if we want or not a political unit between Menorca, Mallorca, Eivissa and Formentera, and if we want to continue in the Spanish state.

For JERC, the maximum exponent of self-determination, independence, would suppose freedom from the oppression that being in Spain represents. It is a neo-fascist and retrograde state, unable to condemn the bloodthirsty dictatorship which repressed our population during four decades. We want the Catalan Countries to stop financing the benefits of the Spanish upper classes through our taxes, resources that are not given back to us in the shape of investments in infrastructure and public expenditure in social services in our nation. We want Catalanism, Valencianism, Mallorquinism or Menorquism to no longer be but a reaction, a result of this repression. We do not want to be criticised as "nazis" or "totalitarian" for willing to freely decide our future. We no longer want to be accused of going against the Constitution and threatening the unity of Spain, as the real destroyer of the Spanish state are the upper classes which enjoy extra benefits thanks to the working class of the Iberian peoples and especially those of the Catalan Countries. Therefore, by taking the phrase to "war between classes, peace between peoples" as inspiration, we must use the right of self-determination to redefine the relationship between the peoples of the Spanish state, a redefinition underlining a fraternal relationship within the structures of the European Union.


sota la mitjana, que aporta més recursos dels que rep de l'estat. També cal homenatjar degudament les víctimes del franquisme que va omplir durant 40 anys la nostra terra de por, començant per treure les distincions a feixistes dels carrers dels nostres pobles i ciutats, i realitzant polítiques de memòria històrica que persegueixin l'apologia i la banalització d'aquella dictadura feixista. Per superar no hem d'oblidar sinó recordar.

A les illes dels Països Catalans: Menorca, Mallorca, Eivissa i Formentera; el concepte d'autodeterminació s'expressa també en la capacitat de cada illa a decidir el seu futur autònoma. Cada illa ha de ser capaç de decidir democràticament quina relació vol amb cadascuna de les altres, tot trencant amb un model centralista que fomenta el caràcter de doble insularitat de Menorca i Eivissa, i de triple insularitat de Formentera. Un clar exemple d'aquest doble centralisme de Madrid i Palma, és la impossibilitat d'agafar un vol directe entre Menorca i Eivissa, sent l'opció més econòmica l'escala a l'Aeroport de Barcelona el Prat. Així doncs les illes han del replantejar l'encaix no només amb Espanya, sinó entre elles mateixes. Cal trencar tabús i obrir un debat que permeti a la ciutadania, decidir democràticament per primera vegada si vol o no donar continuïtat a la unitat política entre Menorca, Mallorca, Eivissa i Formentera, i si vol continuar formant part de l'Estat Espanyol.

Per a les JERC, el màxim exponent de l'autodeterminació, la independència, suposaria l'alliberament del llast que representa ser part d'Espanya, un estat neofeixista i retrograd incapàc de condemnar una sanguinària dictadura que reprimí al nostre poble durant quatre dècades. Volem que els Països Catalans deixin de pagar la festa a les classes extractives castellanes a través dels nostres impostos, recursos que després no són retornats en forma d'inversions en infraestructures o despesa pública en serveis socials a la nostra nació. Volem que el catalanisme, el valencianisme, el mallorquinisme o el menorquinisme deixin de ser el boc expiatori de la ressaca que ha provocat aquesta festa. Volem que se'n deixi de titllar de «nazis» i «totalitaris» per voler decidir lliurement el nostre futur, que se'n deixi d'acusar d'attemptar contra la constitució i la unitat d'Espanya, en tant que qui està destruint realment l'Estat Espanyol és aquesta casta que viu a costa de la classe treballadora dels pobles ibèrics i especialment dels Països Catalans. Així doncs, seguint la famosa premissa de «guerra entre classes, pau entre pobles» cal utilitzar el dret a l'autodeterminació per a redefinir la relació entre els pobles ibèrics, redefinició que passa per una relació fraternal en el sí de la Unió Europea.

In the Catalan Countries we realise that the right of self-determination has not only a collective meaning but also an individual one. The term of the right to decide reflects both meanings: the right to decide the political future of Catalonia, the right to decide about the energy system, the right to decide about a Catalan framework of labour relationships; but also the right to decide about our body, or the right to decide our working place. All in all, the right of self-determination and the right to decide are a sine qua non condition of freedom, the capability of individuals and populations to be owners of their will, to control and determine their own actions and destiny. However, to reach self-realisation in collective terms, we must not forget that a republican freedom means no domination, no domination to be able to self-determine, to be able to decide what future the people wants for its state. To fight against this domination, which in the Catalan Countries is shaped as the Spanish State, a critical and politically active citizenship is needed, with a refined democratic culture which ensures that our democracy will no longer be hijacked by corrupt politicians. An active citizenship which tells the sons of Franco's dictatorship that we want to break with this Spain that has now expired.

Als Països Catalans som conscients que el dret a l'autodeterminació no només té una vessant col·lectiva, sinó individual. El concepte del dret a decidir reflexa aquestes ambdues vessants: Dret a decidir el futur polític de Catalunya, dret a decidir sobre el model energètic, dret a decidir sobre un marc català de relacions laborals; però també dret a decidir sobre el propi cos, o dret a decidir als centres de treball. En definitiva el dret a l'autodeterminació i el dret a decidir són una condició sine qua non del que es coneix com a llibertat positiva, la capacitat d'individus i pobles de ser amos de la seva voluntat, de controlar i determinar les seves pròpies accions i destí. Tanmateix, per assolir aquesta autorrealització en la vessant col·lectiva, no podem oblidar la concepció de llibertat republicana com a no dominació, no dominació per a poder autodeterminar-se, per a poder decidir quin futur vol el poble per al seu estat. Per a lluitar contra aquesta dominació, que als Països Catalans pren forma d'Estat Espanyol, cal una ciutadania crítica i activa en la vida política, amb una refinada cultura democràtica que impedeixi que la nostra democràcia no sigui segrestada mai més per corruptes, i que digui als fills dels franquistes que volem trencar amb aquesta espanya caduca.



THE MORAVIAN RIGHT TO SELF- DETERMINATION

Marek Pavka

Moravané, Moravia

Moravia has been a self-governed land with its own political institutions since the end of 12th century. Our borders with Lower Austria, Bohemia and Hungary are amongst the longest continually existing borders in Europe. Borders with Silesia have a much more complicated history and it is one of the reasons why the movement for renaissance of constitutional status of Moravia is connected with similar efforts in southern Silesia, which was for some time a part of the Land of Moravia-Silesia.

From a closer look it is possible to distinguish some typical signs of the Moravian politics.

One of them is an effort to reach a reconciliation or compromise. It is visible, for example in religious affairs. During the Reformation in 16th century, Moravia was famous for its tolerance. Historian Ernest Denis wrote: "In Germany, Moravia was considered as the country with the greatest freedom of conscience in the world; various sects existed next to each other, refugees came here, since they knew that they would be secure here." Moravia received religious immigrants like Jews from Prague in 15th

SEBEURČENÍ MORAVY A SLEZSKA

Marek Pavka

Mladi Moravané, Moravy

Morava byla samosprávnou zemí s vlastními politickými orgány už od konce 12. století. Hranice Moravy s Dolním Rakouskem, Čechami a Uhrami patří k nejdéle kontinuálně existujícím hranicím v Evropě. U hranic se Slezskem je to poněkud složitější a i proto je hnutí za obnovu státoprávního postavení Moravy úzce spjato s obdobnými snahami ve zbytkovém, jižním Slezsku, které bylo několikrát součástí Země moravskoslezské a které je dnes součástí České republiky.

Při bližším pohledu vidíme několik rysů moravské politiky, které jsou pro ni typické.

Jedním z nich je snaha o dosažení smíru či kompromisu. Nejprve se to projevilo u náboženské tolerance. V době reformace, tedy v 16. století, Morava proslula soužitím mnoha konfesí. Historik Ernest Denis prohlásil: „V Německu Morava byla pokládána za zemi, kde svoboda svědomí na světě jest nejúplnejší: nejrůznější sekty žily tu pokojně vedle sebe, všichni vypovězenci se utíkali sem, jsouce si jistí před pronásledováním.“

century, Anabaptists from Southern Germany, Switzerland and Austria and members of various sects from Bohemia in 16th century, Catholics from Poland and Jews from Lithuania and Vienna in 17th century.

An effort to reach a compromise could be found in ethnical relations as well. At the same time when Europe had been shattered by nationalism, the Moravian Diet approved an unique solution of language problematic based on ideas of Karl Renner, the so-called Moravian Pact. It was so successful, that it has been used as a model in other lands of Habsburg monarchy and even abroad. One of authors of European constitution, Peter Glotz, mentioned in 1999 that world needs more Moravian Pacts.

In the same manner, Moravian and Silesian politics blurred the edges of conflicts among social classes. It was a Silesian Hans Kudlich and a Moravian Alois Pražák who pushed through the abolition of serfdom and servitude. It was a Moravian, Julius Tandler and a Silesian, Ferdinand Hanusch, who created a welfare state in its present day form. We should not overlook the contribution of Moravian businesspeople in the resolution of social problems. We can mention dynasties of Kleins from Jeseníky Mountains, Gutmanns from Ostrava, Baťas from Zlín, Budischowskys from Třebíč or Friedrich Wannieck from Brno. Successful development of Moravian and Silesian autonomy in 19th century and at the beginning of 20th century coincided with an economic boom and an increase in the standards of living of inhabitants of Moravia and Silesia.

Another feature typical of Moravian politics is a tendency to Central European integration. Moravian politicians have always recognised Moravia to be a transit country (mainly in north-south direction), which takes advantage from its open borders. They also knew that most of the wars in Central Europe would directly concern Moravia, which could not be defended easily due to its geography. The Moravian Diet – unlike the Bohemian Diet – supported a suggestion of founding of the Parliament of Habsburg lands in the 16th century and therefore the Moravian Diet tried to negotiate peace in the times of the Bohemian rebellions against the Habsburgs in 1547 and 1618. We would not find many great generals and military leaders in history of Moravia, but there were a lot of peacemakers. Moravians negotiated the Peace Treaty in Westphalia and the Peace Treaty in Rijswijk and closed two centuries of hostility between the Habsburgs and France. These pacifist tendencies have been spread throughout the world, mainly by the Moravian Brethren.

The essence of these trends is a conciliation and division of powers.

A skutečně, Morava přijímala uprchlíky před náboženským pronásledováním, jako byli v 15. století židé z Prahy, v 16. století habáni z jižního Německa, Švýcarska a Rakouska a příslušníci různých sekt z Čech, v 17. století katolíci z Polska a židé z litevského velkoknížectví a Vídňě.

Obdobně se touha po kompromisu projevila i v etnické sféře. V době, kdy Evropou otřásal nacionalismus, moravský zemský sněm na základě myšlenek Karla Rennera, rodáka z Dolních Dunajovic, přijal naprostě unikátní řešení jazykové otázky v rámci takzvaného moravského vyrovnání v roce 1905. To bylo natolik úspěšné, že bylo rychle přebíráno jako vzor i v jiných zemích habsburské monarchie či dokonce v zahraničí. Jeden z autorů návrhu evropské ústavy Peter Glotz pak v roce 1999 prohlásil, že svět potřebuje více moravských vyrovnání.

Stejným způsobem moravská a slezská politika otupovaly hrany třídních konfliktů. Byli to Slezan Hans Kudlich a Moravan Alois Pražák, kdo prosadili zrušení poddanství a roboty v habsburské monarchii. Byli to Moravan Julius Tandler a Slezan Ferdinand Hanusch, kdo vytvořili sociální stát v podobě, která dnes všem připadá normální. Nesmíme také přehlížet přínosy moravských podnikatelů k řešení sociálních otázek, uvedeme jen dynastie Kleinů z Jeseníků, Gutmannů v Ostravě, Baťů ve Zlíně, Budischowských v Třebíči nebo Friedricha Wanniecka v Brně. Není náhodou, že rozvoj politické samosprávy Moravy a Slezska v 19. století a na počátku století 20. šel ruku v ruce s hospodářským bohem a zlepšováním životní úrovni obyvatelstva Moravy a Slezska.

Jiným rysem typickým pro Moravu je snaha o integraci středoevropského prostoru. Naši politikové si vždy uvědomovali, že Morava jako tranzitní země (především v severojižním směru) profituje z otevřených hranic. A stejně tak jim bylo jasné, že jakýkoli válečný konflikt ve střední Evropě přímo zasáhne také Moravu, která se kvůli své geografii dá jen obtížně bránit. Proto tedy moravský zemský sněm – na rozdíl od českého – podpořil návrh na vytvoření společného stavovského sněmu habsburských zemí v 16. století, proto se moravský zemský sněm snažil vyjednat mír při českých vzpourách proti Habsburkům v letech 1547 a 1618. Jestliže v moravských dějinách nenajdeme mnoho vojevůdců, nalezneme v nich spoustu významných mírotvorců a diplomatů. Byli to Moravané, kdo vyjednal vestfálský mír a mír v Rijswijku, kdo ukončil dvě sta let trvající nepřátelství mezi Habsburky a Francií a tyto pacifistické tendenze pak Morava prostřednictvím moravských bratrů šířila do celého světa.

Unfortunately the opposite approaches prevailed in Central Europe, which led to the ignorance or suppression of minorities and to the concentration of power. Assets of Moravian politics were considered as a weakness. Moravia had to pay a toll, because of its role in the Central European integration and because it offered an alternative to nationalism. Therefore the abolition of Margravate of Moravia and Dukedom of Silesia and their institutions was among the first steps of the Czechoslovakian revolutionary bodies in 1918.

Resistance by most of Moravian and Silesian politicians and by the population as a whole against this abolition led to a partial renewal of Moravian-Silesian autonomy before the Second World War, but when the Communist regime abolished the self-governance of Moravia and Silesia once more on 1st January 1949, there was no possibility to resist. However, in 1968, when the reins of the Communist Regime released for a while, a mass movement demanded the renaissance of Moravia and Silesia. Hundreds of thousands of citizens demanded such restoration and perceived it as a part of the process of democratisation. Soviet invasion and subsequent so-called 'normalisation' suppressed such efforts. The founding of the Czechoslovakian federation, which ignored demands of Moravians and Silesians, was one of fruits of the 'normalisation' process in 1969.

At the beginning of nineties Moravia and Silesia raised their voice again. HSD-SMS (Self-government Movement – Society for Moravia and Silesia) was successful in parliamentary and local elections and became the most popular political party in many regions mainly in southern Moravia. An idea of renewal of self-government received such substantial support that it was accepted by some other political parties as well. In the next parliamentary elections in 1992, political parties supporting renewal of Moravian and Silesian autonomy got the majority of votes. Unfortunately, some of them, such as the Christian and Social Democrats, did not deliver on their promises after the elections. Similar was the fate of the most successful petition in the history of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, which demanded the renewal of Moravian and Silesian autonomy. There were more than 600,000 signatures on this petition, but it was completely ignored by the majority of Czech politicians.

Political decisions of this time were often made without considerations of wishes of citizens. For example, the Czechoslovakian federation was destroyed by the politicians, who did not have this step in their election

Jádrem těchto trendů je snaha o smír a dělbu moci. Po roce 1918, kdy ve střední Evropě bohužel zavládl opačný přístup – tedy bezohlednost vůči menšinám a koncentrace moci – však pražské mocenské centrum chápalo tyto typické rysy moravské politiky nikoli jako přednost, nýbrž jako slabost. A podle toho také s moravskými a slezskými samosprávnými institucemi jednalo. Morava musela zaplatit za to, že integrovala střední Evropu a že nabídla alternativu k nacionalismu. Proto k jedněm z prvních kroků revolučních orgánů v roce 1918 patřilo zrušení Markrabství moravského a Vévodství slezského. Brzy došlo k jejich částečné obnově, ale vše zopakovali komunisté v roce 1949.

Jestliže odpor moravských a slezských politiků i obyčejných obyvatel vůči zrušení moravské a slezské samosprávy v roce 1918 vedl k jejímu – byť omezenému – obnovení, po roce 1948 takovouto možnost odporu občané neměli. Hned v první chvíli, kdy se tato možnost naskytla, tedy v roce 1968, se na Moravě a ve Slezsku objevilo mohutné hnutí za obnovu samosprávy obou zemí. Statisíce občanů tehdy požadovaly tuto restauraci a chápaly ji jako součást demokratizace. Příjezd sovětských tanků a následná normalizace však tyto snahy násilím potlačily. Plodem normalizace pak byla československá federace z roku 1969, která požadavky Moravanů a Slezanů zcela ignorovala.

Hned při další příležitosti, po roce 1989, se Morava a Slezsko ozvaly znovu. Hnutí za samosprávu Moravy a Slezska – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko uspělo v parlamentních i místních volbách a v mnoha regionech Moravy a Slezska bylo vůbec nejpopulárnějším politickým subjektem. Myšlenka obnovy samosprávy měla tak velkou podporu, že ji přebíraly i jiné politické strany. V dalších parlamentních volbách, v roce 1992, pak politické strany prosazující obnovu moravské a slezské samosprávy dokonce podpořila většina obyvatel. Bohužel však některé z nich – lidovci a sociální demokraté – na své sliby hned po volbách zapomněly. Příznačný je osud vůbec nejúspěšnější petic v dějinách Československa a České republiky, kdy požadavek obnovy samosprávy Moravy a Slezska podpořilo více než 600 tisíc obyvatel. Česká politická věrchuška ji zcela ignorovala.

Politická rozhodnutí nyní byla činěna bez ohledu na přání obyvatel a tak například československou federaci rozobili lidé, kteří tento krok neměli ve svém předvolebním programu. A referendum k této zásadní otázce nepřipustili. Jednoznačnému popírání předvolebních slibů se stalo něčím normálním, což se projevilo například při podpoře vlády ODS ze strany

programs. Moreover they did not even allow a referendum on the topic. Clear ignorance of pre-election promises became the norm, which could be illustrated by a mutual support of Civic Democratic Party and Social Democracy after 1996 and 1998 elections. At this time the Parliament approved a return to the Communist system of regions, although the politicians, who pushed that through, did not have this reform in their electoral programs. And of course, no one consulted the citizens.

Naturally, it led to the apathy of our citizens, who had been too many times betrayed by their politicians. People stopped becoming engaged in politics, because they came to believe that they could not change anything. This has only deepened the crisis, because big political parties can actually do what they want. Concentration of power led to a creation of non-transparent conglomerates of lobbyists, high bureaucrats, parliamentary political parties, speculators and media. The demands of citizens are ignored.

As a consequence, the Moravian and Silesian movement disintegrated. It had many causes. We should also mention unfair attacks against its leaders, untrue accusations in the media of separatism or misusing the disintegration of Yugoslavian or Czechoslovakian federations, although Moravian and Silesian activists had nothing to do with it. Also, Moravian and Silesian politicians were normal people from an activist base, while many Czech politicians had been preparing for the takeover of power before 1989 in scientific and political institutions such Prognostic Institute, National Bank or the Christian Democratic Party, with direct support from the Communist regime.

Therefore, it took more than 10 years until the political wing of Moravian and Silesian movement was reunited in Party of Moravians. This subject stresses a renewal of Moravian and Silesian autonomy.

These days we can observe that politics in the Czech Republic lacks the features typical for Moravia before 1918, where respect to minorities and the division of power was the norm. Inhabitants of Moravia and Silesia are a minority in the Czech Republic and therefore they cannot push through their demands, because the system does not take much regards to minorities. At the same time citizens cannot push their demands against oligarchy, which emerged due to centralism. It follows that the power of the centre has to be weakened.

This can be done by adopting two principles – and both can be found in the program of the Moravané Party. First is federalism together with the principle of subsidiarity. Second is a direct democracy, when citizens can

sociálních demokratů po roce 1996 nebo naopak po roce 1998. Tehdy také došlo k prosazení návratu ke komunistickým krajům, což přitom politikové, kteří to schválili, neměli ve svých volebních programech. Obyčejných lidí se jako obvykle nikdo na nic neptal.

Výsledkem pak byla apatie obyvatelstva, které bylo příliš mnohokrát zrazeno svými politiky. Lidé se přestali angažovat v politice, protože vidí, že nic nezmění. Tím se však situace ještě zhoršila, protože parlamentní politické strany si nyní dělají, co chtějí. Koncentrace moci vedla k vytvoření zcela neprůhledného propletence lobbistů, vysokých státních úředníků, parlamentních stran, spekulantů a médií. Požadavky občanů jsou ignorovány a často se jim mocipání přímo vysmívají.

Na pozadí těchto dějů došlo k rozpadu moravského a slezského hnutí. Podílely se na tom podpásové útoky vůči jeho čelným představitelům, vylhané osočování z terorismu v médiích či poukazování na rozpad Československa nebo Jugoslávie (ačkoli moravskoslezské hnutí chtělo československou federaci zachránit a federaci jugoslávskou rozbil nacionalismus, na kterém je postavena Česká republika). Projevilo se také to, že moravští a slezští aktivisté byli amatéři a vše dělali takříkajíc na koleně, zatímco česká polistopadová politická špička se před rokem 1989 na převzetí moci přípravovala v institucích jako Prognostický ústav, Státní banka československá nebo Československá strana lidová, s přímou podporou komunistického režimu.

Proto trvalo více než deset let, než byla politická část moravského a slezského hnutí v roce 2005 sjednocena ve straně Moravané.

Ta se snaží o návrat k tradicím samosprávné Moravy a Slezska. Ukázalo se totiž, že naší politice chybí přesně to, co bylo před rokem 1918 typické pro politiku moravskou. Totíž zohlednění menšin a dělba moci. Jelikož obyvatelé Moravy a Slezska tvoří menšinu obyvatel ČR, nemohou své požadavky prosadit, pokud systém nezohledňuje menšiny. Na druhé straně občan neprosadí své požadavky, pokud stojí proti mocné oligarchii, která vznikla díky centralismu. Obojí ukazuje nutnost oslabit moc centra.

Toho lze dosáhnout dvěma způsoby – a oba Moravané podporují. Prvním z nich je federalismus, kdy se vše, co lze řešit na co nejnižší úrovni veřejné správy, řeší na této úrovni, tedy co nejbliže občanům. Druhým je přímá demokracie, kdy občané sami mohou navrhovat zákony a schvalovat je či odmítat. Zkušenosti okolních zemí, jako je Švýcarsko, Německo či Rakousko, ukazují, že tyto dva principy vedou k daleko lepším

propose and approve the laws. Experiences from the neighboring countries, e.g. Switzerland, Germany or Austria, show that these two principles lead to much better solutions than in the non-transparent, centralist Czech state. Moreover, there is a clear correlation between federalism and direct democracy which is proved by study of Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer. If we adopted the German model of public administration, we could save 3 billion euros per year. If we adopt the Swiss model, we could save 8 billion euros.

Last century has proved that centralised system, where everything is to be decided in Prague, has not been of benefit to Moravia and Silesia and has led to downfall. In the past the political system of Moravia was so functional that it served as a model for other countries. Who uses the Czech Republic as a model now? The economic prosperity of the past, when Moravia and Silesia had their self-government, is seen by architecture of our cities, and not only in the cities like Brno or Olomouc, but also in smaller towns, which are now threatened by depopulation. At that time a standard of living in Moravia and Silesia was comparable with France. Where is it now? In many industrial sectors, companies from Moravia and Silesia belonged among the world elite. It was in Moravia where the first submersible pump, the first Kaplan turbine, the first sugar mill vaporizer or the first rocking chair in history was made. Where are we now?

We believe that this grim development could be stopped. Our proposals are not experiments, these solutions are successful in neighboring countries – and they were successful in autonomous Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia in the past. On the contrary, the contemporary centralistic and oligarchic political system of Czech Republic is in our opinion an experiment – and a very expensive experiment. It removed the Czech lands out of their geographical and historical context; it ignores citizens and led us to the situation where we are now.

At the same time we realise that Europe has to unite if it wants to resist the pressure of great powers like USA, Russia or China. National states have proved that they cannot reach such integration. We believe that historical lands and regions may become steadier foundations of European integration. Therefore the Moravané party is a member of the European Free Alliance. In other words we think that a renewal of Moravian and Silesian self-government would be advantageous not only for the inhabitants of the Czech lands, but it is also a strategic need for the Europe in its entirety.

rozhodnutím, než jaká činí neprůhledný, centralistický český stát. O tom se může každý přesvědčit na vlastní oči, když zavítá do těchto zemí. Navíc jsou přímá demokracie a federalismus v přímé souvislosti a navzájem se podporují, což dokazuje studie švýcarských autorů Bruna Freye a Aloise Stutzera. Pokud bychom převzali německý model veřejné správy, každý rok bychom ušetřili více než 70 miliard korun. Pokud bychom převzali model švýcarský, roční úspora by činila 200 miliard korun. Opravdu chceme dál házet tyto peníze do chrtánu oligarchie, která se nám vysmívá?

Uplynulé století ukázalo, že bezohledný centralismus, kdy se vše rozhoduje v Praze, Moravě a Slezsku neprosplal a přivedl naše země k úpadku. Politický systém Moravy byl kdysi natolik kvalitní, že byl kopirován v mnoha jiných zemích. Kdo a v čem nyní kopíruje Českou republiku? Hospodářskou prosperitu z dob moravské a slezské samosprávy dokazuje architektura našich měst, a to nejen velkých center jako Brno či Olomouc, ale i těch menších, které dnes trpí vylidňováním. Životní úroveň byla u nás v době moravské a slezské samosprávy na úrovni Francie. Kde je dnes? V mnoha průmyslových oborech byly kdysi Morava a Slezsko mezi světovou špičkou, byla zde vyrobena první Kaplanova turbína, první ponorné čerpadlo, první vertikální cukrovárnický odpařovák či první houpací křeslo na světě. Kde jsme dnes?

Jsme přesvědčeni, že tento chmurný vývoj lze zastavit. Naše recepty nejsou žádné experimenty, jde o řešení, která jsou úspěšná v sousedních zemích – a která byla kdysi úspěšná na samotné Moravě, ve Slezsku i Čechách. Naopak za experiment – a to příliš drahý experiment – považujeme současný centralistický a oligarchický politický systém ignorující obyčejného občana, který nás vyrhl z našeho zeměpisného a historického kontextu a který naše země přivedl do stavu, v jakém dnes jsou.

Současně si uvědomujeme, že Evropa se musí sjednotit, pokud chce odolat tlaku mocností, jako jsou USA, Rusko a Čína. Národní státy prokázaly, že tohoto sjednocení nejsou schopny. Jsme přesvědčeni, že mnohem pevnějším základem evropské integrace mohou být historické země a regiony, což ukázalo jak habsburské soustátí, tak Svatá říše římská. Proto jsme členy nejstarší – a podle průzkumů také nejpracovitější – evropské politické strany Evropská svobodná aliance. Jinými slovy považujeme obnovu samosprávné Moravy a Slezska nejen za výhodnou pro obyvatele těchto dvou zemí, ale také za strategickou nutnost pro celou Evropu.



THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SELF-DETERMINATION PROCESS OF ARTSAKH

Lilit Asryan

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has become the spotlight of the international mass media discussion since 1988. All the world prestigious television and radio companies, newspapers, other periodicals started their programmes and issues with the latest news on Nagorno-Karabakh. Why was this small, almost undistinguished spot on the Planet favoured with the attention of mass media? The reason was the courage to be the first to hoist the flag of freedom in the composition of the Soviet Union. The purpose of this was to liberate Armenian Karabakh, formerly annexed to Azerbaijan, which had been sovietized in the 20s of the previous century. The peaceful demonstrations of the small nation claiming on streets their right to self-determination were unprecedented phenomena, given the conditions of the Soviet Socialist regime. Quite naturally, it could not but capture the attention of the international community.

Տեղեկատվական տեխնոլոգիաների դերը Արցախի ինքնորոշման գործում

Lilit Asryan

Nagorno-Karabakh

Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի մասին միջազգային լրատվամիջոցները սկսեցին հաճախակի խոսել 1988-ից: Աշխարհի բոլոր հեղինակավոր հեռուստա և ռադիո ընկերությունները, թերթերը, մյուս պարբերականներն իրենց թողարկումները սկսում էին Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի մասին վերջին նորություններով: Ինչո՞վ էր արժանացել Երկրագնդի վրա այս փոքրիկ, գրեթե անշան կետը մասս-մեդիայի ուշադրությանը: Պատճառը՝ Խորհրդային Միության կազմում առաջինն ազատության դրոշը բարձրացնելու համարձակությունն էր, որի նպատակը նախորդ դարի 20-ական թվականներին ստվետականացված Ադրբեյջանի բռնակցված հայկական Ղարաբաղն ազատելն էր: Իր ինքնորոշման իրավունքի համար փողոց դրված եկած փոքրիկ ժողովրդի խալաղ հանրահավաքները աննախադեպ երևույթ էին խորհրդային սոցիալիստական ուժիմի պայմաններում, ինչը, բնականաբար, չէր կարող չինտաքրքրել միջազգային հանրությանը:

It was very interesting to follow international reaction just from Nagorno-Karabakh. Thousands of people, protesting in towns and villages, having lost anchor of the favour of Soviet authorities, every day tuned the radio-receiver in the stations "Svoboda" (Freedom), "Voice of America" and other radiowaves, expecting from the international community to understand their demand and recognize their right to self-determination.

Unfortunately, nothing prevented Azerbaijan from fomenting violations, and peaceful demonstrations in 1991 developed into war. Under the circumstances of the enforced military operations Karabakh people exercised their right to self-determination, legalized the proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic through a nationwide referendum on 10 December, 1991, symbolically the International Human Rights Day. The Azerbaijani-Karabakh war lasted nearly 4 years. During this time period the economy, infrastructures, housing stock of Karabakh fundamentally disrupted, both sides suffered tangible human losses. On 12 May, 1994 a trilateral ceasefire agreement was signed. Since then, the condition of fragile peace has prevailed in Karabakh.

However, the ceasefire agreement did not bring to end the Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict, but switched it to diplomatic, economic and information platforms.

Despite all this, Karabakh people used the 21 years of peace to eliminate the consequences of war, to restore the ruined, build the new and for the state-building process. It is noteworthy that remaining blockaded and internationally unrecognized, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, or as it is historically known, the Artsakh Republic, remained loyal to panhuman, universal principles and to the norms of International Law, building a free, independent and democratic state.

How efficient is it to apply information technologies in the self-determination issue?

The rapid development of Information and distance communication technologies and networking infrastructures play a significant role in the self-determination process of people and developing nations. Their application is marked with two directions:

Ժատ հետաքրքիր էր հետևել աշխարհի արձագանքին հենց Լեռնային Ղարաբաղից: Քաղաքներում ու զյուղերում միտինգների ու ցույցերի դրւութեած հազարավոր մարդիկ, Խորհրդային իշխանությունների բարեհաճությունից հոյսը կտրած, ամեն օր ուղիղությունիշներով որսում էին «Ազատություն», «Ամերիկայի ծայն» և մյուս ուղիղկայանների ալիքները, ավելացնելով, որ վերջապես միջազգային հասրությունը կիասկան իր պահանջը և կճանաչի իր ինքնորոշման իրավունքը:

Յավոր, ոչինչ չկանխեց Աղրեցանի կողմից բռնությունների հրահրումը և խաղաղ ցույցերը 1991-ին վերաճեցին պատերազմի: Պարտադրությունը ուազմական գործողությունների պայմաններում Ղարաբաղի ժողովուրդը հրացրեց իր ինքնորոշման իրավունքը՝ 1991թ. դեկտեմբերի 10-ին, Մարդու իրավունքների պաշտպանության միջազգային օրը, համաժողովրդական համրավետի միջոցով օրինականացրեց հոչակված Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանրապետությունը: Աղրեցանա-ղարաբայան պատերազմը շարունակվեց մոտ 4 տարի: Այդ ընթացքում իիմսովին ավերվեց Ղարաբաղի տնտեսությունը, Ենթակառության քայլը ֆոնը, երկուակտեր եղան զգալի մարդկային կորուստներ: 1994-ի մայիսի 12-ին ստորագրվեց զինադադարի մասին եռակողմ համաձայնագիր: Այդ օրվանից մինչ այսօր Ղարաբաղում փիսրուն խաղաղություն է տիրուած:

Զինադադարի կնքումով, սակայն, ղարաբաղա-աղրեցանական հակամարտությունը չավարտվեց, այլ տեղափոխվեց այլ հարթություններ՝ դիվանագիտական, տնտեսական և տեղեկատվական:

Այդուհանդերձ, խաղաղության 21 տարիները ղարաբաղիներն օգտագործեցին պատերազմի հետևանքները վերացնելու՝ ավերված վերականգնելու, նոր կառուցելու և պետականաշխության համար: Հատկանշական է, որ մասնիկ շրջակական մեջ եւ միջազգայնութեն չճանաչված Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանրապետությունը կամ պատմական անոնու՞ Արցախի Հանրապետությունը հավատարիմ մնաց համամարդկային սկզբունքներին ու միջազգային իրավունքի նորմերին և կառուցեց ազատ, անկախ եւ ժողովրդավարական պետություն:

Որքանո՞վ է արդյունավետ տեղեկատվական տեխնոլոգիաների կիրառումը ինքնորոշման հարցում:

Տեղեկատվական ու հետահարողակցության տեխնոլոգիաների և ցանցային Ենթակառության արագ զարգացումը կարևոր դեր են կատարում մարդկանց և զարգացող ազգերի ինքնորոշման գործում: Դրանց գործածումը երկու ուղղություն ունի:

Internal

The availability of information and facilitation of communication afford new and elaborate opportunities for participating in the self-determination process, having the aim to improve political, economic, social, educational and cultural development, independent of conventional institutions and governing models.

External

The Internet offers the chance to still developing and unrecognized countries to make their voices heard for the international community via the application of this sphere and draw the latter's attention on the issue of self-determination.

While involving in the activity of this field it is always necessary to know exactly the purpose and reason of its application.

Information technologies are mere tools, so their level of efficiency is equal to the efficiency coefficient of the information they offer.

It follows that it must contain exact message and must be directed towards the proper target audience.

Nowadays, social networking is widely used throughout the world. Facebook, twitter, Instagram are the most popular social networking sites. A vast number of the Earth's population makes use of them which proves that their influence cannot side-step issues of self-determination.

Touching upon the role IT play in the Karabakh conflict, I consider it apt to mention that the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has a unique position. On the one hand, the development of IT field affords the opportunity to break through the Azerbaijani blockade and provide true information about Artsakh (Karabakh) to the international community. On the other hand, disinformation on the Azerbaijani part and flood of distorted information on Karabakh confuse the international community, complicating the real perception. By the way, it concerns the domestic audience of the conflicting parties. I would try to illustrate a concrete example to make my words more pictorial. Several years ago, the resident of one of the villages of Artsakh in an interview to the local television clearly confessed: "When I wake up in the morning and go to work to the vineyards, I rejoice; at last life is in its normal course, I have my work, I can feed the family, I see day by day how life improves in our country, and when in the evening coming back home I suddenly switch on an Azerbaijani channel, I am surprised, at the same time angry, because it turns out that we are aggressors, that

Ներքին

Ինֆորմացիայի հասանելիությունը և շփման դյուրացումն ինքնորոշման գործընթացին մասնակցելու նոր և կատարելագործված հնարավորություններ է ընծոռում՝ նպատակ ունենալով բարեկավել քաղաքական, տնտեսական, սոցիալական, կրթական և մշակութային զարգացումը՝ անկախ ավանդական հնատիտուտներից և կառավարման ձևերից:

Արտաքին

Համացանցը հնարավորություն է տալիս զարգացող և դեռևս ճանաչում չստացած երկրներին այդ տիրույթի օգտագործման միջոցով իրենց ձայնը լսելի դարձնել միջազգային հանրությանը և վերջիններիս ուշադրությունը սկսելու հնքնորոշման թեմայի վրա:

Այս ասպարեզում գործունեություն ծավալելիս միշտ հարկավոր է հստակ հմանալ, թե որն է դրա օգտագործման նպատակն ու պատճառը:

Տեղեկատվական տեխնոլոգիաները միայն գործիք են, ուստի՝ դրանց արդյունաբետության աստիճանն այնքան է, որքան դրանցում պարունակվող ինֆորմացիայի օգտակարության գործակիցը:

Այսպիսով՝ այն պետք է պարունակի հստակ հաղորդագրություն եւ ուղղվի ճշգրիտ թիրախային խմբին:

Մեր օրերում ամբողջ աշխարհում մեծ կիրառում են ստացել սոցցանցերը: Ֆեյսբուք, թվիթթեր, ինստագրամ պրաման ամենատարածված սոցիալական ցանցերն են: Դրանցից օգտվում է երկիր մոլորակի բնակչության մի ստվար մասը, հետևաբար դրանց ազդեցությունը չի կարող շրջանցել ինքնորոշման խնդիրները:

Աղողադանալով դարաբառյան հիմնախնդրում ՏՏ ունեցած դերին, տեղին եմ համարում նշել, որ Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանրապետությունը, գտնվում է շատ յուրահասուկ իրավիճակում. մի կողմից՝ ՏՏ դոլորտի զարգացումը հնարավորություն է տալիս ճեղքելու Աղրթեզանի կողմից շրջահակումը և Արցախ-Ղարաբաղի մասին ճշմարտությունը հասցնել միջազգային հանրությանը: Մյուս կողմից՝ աղրթեզանական ապատեղեկատվությունը և Ղարաբաղի մասին խեղաթյուրված տեղեկատվական մեծ հոսքերը մոլորության մեջ են գցում նոյն հանրությանը՝ դժվարեցնելով իրական ընկալումը: Ըստ որում, դա վերաբերում է նաև հակամարտող կողմերի ներքին լսարաններին: Ասած փորձեմ պատկերավոր դարձնել կոնկրետ օրինակով. Մի քանի տարի առաջ, Արցախի գյուղերից մեզի բնակից տեղական հեռուստաներությանը տված հարցազրոյցում պարզ կերպով խոստովանեց. «Եթե առավոտյան արթանանում եմ և գնում խաղողի այգիներում աշխատանքի, ուրախանում եմ, որ վերջապես լսամքը հոնի մեջ է մտել, որ աշխատանք ունեմ, կարող եմ ընտանիք պահել,

things are bad, that we escape from fear leaving our houses."

Of course, a person living in Karabakh can differentiate between the reality and false information. The question is how someone living in Azerbaijan and some other corner of the world will conceive it under such conditions. Azerbaijan definitely spares no effort to force its so-called "reality" and with this aim floods mass media, including the Internet, with fake information. Under these unequal conditions of information war or cyberwar we have to trust our own strength and the international community's virtue and honesty.

Though the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has not been officially recognized by any country, nevertheless, in the age of developing technologies, when there is wide communication and constant exchange of information takes place, it is impossible to veil the existence of Artsakh and or not to notice the accomplishments and development of the country. Thus, the availability of IT facilitates the process, as despite of the real area, as an important precondition for self-determination, Karabakh today has cyberspace, where they upload photos, videos, articles, comments or remarks, and the entire world becomes partly aware of the country, the level of recognition increases, certain degree of interest arises, people study the history of the country, they wish to visit it.

For instance, a few years ago amateurs of extreme sport visited Artsakh, because they had seen on the Internet the photo of "Hounot Canyon" and decided that it was a wonderful place for extreme sport amateurs. Coming to Artsakh they went base-jumping from the height, then spread the photos and videos on the Internet, provoking a large wave of interest both for extreme sport amateurs and among people who had never known about Artsakh.

So, presence on the Internet itself contributes to raising the level of recognition of the country and, whether intentionally or not, directs people's attention towards the issue of self-determination.

As it has been mentioned, in this process, social networking sites are quite efficient. Not only common people, but also public and political figures, prominent people, state leaders and others are involved in this platform. The latter usually have thousands of followers, and even a message or update on their pages is at the spotlight of their followers, who in their turn

որ տեսնում եմ,թե օր-օրի ինչպես է բարեփոխվում կյանքը մեր երկրում, իսկ եթք երեկոյան վերադառնալով տուն, հանկարծ աղբեցանական հեռուստաալիք եմ միացնում՝ ապշում ու զայրանում եմ, որպեստև պարզվում է, որ մենք ագրեսորներ ենք, որ մեզ մոտ ամեն ինչ շատ վատ է, որ մենք վախճում ենք, թողնելով մեր տները և այլն...»

Իհարկե, Ղարաբաղում ըսակվող մարդ կարող է տարբերել իրականությունը կեղծիքից, սակայն ինչ պատկերացում պիտի կազմի Աղբեցանում և աշխարհի որևէ անկյունում ապրող մարդը Ղարաբաղի մասին՝ այս պարագայում: Աղբեցանը, ըսականաբար, միջոցներ չի խնայում իր «ճշմարտություն» աշխարհին պարտադրելու համար և այդ նպատակով մեղիա-միջոցները, այդ թվում և համացանցը հեղեղում է ապատեղեկաւությամբ: Տեղեկատվական պատերազմի ահա այսպիսի անհավասար պայմաններում մենք ստիպված ենք նորից ապավինել մեր ուժերին և միջազգային հանրության ողջամտությանը:

Թեպետ ԼՂՀ-ն դեռ ոչ մի երկրի կողմից պաշտոնապես ճանաչում չի ստացել, այսուամենայիվ, զարգացող տեխնոլոգիաների դարաշրջանում, ուր շփումը մեծ է և տեղի է ունենում իսֆորմացիայի անընդհատ փոխանակում, անհնար է գաղտնի պահել Արցախի գոյությունը կամ չնկատել երկրի ձեռքբերումներն ու զարգացումը: Այսպիսով՝ SS առկայությունը որոշ չափով ոյուրացնում է այդ գործընթացը, քանի որ ինքնորոշման համար կարևոր նախապայման հանդիսացող ունալ տարածքից բացի, Ղարաբաղն այսօր ունի նաև կիրերտարածք, որտեղ տեղադրվում են լուսանկարներ, տեսանյութեր, հոդվածներ, գրառումներ, և ողջ աշխարհը այս կամ այս չափով տեղեկանում է այդ երկրի մասին, մեծանում է ճանաչելիության աստիճանը, առաջանում է հետաքրքրություն, մարդկա ուսումնասիրում են այդ երկրի պատմությունը, ցանկություն է առաջանում տեսնելու այն: Օրինակ. մի քայլ տարի առաջ տարբեր երկներից Արցախ էին ժամանել էրստրեմալ սպորտի սիրահարներ, ովքեր համացանցում տեսել էին [Հովհաննիկիրմին](#) կիրճի լուսանկարը, և որոշել էին, որ այս հրաշայի վայր է էրստրեմ սպորտի սիրահարների համար: Գայլով Արցախ՝ նրանք բեյս-ջամկինը էին կատարել բարձունքից, իսկ հետո լուսանկարները և տեսանյութը տարածել համացանցում՝ առաջանելով հետաքրքրության մեջ ալիք, թե էրստրեմալ սպորտի սիրահարների և թե Արցախը մինչ այդ չճանաչող մարդկանց շրջանում:

Այսպիսով՝ Ներկայությունը համացանցում արդեն նպաստում է երկրի ճանաչելիության մակարդակի բարձրացմանը և մարդկանց ուշադրությունը կամա թե ակամա ուղղորդում է դեպի ինքնորոշման խնդիրը:

Ինչպես նշեցինք, տվյալ գործընթացում քավականին արդյունավետ են նաև սոցցանցերը: Այս հարթակում իրենց գործունեությունն են ծավալում ոչ միայն հասարակ մարդիկ, այլև՝ հասարակական ու քաղաքական գործիչները,

share and spread the information on their personal profiles, organizing discussions, providing comments, thus drawing the attention of large audiences on the following issue.

These days political leaders make serious announcements via Twitter, and journalists, citing any official's words, from time to time make references to his/her profile on Twitter. It could be stated that diplomacy has begun to straightforwardly use the opportunities virtual world or cyberworld offers. During the recent years some representatives of authority in Artsakh have opened their official webpages on social networking sites, however, the phenomenon is not widespread yet. Political parties of Artsakh have also begun to extend their informative activity predominantly via websites. If previously their activity was directed to the domestic audience through printed newspapers, today it is more promising to apply information technologies, as they involve broader audiences.

The number of social networking users in Artsakh constantly increases. They post photos representing the country, videos, which become available for their friends both of Armenian and foreign origin. All these again lead to the non-official recognition of the country. However, we face here a problem: for example, on Facebook, Armenian users more often post with Armenian or Russian phonetic symbols, which limits the audience and deprives Europeans or Americans of the opportunity to be informed enough about Artsakh.

Instead, the Azerbaijani side artificially instigates disinformation on Artsakh on the Internet. If you search in search engines the expression "Nagorno-Karabakh", the majority of results will comprise materials, spread by Azerbaijani sources, in which Nagorno-Karabakh is introduced on the most negative sides as a dangerous place, centre of terrorist groups, where extreme poverty prevails and other data not corresponding to reality. All these, of course, leave false impression on anyone, searching for information about Artsakh and can have an impact on the unaware users. There were cases when certain effect of Azerbaijan's dissemination of false information was felt among the participants of events organized in Artsakh.

However, gradually increases the number of people and figures who, aware of direct incitements used on the Azerbaijani part, visit Artsakh and even to spite the foes, leave Artsakh with positive and admiring impressions

պետական առաջնորդները և այլոք: Վերջիններս սովորաբար ունենում են հազարավոր հետևորդներ և բավական է մեկ գրառում կամ որևէ թարմացում կատարեն իրենց էջում՝ այս հայտնվում է նրանց հետևորդների ուշադրության կենտրոնում, ովքեր էլ տարածում են իրենց անձնական էջերում՝ ծավալում քննարկումներ, կատարում մեկնաբանություններ՝ այդկերպ լայն շրջանակների ուշադրությունը սեղույղու տվյալ գրառման կամ այս ու այս խսդրի վրա:

Մեր օրերում քաղաքական գործիչները լուրջ հայտարարությունները հաճախ հայտնում են թվիթերի միջոցով և լրագրողները, մեջբերելով, որում պաշտոնյայի խոսք, պարերաբար հղում են կատարում նրա թվիթերյան էջին: Կարելի է ասել՝ դիվանագիտությունը սկսել է քացահայտ օգտվել վիրտուալ աշխարհի համարակիրություններից: Արցախում, վերջին մի քանի տարիներին, որոշ պաշտոնյաներ սոցցանցերում բացել են պաշտոնական էջեր, սակայն, այդ երեսույթը դեռ համատարած բնույթ չի կրում: Արցախի կուսակցությունները ևս սկսել են իրենց ինֆորմացիոն-տեղեկատվական գործունեությունը ծավալել առավելապես կայքերի միջոցով: Եթե նախկինում նրանց գործունեությունն ուղղված էր ներքին լսարանին՝ տպագիր թերթերի միջոցով, այսօր առավել հեռանկարային է հենց տեղեկատվական տեխնոլոգիաների կիրառում, քանի որ այս ավելի լայն շրջանակներ է ընդգրկում:

Արցախում սոցցանցերից օգտվողների թիվը ևս անընդհատ աճում է: Օգտատերերը հրապարակում են երկիրը ներկայացնող լուսանկարներ, տեսանյութեր, ինչը հասանելի է դառնում իրենց ոչ միայն հայ, այլև՝ այլազգի ընկերներին: Այս ամենը կրկին հանգեցնում է երկրի ոչ պաշտոնական ճանաչման: Սակայն այստեղ կա խնդիր՝ օրինակ ֆեյսբուքում հայ օգտատերը ավելի հաճախ գրառում է կատարում հայատառ կամ ոռաերեն, ինչը սահմանափակում է նրա լսարանը և հսարակությունը չի տաիս եվլուացուն կամ ամերիկացուն՝ բավականաշատ տեղեկացված լինել Արցախի մասին:

Փոխարենը, աղրբեջանական կողմը համացանցում արհետականորեն ուղարկում է Արցախի մասին ապատեղեկատվությունը: Եթե այսօր որոնողական կայքերում փնտրեք Լեռնային Ղարաբաղ արտահայտությունը, ապա արդյունքների գերակշին մասը կինքի աղրբեջանական աղբյուրների տարածած նյութերը, որոնցում Լեռնային Ղարաբաղը ներկայացվում է ամենաբացասական կողմերից՝ որպես վտանգավոր վայր, որպես ահարեկալի խմբավկումների կենտրոն, որը ծայրաստիճան աղբառություն է տիրում և այլ՝ իրականության հետ կապ չունեցող տեղեկություններ: Այս ամենը իհարկե թյուր կարծիք է ստեղծում Արցախի մասին տեղեկատվություն փնտրողի մոտ և կարող է ազդել անտեղյակ օգտատերերի վրա:

and with strong determination to return and extend their activity there.

Nevertheless, despite the opportunities offered by the IT field, Azerbaijani cyberaggression is still the pivotal serious obstacle in this sphere. They disseminate great deal of fake information on social networking sites, mostly on Twitter, create fake websites, attack real websites flooding them with propagating materials for their benefit.

The development of the IT field is one of the crucial directions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Though two IT development centres function in Artsakh, however, substantial drawbacks are still present.

- There is no professional team who will work systematically and targeted, placing materials on Artsakh, in order to make them available for foreigners too. It is necessary to upload materials representing life in Artsakh, which will counterweight the Azerbaijani disinformation.
- On Armenian websites information on Artsakh is presented predominantly in Armenian, thus decreasing the availability of information for foreigners, which limits the audience and drives the country to information blockade.

We are trying to undertake the following steps aimed at the country's self-determination and recognition:

- Preparation of qualified specialists and investment of means in the sphere;
- Concrete steps towards creating propagating and anti-propagating structures of the Armenian side and organizing their mutual cooperation;
- Digitalisation of national, historic-cultural materials for raising the level of the country's recognition;
- Organisation of online seminars and establishment of open universities, which will afford the opportunity to overcome the territorial barrier and unite many people around a common idea or initiative.

SUMMARY

The 21st century is the age of information technologies, and there are no borders in this sphere; everyone is equal there. Time will show whether we will manage to make proper use of the opportunities IT offer and overcome the problems, or it will become the beginning of new problems. But the fact that this sphere has an important role in the process of self-

etermination is clear. We must take advantage of the opportunities offered by the IT field and return to Artsakh. We must also take steps to overcome the challenges posed by Azerbaijan's cyberaggression. This requires a coordinated effort from all sectors of society, including government, civil society, and the private sector. By working together, we can build a better future for Artsakh.

Այս ամենով հանդերձ, չնայած SS ընծեռած հարավորության՝ աղրբեջանական կիրեագրեսիան հիմնական լորջ խոչնդրություն է այս քնազակառում: Նրանք սոցցանցերում և առավելապես թվիթերում տարածում են մեծ ծավալի ապատեղեկատվություն, ստեղծում են կեղծ կայքեր, շարքից հանում են իրական կայքեր՝ դրանք լցնելով իրենց ծեռնոտու քարոզական նյութերով:

SS ոլորտի զարգացումը Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի Հանարապետության համար գերակա ուղղություններից է: Արցախում գործում է SS զարգացման երկու կենտրոն, սակայն դեռևս առկա են որոշ թերություններ.

- Չկա մասնագետների խումբ, ովքեր պարբերաբար և նպատակաւորված կաշխատն Արցախի մասին նյութեր տեղադրելով, դրանք հասու լինեն նաև օտարերկրացիներին: Հարկավոր է տեղադրել Արցախի կյանքը ներկայացնող նյութեր, որոնք ինքնաշխատ հակակաշին կլինեն Աղրբեջանի տարածած ապատեղեկատվությանը:
- Հայկական կայքերում Արցախի մասին նյութերը տեղադրվում են հիմնականում միայն հայերն՝ այդպիսով փակելով տեղեկատվության մատչելիությունը օտարերկրացու համար, ինչն էլ սահմանափակում է լսարանը և երկիրը տանում է տեղեկատվական շրջափակման:

Երկրի ինքնորոշման ու ճանաչման նպատակով՝ SS ոլորտում առաջարկում են ծեռնարկել հետևալ քայլերը.

- որակալ մասնագետների պատրաստում և այդ քնազակառում միջոցների ներդրում,
- կոնկրետ քայլեր՝ հայկական կողմի քարոզական և հակաքարոզական կառույցների ստեղծման և դրանց փոխգործակցության կազմակերպման ուղղությամբ,
- ազգային, պատմամշակութային նյութերի թվայնացում՝ երկրի ճանաչելիության մակարդակը բարձրացնելու համար,
- օնլայն սեմինարների և բաց համալսարանների կազմակերպում, ինչը հնարավորություն կտա հաղթահարել տարածական պատնեշը և շատ շատերին համախմբել մեկ գաղափարի, նախաձեռնության շուրջ:

determination and recognition of nations requires no additional evidence. Today it is crucial for the Armenian side to outline their benchmarks in the propaganda and cyberwars, which must make the issue grounded in the process of introducing it to the international community.

Taking into account the circumstance that modern technology means are more available for the youth, I suggest creating such a platform within the frameworks of the European Free Alliance which will allow the youth wing of the Alliance and its members from time to time to engage the attention of the international community and exchange worthy information on their countries.

And finishing my speech I would like to address the attendees: if the information I have rendered has not been persuasive enough or hasn't created the proper conception about Karabakh, you can make certain by visiting the country. I assure, Karabakhian hospitality, even in the light of Azerbaijani stubborn efforts, nobody could disprove.

Thank you for attention.

Ամփոփում

21-րդ դարը տեղեկատվական տեխնոլոգիաների դարաշրջանն է, իսկ այդ ոլորտում սահմանների գոյություն չունեն, այդտեղ բոլորը հավասար են: Կաջողութիւնը գրագետ օգտվել SS ընծեռած հնարավորություններից և հաղթահարել ինտիմները, թե այս նոր ինտիմների սկիզբ կդառնա՝ ցոյց կտա ժամանակը: Բայց այս, որ այս ոլորտը կարևոր դերակատարում ունի ինքնորոշման և ազգերի ճանաչման գործում՝ լրացնից ապացույցների կարիք չունի: Այսօր հայկական կողմից համար խիստ կարևոր է ուրվագծել իր եվակտները քարոզական և տեղեկատվական պայքարում, որը հիմնավորված պետք է դարձնի հիմնախնդիրը միջազգային հանրությանը ներկայացնելու գործում:

Հաշվի առնելով հանգամանքը, որ ժամանակակից տեխնոլոգիական միջոցներն առավել հասուն են երիտասարդներին, առաջարկում եմ Եվրոպական ազատ դաշինքի շրջանակում ստեղծել ամսվահարթակ, որը թույլ կտա դաշինքի երիտասարդական թվին և անդամներին պաշտերաբար իրենց երկրների մասին միջազգային հանրության ուշադրությանն արժանի տեղեկություններ տեղադրել և փոխանակել:

Եվ, ավարտելով խոսքը, ուզում եմ դիմել ներկաներին. Եթե իմ հաղորդած տեղեկույթը չհամոզեց կամ ճշգրիտ պատկերացում չտվեց ձեզ՝ Դարաբաղի մասին, ապա համոզվեք ինքներդ՝ այցելելով այստեղ: Վստահեցնում եմ, որ դարաբաղյան հյուրախորությունը, նոյնիսկ աղբեջանական համար ջանքերի կիրառման պայմաններում, դեռ ոչ մեկին չի հաջողվել հերթել:

Ծնորհակալություն ուշադրության համար:



THE YOUTH, PIONEERS IN THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF SOUTH TYROL?

Christoph Mitterhofer
Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, South Tyrol

If you look up the word self-determination in a thesaurus, you will immediately see that this word means more than it seems. Self-determination is mentioned in the same breath as the words independence, personal responsibility, maturity and self-responsibility. Only now it is clear what a high significance this word has, especially in connection with independence movements throughout Europe. Entire regions and whole nations in Europe are striving for independence so that they can drop the shackles of old systems and develop freely, according to their own needs. In Scotland and Catalonia self-determination is *the* political issue. It raised by the economic turmoil and the inability of state governments to respond to the needs of their regions. In South Tyrol too a part of the population has been fighting for the independence of this territory and its secession from the Italian state for years.

DIE JUGEND, VORREITER FÜR DIE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG SÜDTIROLS?

Christoph Mitterhofer
Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Süd-Tirol

Sucht man in einem Synonym Wörterbuch nach dem Wort Selbstbestimmung, wird eines sofort klar, das Wort bedeutet mehr als es den Anschein hat. Selbstbestimmung wird in einem Zug genannt mit den Wörtern Unabhängigkeit, Eigenverantwortung, Mündigkeit und Selbstverantwortung. Erst jetzt wird einem deutlich welche Aussagekraft dieses Wort hat, überhaupt in Zusammenhang mit den Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen in ganz Europa. Ganze Regionen bzw. ganze Völker streben in Europa nach der Selbstständigkeit, um die Fesseln alter Systeme abzulegen und um sich frei entfalten zu können, nach ihren Bedürfnissen. In Schottland und Katalonien ist die Selbstbestimmung das politische Thema schlechthin. Wirtschaftliche Turbulenzen und Unfähigkeit der Regierung auf die Bedürfnisse seiner Regionen einzugehen, fachte diese Thematik an. Auch das Land Südtirol kämpft seit Jahren für seine Unabhängigkeit und die Lösung vom italienischen Staat.

During the last years in particular, the youth has started to become more interested in politics and has started putting the focus on self-determination. The majority of young people have become more open-minded, and they think that the current autonomy system, which implies South Tyrol's dependence on Italy, cannot be the end of the development of our region. The concept of the nation-state is increasingly giving way to the idea of regional identities in a united Europe. The youth movement in the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit is particularly strong. Our movement is called "Junge Süd-Tiroler Freiheit", and its members are under 30 years old. After the elections of the South Tyrolean Parliament in 2008, Sven Knoll, at the time 28 years old, was the youngest member of the entire Parliament. Since then, the number of young people active in the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit has steadily increased. Both direct connection and the direct dialogue with young people not active in politics is very important for the Junge Süd-Tiroler Freiheit. Before the elections to the South Tyrolean Parliament in 2013, our youth movement organised a region-wide tour of nightclubs. A specially produced non-alcoholic beer was distributed to the young people so it was easy to get talking with them.

In the municipal elections in 2015 a great deal of the candidates of the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit were young people under 30 years, around 44%! With a share of 47 percent of the candidates not being older than 35 years, it shows that, contrary to the prevailing opinion of the South Tyrolean media, disenchantment with politics is not an issue, at least to the Junge Süd-Tiroler Freiheit. The average age of the members of the entire movement is 39. Approximately 10 percent of these members have not reached the age of 18 years.

The issue of self-determination is well accepted by the youth, compared to the past years, due to their better level of knowledge and their higher level of education. In South Tyrol the majority of young people have graduated from at least high school and subsequently these people go on to either study or work. However, we should not assume that a graduated person is automatically in favour of self-determination. Very often, education at home by parents takes a big impact. Throughout one's whole life one is accompanied by the values provided by parents during childhood. In addition, there are personal experiences by which personal views are affected. Thanks to the freedom of movement and cheap travel, the youth is able to experience other places, cultures and political systems. In doing so, young people's horizons are broadened and they subsequently

In den letzten Jahren hat vor allem die Jugend angefangen, sich wieder vermehrt politisch zu interessieren und steht dem Thema Selbstbestimmung offen gegenüber. Die derzeitige Autonomie, die die Abhängigkeit Südtirols von Italien bedeutet, kann nicht der Endpunkt der Entwicklung sein, sind sich viele Jugendliche überzeugt. Die Idee des Nationalstaates weicht immer mehr der Idee einer regionalen Identität in einem vereinten Europa. Besonders stark ist die Jugendbewegung in der Süd-Tiroler Freiheit. Sie nennt sich Junge Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, und ihre Mitglieder sind unter 30 Jahre alt. Nach den Landtagswahlen 2008 stellte die Bewegung mit Sven Knoll, damals 28 Jahre, den jüngsten Abgeordneten des gesamten Landtages. Die Anzahl der aktiven Jugendlichen in der Süd-Tiroler Freiheit ist seitdem konstant angestiegen. Der direkte Kontakt und das direkte Gespräch mit jenen Jugendlichen, die nicht in der Politik aktiv dabei sind, ist der Jungen Süd-Tiroler Freiheit ein großes Anliegen. Vor den Landtagswahlen 2013 organisierte sie eine landesweite Diskotour, auf der sie ein eigens produziertes alkoholfreies Bier verteilte und so mit den Jugendlichen leicht ins Gespräch kam.

Bei den Gemeinderatswahlen 2015 waren der Großteil der Kandidaten der Süd-Tiroler Freiheit Jugendliche unter 30 Jahren, das sind ganze 44,24 Prozent! Mit einem Anteil von 47 Prozent der Kandidaten, die nicht älter als 35 Jahre waren (insgesamt 66), wird klar, dass, entgegen der vorherrschenden Meinung der Südtiroler Medien, zumindest in der Süd-Tiroler Freiheit das Problem der viel zitierten politikverdrossenen Jugend nicht existiert. Das Durchschnittsalter der Bewegung beträgt laut Mitgliederstatistik 39,09 Jahre. Zirka 10 Prozent der Mitglieder haben das 18. Lebensjahr noch nicht erreicht.

Dass das Thema Selbstbestimmung bei der Jugend gut ankommt, dürfte, im Vergleich zu früher, ihrem besseren Wissensstand und höheren Bildungsgrad geschuldet sein. In Südtirol absolviert ein Großteil der Jugend mindestens die mittlere Reife und geht danach entweder studieren oder begibt sich in die Berufswelt. Jedoch darf man nicht verallgemeinern, dass ein Akademiker durch seinen Bildungsgrad automatisch ein Befürworter der Selbstbestimmung ist. Vielmehr ist es die Erziehung, die einen großen Einfluss nimmt. Die Werte, die man als Kind von seinen Eltern vermittelte bekam, begleiten einen auch als Jugendlichen durchs Leben. Hinzukommen persönliche Erfahrungen, die wiederum auf die persönlichen Ansichten Einfluss nehmen. Die Reisefreiheit und das einfache bzw. günstige Umrunden der Erde ermöglichen es der Jugend,

start questioning certain conventions. To move boundaries is no longer impossible, including in South Tyrol. Young people have become more eager to try out new things, more mature and more critical of the established system. The young people will not dissuade from their visions and ideas that are quite well thought. The concept of "Heimat", i.e. of identifying oneself with the place and its roots where one lives, is today more important to the youth than it was two decades ago. The patriotic youth is, by using democratic and peaceful means, ready to fight for a Europe of free peoples, peoples living in mutual harmony and respect, peoples exchanging and tolerating one another, making use of synergies instead of poisoning one another diplomatically. These young people do not want to move towards one European homogenous mass. They want to emphasize the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical individuality of everyone's own region. Together with the other regions, a colorful European diversity rises. In the future the young adults see themselves as European citizens, not tied to nationalities, but based on regional identities. They have the vision of a federal union of Europe, built on the strengths of its peoples and freed from the domination of certain world powers. The basis for this model is once more the self-determination, and this starts on a small scale, namely in one's own region.

In South Tyrol, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP – the South Tyrolean People's Party), the Italian parties and the Greens have set themselves the task to erect barriers against self-determination for this region. In doing so, they gain support from the regional media. This was particularly the case when the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit in the summer and autumn of 2013 conducted a self-administered referendum on self-determination. It turned out that about 90 percent of the voters agreed that the right to self-determination should be applied to the South Tyrol. The participation rate in the referendum was 15% of the electorate, or about 60,000 out of 400,000 registered voters. At first appearance, this result, which was not binding, seems to be rather low. However, it must be remembered that, unlike in Scotland and Catalonia, self-determination in South Tyrol is not supported by the mainstream parties. People were even instructed to boycott the referendum! The affiliation of South Tyrol to Italy has been accepted by the Südtiroler Volkspartei, because by this status the retention of the party's power is guaranteed. When it comes to self-determination, fears are fuelled because in case of secession the peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups is supposed to be at stake. In addition, it is alleged that the secession is provincial selfishness and leads into the abyss and into chaos.

andere Orte, Kulturen und Systeme zu erleben und zu entdecken. Dies erweitert auch den geistigen Horizont und lässt es zu, dass manche Konventionen in Frage gestellt werden. Grenzverschiebungen werden nicht mehr für unmöglich gehalten, auch in Südtirol. Die Jugend ist experimentierfreudiger als früher, mündiger und systemkritischer. Sie lässt sich von ihren Visionen und Ideen, die durchaus gut durchdacht sind, nicht abbringen. Dem Begriff der Heimat misst die Jugend eine höhere Bedeutung bei, als sie es noch vor zwei Jahrzehnten tat. Die patriotische Jugend ist bereit zu kämpfen – mit demokratischen und friedlichen Mitteln für ein Europa der freien Völker, die im gegenseitigen Einklang und Respekt leben, sich gegenseitig austauschen und tolerieren und Synergien nutzen, anstatt sich diplomatisch gegenseitig zu vergiften. Man will nicht hin zu einem europäischen Einheitsbrei, man will die ethnische, kulturelle, sprachliche und historische Individualität seiner Region herausstreichen. Gemeinsam mit den anderen Regionen ergibt sich eine bunte europäische Vielfalt. Die jungen Erwachsenen sehen sich in Zukunft als Bürger Europas, nicht gefesselt an Nationalitäten, sondern auf der Grundlage der eigenen regionalen Identität. Man hegt die Vision von einer föderalistischen Union Europas, geflochten aus den Stärken seiner Völker und befreit von der Vorherrschaft von bestimmten Weltmächten. Die Grundlage für dieses Modell ist einmal mehr die Selbstbestimmung, und diese fängt im Kleinen an, also in der eigenen Region.

In Südtirol haben es sich die Südtiroler Volkspartei, die italienischen Parteien und die Grünen zur Aufgabe gemacht, die Selbstbestimmung für Südtirol schlechtzureden. Von den Südtiroler Medien werden sie dabei gerne unterstützt. Dies war besonders dann der Fall, als die Süd-Tiroler Freiheit im Sommer und Herbst des Jahres 2013 ihr selbst verwaltetes Selbstbestimmungsreferendum durchzog. Über 90 Prozent der Befragten haben sich dafür ausgesprochen, dass in Südtirol das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung zur Anwendung kommen solle. Die Beteiligung am Referendum lag bei 15 % – in Zahlen sind dies ca. 60.000 von ca. 400.000 wahlberechtigten Personen. Auf den ersten Blick scheint dieses Ergebnis, das nicht bindend war, zwar niedrig zu sein. Doch es muss daran erinnert werden, dass im Gegensatz zu Schottland und Katalonien die Selbstbestimmung in Südtirol von der offiziellen Südtiroler Politik nicht unterstützt wird. Diese hatte sogar zum Boykott des Referendums aufgerufen. Mit dem Verbleib Südtirols bei Italien hat sich die Südtiroler Volkspartei längst abgefunden, denn dieser garantiert ihr den eigenen Machterhalt. In Sachen Selbstbestimmung werden Ängste geschürt, denn

On the other hand, they say that South Tyrol is too small to govern itself, and that the reunification of the Tyrol is merely fantasy of diehards.

The defamation of the self-determination movement was also a popular strategy in the past. Eva Klotz, the central figure of the movement, had to endure ridicule in the 1970s. She was called a political fool by the Südtiroler Volkspartei. From the Italian side, she was often asked to leave the country and emigrate to Austria. However, today the situation is not that blatant, but still the South Tyrolean media regularly report that the affiliation of South Tyrol to Italy has a lot of benefits whereas self-determination is presented as an issue posing a risk in every perspective. The fact that the real danger is Italy, remains unmentioned. In recent years, Italy has broken important provisions of the Statute of Autonomy, for example financial and commercial laws, law of apprentices, and the giving of place names. This is glossed over by the responsible politicians and accordingly by the media. Objective reporting is provided only outside the South Tyrolean 'mainstream media' and on some Internet portals.

The free medium Internet and therefore also the social media have become popular means of communication. In South Tyrol these are used most intensely by the Südtiroler Freiheit. The movement is very committed to constantly updating its own website with press releases, letters to the editor, the announcement of events and sharing them on Facebook and Twitter. The number of "Likes" on the Facebook fan page of the Südtiroler Freiheit now amounts to over 10,000, and many of our fans live outside of South Tyrol.

Thanks to the modern media, also the Junge Süd-Tiroler Freiheit can expand and maintain its international contacts. The stage for a Europewide network of young people striving for self-determination has been set. They all have something in common: Everyone of them is following the path of regionalism in an international context, and everyone can feel the new and unifying power of modern European patriotism.

eine womögliche Sezession setzt angeblich das friedliche Zusammenleben der Volksgruppen aufs Spiel. Auch wird der Vorwurf erhoben, dass die Sezession provinzieller Egoismus sei und in den Abgrund und ins Chaos führen würde. Andererseits heißt es, Südtirol sei zu klein, um sich selbst zu verwalten, und die Wiedervereinigung Tirols sei lediglich ein Hirngespinst von Ewigestrigen.

Die Diffamierung der Selbstbestimmungsbewegung war auch in der Vergangenheit ein beliebtes Mittel. Eva Klotz, die zentrale Figur der Bewegung, musste schon in den 1970er Jahren Spott und Hohn über sich ergehen lassen. Sie wurde von der Südtiroler Volkspartei als politische Nährin bezeichnet. Von italienischer Seite wurde sie oft aufgefordert, nach Österreich auszuwandern. So krass ist es heute zwar nicht mehr, aber dennoch berichten die Südtiroler Medien kontinuierlich, dass die Zugehörigkeit Südtirols zu Italien eine Reihe von Vorteilen habe, während von der Selbstbestimmung in jeder Hinsicht eine Gefahr ausgehe. Dass die eigentliche Gefahr jedoch Italien lautet, bleibt gerne unerwähnt. Dass Italien besonders in den letzten Jahren wichtige Bestimmungen des Autonomiestatuts (z. B. Finanzen, Handelsgesetz, Lehrlingsgesetz, Ortsnamengebung) bricht, wird von den verantwortlichen Politikern und entsprechend von den Medien schönergedet. Objektive Berichterstattung wird einem nur außerhalb der Südtiroler „Mainstream-Medien“ und in manchen Internetportalen geboten.

Das freie Medium Internet bzw. die sozialen Medien sind zu beliebten Kommunikationsmitteln geworden, die in Süd-Tirol am intensivsten von der Süd-Tiroler Freiheit genutzt werden. Die Bewegung ist sehr bemüht, Ihre Internetseite laufend mit Pressemitteilungen, Leserbriefe und Veranstaltungshinweisen zu aktualisieren und über Facebook und Twitter weiterzuverteilen. Die Anzahl der Fans auf der Facebook-Seite der Süd-Tiroler Freiheit beläuft sich mittlerweile auf über 10.000, und viele dieser Fans leben außerhalb von Südtirol.

Geraude dank der modernen Medien kann auch die Junge Süd-Tiroler Freiheit ihre internationalen Kontakte weiter ausbauen und besser pflegen. Die Weichen für ein europaweites Netzwerk der jugendlichen Selbstbestimmungsbefürworter sind bereits gestellt. Allen ist gemeinsam, dass sie international regional unterwegs sind, und jeder kann sie spüren: Diese neue, verbindende Kraft des modernen europäischen Patriotismus.

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
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The European Parliament recognized the Centre Maurits Coppieters (CMC) as a Political Foundation at a European Level in 2007. Since then the CMC has developed political research focusing on European issues, also in the fields of multilevel governance, management of cultural and linguistic diversity in complex (multi-national) societies, decentralization, state and constitutional reform, succession of states, conflict resolution and protection of human rights.

So far, every little step has been important to the steady consolidation and growth of the Centre, that's why I'm especially proud of this publication. Indeed, it undoubtedly represents a crucial contribution to the current state of affairs and will certainly have a notorious impact both in the Academia and among European decision makers in a broad sense, including European Institutions (like the European commission, European Parliament, Council and Committee of the Regions), other political actors, think tanks, research centers and contributors to the European integration process.

On behalf of the Centre Maurits Coppieters and our partners I sincerely wish to thank the authors of the report for their groundbreaking approach to the subject and their passionate, conceptually robust and well structured factual presentations.

Finally I also wish to thank you (the reader) for your interest in our organization and for reviewing our modest contribution to a much wider European political debate in this area.

Günther Dauwen
Secretary of Centre Maurits Coppieters
www.ideasforeurope.eu

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According to its general regulations, the Centre Maurits Coppieters asbl-vzw pursues the following objectives and references:

- Observing, analysing and contributing to the debate on European public policy issues with a special focus on the role of nationalist and regionalist movements and the process of European integration;
- Serving as framework for national or regional think tanks, political foundations and academics to work together at European level;
- Gather and manage information for scientific purposes on all nationalist and regionalist movements, organisations, structures,... in all its appearances situated in a European context;
- Making available information to the public on the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in a context of a Europe of the Regions;
- Promoting scientific research on the functioning and the history of all national and regional movements in the EU and making the results public to as many people as possible;
- Developing actions to open information sources and historical information sources in a structured and controlled way with the aim to build a common data network on issues of Nationalism and Regionalism in Europe;
- Maintaining contacts with all organisations who are active in national movements and with the Institutions of the EU;

The Centre Maurits Coppieters asbl-vzw takes all the necessary actions to promote and achieve the higher stated goals always observing the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.

MAURITS COPPIETERS (SINT-NIKLAAS, 1920 – DEINZE, 2005)

The Fleming Maurits Coppieters studied history and later became a Doctor of Laws and obtained a master's degree in East European studies. During the Second World War, he refused to work for the German occupier. After many years as a teacher, he worked as a lawyer for a while. He was one of the people who re-established the Vlaamse Volksbeweging (Flemish People's Movement), of which he was the President from 1957-1963.

Coppieters' political career began when he became a member of the Flemish-nationalist party Volksunie (VU) which was formed in 1954. With the exception of two years, Coppieters was a town councillor between 1964 and 1983. He was also elected as a member of the Belgian Chamber (1965-1971) and Senate (1971-1979). At the same time, Coppieters became President of the newly formed 'Cultuurraad voor de Nederlandstalige Cultuurge-meenschap' (Cultural Council for the Dutch-speaking Community, from which later the Flemish Parliament emanated), when the VU formed part of the government. In 1979, Coppieters was moreover elected during the first direct elections for the European Parliament.

As a regionalist, he became a member of the Group for Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Groupings and Members in the European Parliament (TCDI). Among other things, he made a name for himself when he championed the cause of the Corsicans. In the meantime, Coppieters also played a pioneering role in the formation of the European Free Alliance, of which he became the Honorary President and in whose expansion he continued to play a role, even after he said farewell to active politics in 1981. In 1996, Coppieters joined forces with the president of the Flemish Parliament, Norbert De Batselier, to promote 'Het Sienjaal', a project with a view to achieve political revival beyond the party boundaries. Coppieters died on November 11, 2005.

Among other things, Coppieters was the author of: '*Het jaar van de Klaproos*'; '*Ik was een Europees Parlementslid*'; '*De Schone en het Beest*'. He is Honorary member of the EFA.

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Colophon CMC publications, 11

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www.ideasforeurope.eu

Publication date

2015

Publication series and number

CMC publications 11

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Graphics and Layout

Wils&Peeters - Lier

Printing

Drukkerij De Bie - Duffel

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